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South Asia

Inherent dangers in an 'Asian NATO'
By Stephen Blank

During the summer it was revealed that India and the United States were conducting discussions about a potential "Asian NATO", along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Presumably, Washington also was conducting discussions with its other allies in Asia: Japan, Australia and South Korea. But surprisingly little has been reported about what would clearly be a major development in Asian security. We may surmise that this alliance is publicly intended to be against terrorism on a global scale. But the effort to build such an alliance system is bound to raise serious issues, and difficult problems.

For example, India is a strategic partner of the US, but clearly not an ally, at least in any formal sense. If India were to join this Asian NATO, it would mark a sea change in its foreign and defense policies as India has always espoused self-reliance and non-alignment. Nevertheless, major changes may be in the offing. In the "war on terrorism", American forces have access to Indian bases as needed and India has strongly supported the use of Diego Garcia and the base at Trincomalee in Sri Lanka as US bases.

Moreover, India and the US are conducting an expanding number of joint exercises involving all of each nation's military services. These military exercises are part of a larger program of regular high-level contacts and strategic dialogues that also include high-level discussions on missile defenses. Likewise, there are growing indications of US support for substantially greater technology transfer and arms sales to India. These also take the form of support for third party sales, like the imminent formal Israeli announcement of the sale of the Phalcon radar - that resembles AWACS - to India. India also clearly is interested in buying the jointly produced US-Israeli Arrow missile defense system and the accompanying Green Pine radar system.

Similarly, we still do not know what is meant by the term "Asian NATO". While logic tells us that it goes beyond strategic partnership to a more formalized relationship, there is no clarity about what its target is. It could be international terrorism, the containment of Chinese power, or a cover for an expanding American military presence in Northeast, Southeast and South Asia.

Any of these alternatives or a combination thereof is possible. By the same token, if these relationships among the members of this Asian NATO are to become those of a formal alliance, they would logically include many of the same procedures that now characterize the trans-Atlantic alliance: shared defense planning, intelligence, cooperation to a greater degree than had hitherto been the case in a more formalized arms sales and technology transfer program.

Undoubtedly there would be formalized agreements about overflight rights, basing rights, and access to the members' military resources for whatever, as yet unspecified, purposes, this alliance will strive to realize.

This probably means that an Asian NATO would entail some form of regular US forward presence or deployment in and around India with New Delhi's consent. In other words, it would probably mean something like, if not the actuality, of US bases there. The establishment of such an alliance relationship, and to whatever degree of formalization is agreed to by the parties, would represent a strategic earthquake in Asia.

While the overt enemies of this alliance would surely be Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, it would also constitute a potential threat to Pakistan, Iran and China, certainly it could be seen as a new form of containment of China. Thus, any such alliance would have enormous strategic repercussions for the Gulf, Central, South, Southeast and East Asia.

Likewise, the signs of a return to a more permanent American military presence in Southeast Asia, eg in the Philippines, or possibly in Singapore, would have a comparable effect on security trends in Southeast Asia as well. Presumably as well, the discussions about missile defense with prospective members would be taken to a higher level and could lead to various joint programs with India and/or with the other states involved here: Australia, Singapore and Japan. Alternatively, India, Israel and the US could form a kind of consortium as regards missile defense, similar to the agreements Washington has with Tokyo.

But probably the most important point here is that the fact of such discussions has been admitted and has aroused concern, if not apprehension, in Beijing, if not elsewhere. Under the circumstances, it behooves us to ask whether Washington is also prepared to consider as seriously as it needs to its prospective allies' vital interests. For example, it will not be easy to achieve the kind of harmony that exists in NATO between Washington and New Delhi, in spite of the essential congruence of their aims and outlooks.

For India, Islamic terrorism has only one address, Pakistan. Therefore, India would regard such an alliance as beneficial to it mainly to the degree that it brings about greater pressure on Pakistan to stop sending terrorists over the Line of Control into Indian-administered Kashmir and India proper and to stop challenging India's regional hegemony in the sub-continent. This alliance would also substantially alter India's relations with Iran because those two states are presently virtually allies and Indian foreign policy intellectuals overtly argue that this could allow India to serve as an interlocutor between Tehran and Washington, something that apparently the Bush administration has ruled out. It is by no means clear that India's dexterous diplomacy that has made friends with both Tehran and Jerusalem as well as Washington would be sacrificed on the altar of Washington's interests.

Similarly, is Washington prepared to accede to India's desires for regional hegemony in the sub-continent and to play a dominating role "from Socotra [Yemen] to Sumatra [Indonesia]"? Do Indian objectives clash with those of the US navy, which regularly proclaims that global sea supremacy is the alpha and omega of its military missions and objectives? Likewise, is India interested in truly containing China, or merely in checking it by virtue of its own rising power and a partnership with the US?

These two postures would lead to radically different Indian defense and foreign policies, which, in certain circumstances, may not be compatible with some US parties' understanding of how an Asian NATO affects US-Chinese relations. Similarly, Washington may not want to relate to Pakistan through the prism of Indian interests and perceptions.

Thus many questions must be answered before this alliance takes wing. And we could pose questions similar to those pertaining to India insofar as other governments are concerned. Certainly, we still have no clue as to whether this is to be a tight alliance or the looser kind of coalition of the willing that now seems to be the preferred shape of contemporary alliances. In either case, it will be vital to know what might be called the federating clause of any alliance. What circumstances will oblige each party to act militarily in defense of the other? This remains unknown, but if an alliance is on the agenda it will have to be answered, whatever form that alliance may take.

Clearly the strategic repercussions of the answers to all these questions would be immense, making a potential alliance with India and/or an Asian NATO a strategic revolution in Asian and global affairs. Since no answers to these questions are presently available, we are confined to raising questions and to conjectures that are extrapolated from currently observable trends. But there can be no doubt that a major change in America's and Asia's security structure may be about to take place, and we must begin thinking about it now rather than later.

Stephen Blank is an analyst of international security affairs residing in Harrisburg, PA.

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Sep 19, 2003

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