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The down side of cozying up to
Israel
By B Raman
A possible
consequence of the current four-day high-profile visit
of Ariel Sharon, the Israeli prime minister, to India
could be an increase in the frequency and intensity of
jihadi terrorist strikes in Indian territory.
Some analysts have criticized the visit because
of their misgivings about its likely impact on India's
relations with the Arab world in general and the
Palestinians in particular. I am not unduly concerned
over it. Most countries of the Arab world, barring
Saddam Hussein's Iraq, were ambivalent on the role of
Pakistan in sponsoring and nourishing jihadi terrorism
in Indian territory. Saudi Arabia and some of the other
Gulf countries have been turning a blind eye to the
activities of anti-India jihadi organizations, such as
the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), a member of Osama bin Laden's
International Islamic Front (IIF), from their territory.
Saudi Arabia has been an important source of funds to
the pan-Islamic and pro-Wahhabi jihadi organizations.
Even the attitude of Yasser Arafat's Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) to India's complaints of
Pakistani state sponsorship of jihadi terrorism has been
less than forthcoming.
I, therefore, see no
reason why India should be unnecessarily sensitive to
the feelings and concerns of the Arab countries and the
Palestinians over the visit. But I am concerned over its
likely impact on the feelings and concerns of India's
own Muslim minority and its provocative effect on the
Pakistan-based jihadi organizations and bin Laden's IIF,
of which they are members.
Large sections of the
Islamic ummah - the common people and not necessarily
their rulers - view the US and Israel as anti-Islam.
They consider the US anti-Islam because of its support
to Israel. That was why al-Qaeda and the other 12 jihadi
organizations, which are members of the IIF, call it the
International Islamic Front for Jihad against the
Crusaders and the Jewish people - popularly known as the
International Islamic Front for Jihad against the US and
Israel.
For some years now, the five Pakistani
organizations which are members of the IIF have been
demanding that the IIF should be re-named as the
International Islamic Front for Jihad against the
Crusaders, the Jewish People and the Hindus. In other
words, the International Islamic Front for Jihad against
the US, Israel and India. But their demand was not
accepted because the jihadi organizations from Egypt,
the Central Asian Republics and the southern Philippines
made it clear that they did not look on India as
anti-Islam.
That was before the anti-Muslim
riots in Gujarat last year. One does not know whether
there has been any change in their attitude since then.
Past statements purported to be of bin Laden were mainly
directed at the US and Israel and generally avoided any
reference to India, but one of his statements issued
late last year cited the alleged US support to India on
the Kashmir issue as one of the reasons for the Muslim
anger against the US. At the same time, it avoided a
direct attack on India.
At a time when there are
indications that the IIF might succumb to pressure from
its Pakistani components and step up its rhetoric and
operations against India, was it wise to have programmed
this high-profile visit and talk from the rooftop about
India's counter-terrorism cooperation with Israel?
Counter-terrorism cooperation with Israel did
not start yesterday. It has been there for years, but it
remained stealthy and unpublicized. For very valid
reasons. Hype about such cooperation creates misgivings
in the minds of our own Muslim minority, many of whom
share the perception of Israel as anti-Muslim, and could
add to the pockets of anger against India's government
in India's Muslim community. It could also act as
another element of provocation to the jihadi terrorists
aligned with bin Laden in the IIF.
For years, I
have been a strong advocate of counter-terrorism
cooperation with Israel - but covertly and with our feet
firmly on the ground instead of our trying to fly up
above the sky with all sorts of romanticized ideas of
the wonders such cooperation could perform in our fight
against jihadi terrorism.
Counter-terrorism
cooperation means sharing of the intelligence collected
separately by the agencies of each country; collection
of intelligence through joint human intelligence
(HUMINT) and technical intelligence (TECHINT)
operations; sharing of analyses and assessments; sharing
of technical expertise and gadgetry; and joint covert
actions in foreign territory to neutralize terrorists
and their infrastructure.
While we should
welcome unpublicized counter-terrorism cooperation in
areas in which it would be in our national interest,
there would be limitations to such cooperation due to
the following reasons:
Lack of convergence of
perceptions regarding terrorist adversaries. For Israel,
the main terrorist adversaries are Hamas, the al-Aqsa
Martyrs' Brigade of the PLO, the al-Jihad, the Hezbollah
etc. Most of its efforts and resources are devoted to
covering their activities. None of them are the
terrorist adversaries of India. Hence, intelligence
about their activities coming from Israel would be of
little use in safeguarding our national security. For
India, the main foreign terrorist adversaries are the
Pakistani jihadi organizations such as the LET, which
also pose a threat to Israeli lives and interests. It
would therefore welcome intelligence from us on their
activities since it is not in a position presently to
devote adequate attention and resources for covering
their activities. Thus, there would be a greater flow of
useful intelligence from India to Israel than vice
versa.
There are also asymmetries in the
counter-terrorism policies of the two countries. In
Israel, the army plays the leadership role in
counter-terrorism and their response is based on the use
of overwhelming - often disproportionate - military
force against the terrorists. In our country, the army
has an important role in counter-terrorism in Jammu and
Kashmir only because of the involvement of a large
number of Pakistanis. It also plays a limited role in
the northeast. In other states, the police play the
leadership role.
India faces domestic as well as
foreign-sponsored terrorism. Even foreign-sponsored
terrorists use domestic terrorists as their surrogates.
We, therefore, make a distinction in our response
between the foreign-sponsored and the domestic
terrorists. Ruthlessness against the foreign and
reasonable and appropriate force against the domestic
terrorists are our principles. In addition, in our
response to domestic terrorism, we also stress aspects
such as better governance, sensitivity to the feelings
of the minorities, better policing, better law
enforcement etc. Israel only reluctantly admits that the
Palestinians are indigenous people, sons of the soil. It
looks on all Palestinian terrorist groups as
foreign-sponsored and acts against them with
ruthlessness unmindful of the effect of its policies on
its own Muslim minority. Aspects such as better
governance etc mentioned above play no role in Israel's
counter-terrorism policies.
While encouraging
greater interactions between the counter-terrorism
experts of the two countries, we must ensure that our
officials do not become as insensitive in their
responses as the Israelis often are. There are in our
country many admirers of Israel's strong-arm
counter-terrorism methods, based on an overwhelming use
of the military, but they do not notice that despite
over 30 years of the use of such methods, Israel is
nowhere near solving the problem of terrorism.
There are some aspects of counter-terrorism in
which India can greatly benefit from Israel. These are
techniques of counter-terrorism analysis and assessment,
collection and analysis of TECHINT, including cyber
intelligence, techniques of penetration of terrorist
organizations, physical security, terrorism crisis
management etc. The emphasis should be on them.
B Raman is Additional Secretary (ret),
Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, and presently
director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai; former
member of the National Security Advisory Board of the
Government of India. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com. He was also head of
the counter-terrorism division of the Research &
Analysis Wing, India's external intelligence agency,
from 1988 to August, 1994.)
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