| |
Pakistan through the US looking
glass
By B Raman
On the eve
of the second anniversary of al-Qaeda's terrorist
strikes in the US of September 11, the US government
declassified 32 documents relating to the Taliban and
al-Qaeda. Twenty-six of these documents are of the US
State Department, and the remaining are of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the Pentagon. This article
analyzes the contents of three of the DIA documents
only.
The first document (15 pages), prepared in
September, 1999, is based on an analysis of all
information received by the DIA until July 1, 1999. It
is titled "Defense Intelligence Assessment". The subject
of the assessment is "Osama bin Laden/al-Qaeda
Information Operations". Nearly 90 percent of the
document has been excised before its declassification.
Hence, it does not contain anything of value. From a
perusal of the unexcised portions, one could guess that
the assessment must have been about al-Qaeda's
information assets, such as its modern communications
capability, its use of the Internet, its capability for
attacking the information networks of others etc, and
the defensive and offensive options available to the US.
The defensive aspect relates to protecting the networks
of the US against al-Qaeda attacks and the offensive to
neutralizing or penetrating al-Qaeda's assets.
The second document, dated September 24, 2001,
is titled "Veteran Afghan Traveler's Analysis of
al-Qaeda and Taliban's Exploitable Weaknesses" and
carries the following caution: "This is an information
report. Not finally evaluated intelligence."
It
would appear that this document is not the traveler's
report, but an analysis prepared by an official of the
DIA, either in the US embassy in Islamabad or in the DIA
headquarters in Washington DC, on the basis of the
traveler's report. The language used in the portion
declassified and released is that of a professional
intelligence analyst, and not that of an Afghan
traveler.
The analysis carries the following summary,
"Eventually, the Taliban and al-Qaeda will war with
each other. The weakness of both is in the minds of the
individuals that belong to the groups and in the power
that is given to them by their names. Al-Qaeda have
not integrated with Afghans or the Taliban, leaving them
susceptible to exploitation." By this, the analyst means
exploitation by the US to play the Taliban/Afghans and
al-Qaeda against each other. What wishful thinking
this has proved to be in retrospect.
The
analysis carries the most damning account of Pakistan's
role as the real host of bin Laden and his al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan. It says, "Bin Laden's al-Qaeda network was
able to expand under the safe sanctuary extended by the
Taliban following Pakistan directives. If there is any
doubt on that issue, consider the location of bin
Laden's camp targeted by US cruise missiles, Zahawa.
Positioned on the border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, it was built by Pakistani contractors, funded
by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
directorate and protected under the patronage of a local
and influential Jadran tribal leader, Jalaluddin
Haqqani. However, the real host in that facility was the
Pakistani ISI. If this was later to become bin Laden's
base, then serious questions are raised by the early
relationship between bin Laden and Pakistan's ISI."
It describes Jalaluddin Haqqani as "the Jadran
tribal leader most exploited by ISI during the
Soviet-Afghan war to facilitate the introduction of Arab
mercenaries" and the Taliban as "the handy cloak woven
by Pakistan to shroud their progress". Whose progress -
al-Qaeda's or Pakistan's? Most probably, Pakistan's, but
this is not clear.
The analysis describes the US
objective as "the establishment of a more stable
Afghan coalition government free of the Taliban and
Pakistani interference" and advocates a cost-effective
military engagement, with appropriate air support, than
the mass deployment of ground forces. It says, "The
enemy does not have mass, which makes them harder to
engage."
The analysis's predictions of
differences one day emerging between the Afghans and the
Taliban on the one side and al-Qaeda on the other
because of al-Qaeda's superiority complex and its
perception of itself as an elite force destined to
command have not proved correct so far.
The
analysis projects the then coming war against terrorism
in Afghanistan as likely to be fought on two fronts - a
war to destroy the material strength of al-Qaeda - its
cadres, training camps, infrastructure etc - and another
for the minds of the people. In the context of the war
for the minds of the people, it underlines the
importance of right names and right images to influence
the minds of the targeted people.
It points out
the impact on the minds of the Muslims made by the
characterization of the US as "the Great Satan". The
constant reference to the US as the "Great Satan" and
not as the US serves the double purpose of highlighting
the immense power of the US, which could be countered
only with determination and projecting that power in
negative colors to create an aversion for that power. It
stresses the importance of a similar characterization of
al-Qaeda by an appropriate name and not by its real name
of al-Qaeda. Apparently, US policymakers and
psy-warriors have not been able to determine what that
characterization could be.
The third document,
also dated September 24, 2001, is titled "Veteran
Afghanistan traveler's analysis of al-Qaeda and Taliban,
military, political and cultural landscape and its
weaknesses". It also carries the same caution as the
second. It goes into great detail regarding the
Pakistani game in Afghanistan in the following words:
"During the Soviet-Afghan war, the West
preferred to maintain a policy of deniability and
allowed Pakistan to handle the daily administration of
the war, cash and arms distribution. It was a task
Pakistan carried out with great enthusiasm and they
helped themselves to generous portions of cash and arms.
The Pakistan government also had a hidden agenda.
"Unlike the West, they [Pakistan] were concerned
with what would happen after the war to ensure influence
over any government that came to power in Afghanistan
after a Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan decided to directly
influence the outcome. Rather than allow the most gifted
Afghan commanders and parties to flourish, who would be
difficult to control later, Pakistan preferred to groom
the incompetent ones for the role of future leaders of
Afghanistan. Being incompetent, they would be wholly
reliant on Pakistan for support. The principal
beneficiary of this policy was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. His
credentials were that of an anti-Western Islamic
fundamentalist.
