| |
India can lower the border barrier with
China
By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - The recent Chinese intrusions into
the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh underscore the
need for Delhi to afford more urgency to the delineation
of its disputed frontier with Beijing.
Although
officials from both sides have met about 15 times over
the past two decades to discuss the border, progress has
been painfully slow. The two sides have so far exchanged
maps only in the middle sector, the least contentious of
the three sectors. Beijing and Delhi lay claim to huge
chunks of territory in the eastern and western sectors
of their disputed border.
India lays claim to
around 38,000 square kilometers of land occupied by
China in the icy and barren Aksai Chin plateau on the
western stretch of the border. In addition, India
accuses Beijing of illegally holding 5,180 square
kilometers of land in Jammu and Kashmir ceded to it by
Pakistan in 1963.
China lays claim to around
90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory on the
southern slope of the eastern wing of the Himalayas.
This roughly corresponds to the State of Arunachal
Pradesh. It is here that Chinese intrusions into India
were reported recently. Denying the report, China
clarified that it did not recognize Arunachal Pradesh as
part of India.
China has in the past suggested
an "east-west swap" to resolve the border dispute. Under
this swap, China would give up its claims in the eastern
sector recognizing India's sovereignty over that chunk
of territory. In return, India would have to give up its
claims on the Aksai Chin, recognizing Chinese
sovereignty over that area. The logic behind the swap is
that the Aksai Chin being of strategic importance to
China's control over Tibet and the southern slopes on
the eastern sector being critical to India's control
over its restive states in the Northeast, an "east-west
tradeoff", in addition to resolving the tricky part of
the border dispute would address the vital security
concerns of both countries.
Both in 1960 and
1980 when the Chinese put forward the swap proposal,
India turned it down. In 1960, the Indian leadership was
deeply aggrieved with the way the Chinese had seized
Indian land in Aksai Chin. To accept the swap would have
meant accepting the seizure of Indian land. After the
1962 war, accepting this became even harder.
The
general feeling among decision makers here was that
acceptance of the swap would entail concessions only on
the part of Delhi. Explaining the Indian position on the
swap, John W Carver writes in his book Protracted
Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth
Century that India felt it "would be making a major
concession by relinquishing land in the western sector
which rightfully belonged to it but which had been
stolen by China. China would gain that land and give up
nothing, since it had never administered the southern
slope, while India's claim and de facto administration
of that region was incontrovertible. India had not
occupied any Chinese territory, nor did it claim any
Chinese territory. It did not make sense to suggest that
India relinquish some of its own territory in China in
order to get China to drop its claim to other pieces of
Indian territory. A more earthy way of saying this was
formulated by one of India's leading legal experts on
the Indian-Chinese border dispute: If a thief breaks
into your house and steals your coat and your wallet,
you don't say to him that he can have the coat if he
returns the wallet. You expect him to return all that he
has stolen from you."
The Chinese have not
offered the swap since 1980. Moreover, there has been a
significant shift in their position thereafter. For one,
they started asserting claims in the eastern sector,
which had been downplayed hitherto. During the sixth
round of talks in October 1985, Chinese negotiators
pressed claims in the eastern sector. The following
year, serious clashes broke out between the two
countries in the Sumdurong Chu. India saw this as an
attempt by China to assert its new claims in the eastern
sector. Since then, there have been several intrusions
by the Chinese into Arunachal.
Why the shift in
the Chinese position? Why was the swap not offered in
the 1990s and thereafter? A part of the explanation lies
in the declining value of the Aksai Chin in Chinese
strategy. Control over Aksai Chin was very important for
China's control over Tibet, especially in the 1950s and
1960s. The strategic importance of the Aksai Chin to
China in that period must be seen in the context of
Beijing's deployment of tens of thousands of officials
and troops in Tibet and the need to keep them supplied
with food, equipment, fuel etc. Of the three main routes
into Tibet from the rest of China, the one crossing the
Aksai Chin was the most convenient as the terrain
through which it ran was the least rugged and unlikely
to be blocked by snowfall.
A number of factors
resulted in the Aksai Chin road becoming less important
to China in the 1980s and 1990s. These include Beijing's
success in quelling the Tibetan uprising and bringing
Tibet under its iron grip, the building of a robust
transport network into Tibet, and the crushing defeat it
imposed on India in 1962.
Some analysts believe
that with Aksai Chin's value to its Tibet strategy
declining, the swap proposal was put in cold storage. A
more confident China now saw more gains in adopting
India's approach to the border dispute - independent,
non-linked treatment of each sector, for it gave the
Chinese room to push for maximum in all sectors.
Another section of analysts believe that Aksai
Chin remains vital to Chinese strategy and that China's
mounting pressure on India in the eastern sector is to
push Delhi to concede Chinese claims over the Aksai
Chin. It is also aimed at making clear to India that
China does have claims in the eastern sector and would
therefore be making concessions, too, in the event of a
swap.
Unlike in the past when regaining every
square inch of Indian territory from the Chinese
dominated discussions on the border dispute, there is a
recognition that the border needs to be settled in a
spirit of give and take and that the two countries
should look for a "pragmatic solution".
Increasingly, it appears that the "east-west
trade off' is seen in India as the pragmatic solution.
An influential Indian strategic affairs analyst, Dr C
Raja Mohan, points out that the Aksai Chin for Arunachal
swap "involves a basic assumption that the Himalayas are
a natural boundary between the two countries. In
yielding on Aksai Chin, India would concede Chinese
primacy north of the mountain range. In giving up claims
for Arunachal, China will accept India's control of the
southern slopes of the Himalayas. This realistic
settlement has been there for the taking for a long
time. But a peculiar mindset about China had gripped
India since the late 1950s and led to unsustainable
public posturing on the boundary dispute and an
unwillingness to come to terms with the reality."
During Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's
visit to China, the two countries decided to appoint
special representatives "to explore from the political
perspective of bilateral relationship the framework of a
boundary settlement". While India appointed National
Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra, as its special
representative, China appointed Senior Vice Minister Dai
Bingguo.
It has been recognized for some time
now that recourse to historical claims and treaties
cannot resolve the Sino-Indian border dispute. A
negotiated solution it is felt will be possible only
through a decision at the highest political level. With
Mishra's appointment as India's special representative,
the Prime Minister's Office has now taken charge of
exploring a framework for the settlement of the
boundary.
Settling the Sino-Indian border is
facilitated by the fact that it runs through largely
unpopulated areas. A settlement of the border will not
involve resettlement of populations. Besides, no third
parties are involved.
The question is whether
the government will be able to sell a border settlement
involving a swap. Raja Mohan observes, "India as a whole
has largely overcome the trauma of 1962 and is looking
outward with much greater self-confidence. With the
business community now tantalized by the prospects in
the China market, Mr Vajpayee is now in a position to
successfully sell a boundary settlement to the Indian
people."
As for the political parties, the left
will not oppose any settlement with China. The Congress
Party is unlikely to oppose a reasonable settlement.
Opposition if any will be from the ruling Bharatiya
Janata Party's (BJP) own right-wing fraternal
organizations.
The recent Chinese intrusions in
Arunachal did evoke outrage in India. But while cries of
Chinese "perfidy" dominated newspaper reports and
television discussion, there was a simultaneous
acknowledgement that the incident took place because of
the absence of a clearly demarcated border. Whether or
not the Chinese are perfidious, the absence of a
mutually accepted border will give rise to such
intrusions in future as well. That underscores the need
for the two countries to reach a quick settlement.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
