| |
Musharraf's army breaking
ranks By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Ever since its creation
in 1947, Pakistan's political landscape has been
characterized by the military's deep involvement, be it
through direct intervention and the imposition of
martial law, or
through behind-the-scenes manipulation of civilian
governments.
The
present administration is no exception. President
General Pervez Musharraf came to power in October 1999
through a bloodless coup that deposed the elected
government of Nawaz
Sharif. National
elections have subsequently been held, although
Musharraf effectively still wields power through his
presidency and as chief of army staff.
However,
the army's role in politics has been dramatically shaped
by the unprecedented events of September 11, 2001. The
army under Musharraf has been forced, because of the
global fallout from the terrorist attacks on the United
States, to make decisions that have seriously split the
armed forces.
Well-placed sources within the
army have revealed to Asia Times Online that recently
several top officers have been arrested. These arrests
have been kept secret as no charges have been laid. The
officers, according to the sources, were seized after
being fingered by agents of the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) as probably having links with
international Islamic militants.
The FBI has
been given a free hand to interrogate the officers at
its cell in the capital, Islamabad, or at any other
location of its choosing in order to establish ties
between the officers and militant networks.
Asia
Times Online investigations have established the names
of two of those arrested: Assistant Adjutant-General and
Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Khalid Abbassi
(posted in Kohat, North-West Frontier Province) and one
Major Atta.
The investigations show that neither
the family of the officers nor their subordinates know
where they are being detained. Senior officers in the
army, when contacted by this correspondent, remained
tight lipped and their advice was, "stay away from this
matter".
Further investigations reveal that
Abbassi is a widely-respected officer in signals, and
that he is also a very religious person. Apparently, he
delivered lessons from the Koran every day to his junior
officers, a trend that was encouraged by former dictator
General Zia ul-Haq in the army, and which is still
common nowadays.
The army's
about-turn The Pakistani army, largely through
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as part of its
strategic vision for the region actively supported and
promoted the Taliban in its formation and ultimate
seizure of power in Afghanistan in 1996. As a result,
many of Pakistan's top brass are familiar with senior
Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. Notably, the former
director general of the ISI, Lieutenant-General
(retired) Mehmood Ahmed, was close to Taliban leader
Mullah Omar. Mehmood Ahmed is now managing director of
Fauji Fertilizers Company, where a number of former army
officers also work.
It is an open secret in
Washington now that a delegation of senior Pakistani
army officers, sent to Afghanistan prior to the US
invasion ostensibly to convince the Taliban to step
down, actually spent their time instructing the Taliban
on how to protect their weapons from the impending US
aerial bombing.
With the rapid retreat of the
Taliban from Afghanistan, though, and in the face of
tough Washington pressure to join in the global "war on
terror", Musharraf had little choice but to throw in his
hat as an ally of the US. This had two immediate
effects: it disenchanted a large section of the
military-security apparatus, and it paved the way for US
intelligence to muscle into internal Pakistani affairs,
which further upset those within the military-security
establishment.
Initially, the FBI was allowed to
set up small cells in the operations offices of the ISI,
and ISI officials were attached to these cells. However,
the FBI was able to decide on its own targets, and it
delegated specific assignments to ISI officials, but
under FBI surveillance.
Lately, the FBI has been
given separate premises all over the country, and its
own separate teams of officers, who, with the best
bugging devices in the world, now have maximum access to
Pakistan's telecommunications system.
This kind
of access means that the FBI is now privy to much of the
information that the Pakistan army has, which has led to
the Americans being able to nip in the bud a number of
attempts by the ISI to re-establish its presence in
Afghanistan through local commanders of the
Hezb-I-Islami of warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, now a key
player in the Afghan resistance movement.
Call to prayer When General Zia ul-Haq
was president and the chief of army staff in the late
1970s and early 1980s, he encouraged his officers to say
their prayers five times a day (as is customary in
Muslim society), and those who did so were looked on
favorably when promotion time came around. Indeed, it
became essential that anyone seeking a top position in
the army or the ISI displayed the appropriate religious
fervor.
Even better would be if an officer had a
background in the Islami Jamiat-i-Talaba (the student
wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami, the premier fundamentalist
party). Such a connection led to the emergence of the
likes of Lieutenant-General Hameed Gul, Brigadier Imtiaz
and dozens of others who made their names in political
operations in favor of Islamic parties or in launching
conspiracies to unseat secular parties, such as the
Pakistan People's Party of twice premier Benazir Bhutto.
Even after his death in an airplane crash on
August 17, 1988, people have been careful to at least
pay lip service to Zia's legacy. Musharraf himself, a
relative liberal compared to the former dictator,
commented in an interview a few years ago in which he
praised Zia's policies that, "He was a patriot and was a
very God-fearing person."
But times have
changed. After taking over from Sharif, Musharraf placed
a team of religious zealots in all prominent positions.
Now he is reversing that trend and is ditching many
stalwarts in favor of new, more flexible, faces - faces
that are presumably more acceptable to the US.
This has not been without severe backlash. Three
known assassination plots have been hatched against the
general, but he has remained undeterred; in fact, moves
to rid the services of religious-minded officers have
gathered pace, and many have been given their marching
orders or passed over for promotion.
It is no
coincidence, then, that the Jamaat-i-Islami is
championing, with grim determination, a drive to have
Musharraf step down as head of the army. With its
historically close connections to so many within the
forces, Jamaat's move can only be seen as a signal from
within the now bitterly divided armed forces.
And the latest news of Musharraf's willingness
to send 10,000 troops to northern Iraq (the Kurdish
regions only) further aggravates the situation, as this
is strongly opposed by many within the army who foresee
Pakistanis as being used as cannon fodder by the US.
The actual departure of the troops, then, could
be the final straw for Musharraf, who has earned
vengeful and powerful enemies in uniforms as a result of
forcing the army to march to his own beat.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|