"In tandem with favoring the
incompetent Hekmatyar over more enterprising and gifted
commanders such as Ahmed Shah Masoud, the Tadjik
commander from northern Afghanistan, Pakistan also
encouraged, facilitated and often escorted Arabs from
the Middle East into Afghanistan ... visitors from the
Middle East had been in evidence since the very early
part of the Soviet-Afghan war. However, they lacked
numbers, confidence, experience or bonding ties
sufficient to give them a separate identity from their
hosts.
"This was allowed to evolve over a period
of time, which was effectively the incubation of
al-Qaeda. For the first time, large numbers of Arabs
were observed in Afghanistan during the Soviet
withdrawal. One of the key features of the Paktia border
province, in which they were first established, was that
it had no Russians ... at that point, the Arab visitors
were largely linked and reliant on Haqqani's mujahideen
in Paktia.
"When Kabul finally fell, it was
Ahmed Shah Masoud who captured it, not Hekmatyar.
Pakistan could not accept this result and the fragile
Afghan coalition government began another civil war,
with the Pakistani stooge Hekmatyar being backed to
seize total power. He was never able to wrest Kabul from
Masoud, despite massive logistical and material
(including manpower) support from Pakistan. Against this
failure, it should be noted that Pakistan has lost every
war it has ever fought.
"After years of futile
effort, which effectively saw the Lebanonization of
Afghanistan, Pakistan finally abandoned Hekmatyar.
However, not in favor of a more rational policy.
Instead, they set about doing the same thing all over
again. They created another force they hoped to have
better control over than Hekmatyar's rabble. It was
called Taliban, the Arabic name 'Talib' being literally
translated as 'asker' or 'seeker'.
"Taliban
means 'the seekers', signifying a student of divinity.
This inspired title helped cloak Pakistan's hidden
agenda in a new Islamic coat. To lead the Taliban,
Pakistan chose Mullah Mohammed Omar, who was willing to
do as he was told. According to Taliban propaganda, the
mullah was divinely inspired to rid Afghanistan of the
troublesome war and warlords. Afghanistan was blighted
with both, largely due to years of civil war sponsored
by Pakistan and reliant on the stockpile of arms
plundered from a covert Western arms pipeline. From the
old Soviet-Afghan war days, the mullah emerged with a
fully functioning, fully-armed, conventionally-equipped,
fully-trained military force prone to large-scale
conventional actions. Omar's emergence is credited to
Pakistan ISI's actions.
"The repeated,
pronounced pattern under ISI direction has been to
ignore the poorly-trained guerilla nature of the Afghan
mujahideen and press them to conduct conventional-style
engagement, the same style the Taliban are credited with
learning from the Koran. As a result of these actions,
the fully-supported by Pakistan Taliban prevailed over
the unsupported legitimate government of Afghanistan.
"The Taliban is not synonymous with Afghanistan.
It was created, imposed and recognized by Pakistan in
pursuit of its own interests. Playing the Islamic
fundamentalist card as a means of securing control over
a compliant proxy regime in neighboring Afghanistan has
seriously backfired. Pakistan has also lost control of
the Taliban, who are proving to be both unpredictable
and ungrateful. Under the shade of the Taliban umbrella,
the bin Laden brand of extremism has been able to grow
unmolested inside Afghanistan.
"The al-Qaeda
agenda in Afghanistan differs significantly from that of
the Taliban. They are not about creating an independent
Islamic state. Long term, there can be no room for
Taliban in their ambitions. Having been artificially
introduced to the region and encouraged in their
ambitions so far, they have grown in confidence and
stature. Taliban acceptance and approval of
fundamentalist non-Afghans as part of their fighting
force were merely an extension of the Pakistani policy
during the Soviet-Afghan war. It is very important to
realize that members of 055 Brigade [al-Qaeda] might
serve with Taliban forces, but they are not in any
Western sense integrated. They remain rather like an
international brigade, different in language, habit and
in the interpretation of Islam. Additionally, their
vision of the future of Afghanistan differs.
"Pakistan's goals are simple, the continuance of
the policy they have always demonstrated regarding
Afghanistan. It is failing with the Taliban and it
cannot succeed under any Afghan government controlled by
al-Qaeda. The repercussions from Pakistan's attempt to
manipulate the Islamic card are just surfacing.
"In Islamabad, they have tried to ignore or bury
the evidence for some time. It must be a deeply
troubling period for General Pervez [Musharraf] in
Pakistan, who is asked to help hunt down the culprits
that he helped to establish and supported. Not to
support the US invites trouble and to assist the US to
their aims also presents problems to Pakistan. The
quandary leaves the Pakistanis confused as to how they
might be absolved without permanently shattering their
regional aspirations or their government."
The
second and third documents are both dated September 24,
2001. The language in the second document is apparently
that of a professional intelligence analyst, but the
language of the third is not. It appears to be that of a
source and not of the DIA. It would seem that the third
document is the report of the source and the second is
the note of a DIA analyst or analysts who had forwarded
it to their superiors, giving their assessment and
making their recommendations regarding the future course
of action.
From these documents, it is clear
that the DIA knew of the role of the ISI in the
sponsorship of not only the Taliban, but also al-Qaeda.
And yet the Bush administration has for over two years
chosen to close its eyes to the complicity of Pakistan
and to project Musharraf to its own public opinion as
well as to the international community as a frontline
ally in the war against terrorism. Why? A question to
which there has been no convincing answer.
B Raman is Additional Secretary
(ret), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, and
presently director, Institute For Topical Studies,
Chennai; former member of the National Security Advisory
Board of the Government of India. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com. He was also head
of the counter-terrorism division of the Research &
Analysis Wing, India's external intelligence agency,
from 1988 to August, 1994.
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
