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Roadmaps and roadblocks in
Nepal
By Deepak Thapa
KATHMANDU - It was
with a collective sigh of relief that Nepalis greeted
the news, on the evening of July 31, that the Communist
Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) had agreed to continue
negotiations with the government. The announcement by
the rebels came after nearly three weeks of an
increasingly tense situation which saw contact between
the two sides limited to correspondence, the tenor of
which had worsened with each exchange.
A formal
invitation for a third round of talks had been sent on
July 13 by the government to the CPN-M negotiating team.
The last time the rebels had met the government was on
May 9 of this year. In the meantime, the political
parties, which had been calling on King Gyanendra to
reinstate parliament - dissolved since May 2002 - and
form an all-party government, had begun a "people's
movement" against the king's "retrogressive" actions
since October 2002, when the monarch dismissed the
elected prime minister and assumed executive authority.
Bowing to public sentiment, the then prime
minister, Lokendra Bahadur Chand, had resigned and the
king had appointed Surya Bahadur Thapa in his place in
June. Thapa's appointment went against the general
expectation that the king would work with the political
parties and nominate their chosen candidate, CPN
(Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML) general-secretary,
Madhav Kumar Nepal, to the high office. By bypassing the
parties, the king ensured that the government would
continue to face their non-cooperation. The government
is thus exposed to attacks from two flanks, the
political parties and the Maoists.
The Surya
Bahadur Thapa government took office promising to
maintain continuity in the peace process that had begun
with the January 2003 ceasefire. Accordingly, it had
held six rounds of informal talks with representatives
of the high-level Maoist negotiating team. The Maoist
rebels continued to insist on the government honoring
the commitments made at the second round of talks -
including the release of three of their central
committee leaders, revealing the whereabouts of others
in government custody and, most importantly, limiting
the movement of the army to within five kilometers of
their barracks. The government denied that any agreement
had been reached on the army's movement and insisted
that the Maoists not violate the code of conduct
formulated in March, which included ceasing fund-raising
from the public and abductions.
While the war of
words went on in public, the five members of the Maoist
dialogue team slowly disappeared from public view. The
government had then sent the July 13 invitation in
alarm.
As a response was awaited from the
Maoists, their leadership was believed to be meeting
somewhere in west Nepal. The had closed down their
contact office set up in the capital in April two days
after the office secretary was picked up and grilled on
whether the rebels were backing out of talks. The army
and the police were placed on high alert and road
checkposts that had been gradually phased out over the
months, reappeared. Soldiers and policemen on leave were
asked to report back to duty, and a breakdown of
negotiations seemed all but inevitable.
The
Maoists replied 10 days later insisting that the earlier
agreements be complied with and also demanding that the
king be either directly involved in talks, or else that
he should publicly state that he would abide by any
political resolution the government may reach with the
Maoists. They also wanted any future talks to start
dealing with substantive political issues and not remain
bogged down with procedural matters. On July 25, the
government responded with an undertaking to honor the
earlier agreements, although it reserved rights on the
army's movements.
Two days later, the Maoists
issued an ultimatum in the form of a letter signed by Dr
Baburam Bhattarai, the convener of the Maoist
negotiation team, calling on the "old regime" to prove
its sincerity by fulfilling five demands and creating
"an appropriate environment for talks by July 31". "If
these conditions are met we are ready to sit down for a
third round of talks, but if that does not happen we
will be forced to conclude that the old regime has
unilaterally ended the ceasefire," Bhattarai warned.
The "conditions" were a reiteration of the
demands enumerated as well as a public declaration by
the army that it will adhere to the code of conduct and
also honor any agreement arising from talks. The Maoists
also wanted the five-year counter-terrorism agreement
signed with the US earlier this year annulled, and all
US military advisers and experts expelled from the
country.
The ball was now in the government's
court and it showed a measure of flexibility by
releasing three CPN-M central committee members. The
government also dealt with the issues raised in
Bhattarai's letter and provided an item-wise reply,
which proved sufficient as a demonstration of good faith
for the Maoists and the CPN-M chairman, Prachanda,
announced, on July 31, that he had instructed his
negotiating team to proceed with the talks. He also
asked the government to include the political parties in
the dialogue process in future.
There are
expectations that the next round of talks will be held
within a week or so. But problems persist, since the
political parties, which have boycotted the government,
have already made it clear that there will be no
cooperation with "the two armies" unless their demands -
including the restoration of parliament - are first
fulfilled. And without their participation, any
settlement reached will be sorely lacking in legitimacy.
Therein lies the challenge for Nepal.
Deepak
Thapa is a Kathmandu-based journalist and editor
Published with permission from the South
Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
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