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US, India talk nuclear technology
transfer
By Sultan Shahin
NEW DELHI – The carrots dangled before India
earlier this year to persuade it to send troops to Iraq
– a promise by the then United States ambassador to
India, Robert Blackwill, to sell "defensive nuclear,
biological and chemical equipment, special forces gear
and P3 Orion Maritime Patrol aircraft" – are beginning
to take shape now, even though Delhi has not committed
any of its troops.
In the face of strong
objections from a section of US President George W
Bush's administration that high technology transfers to
India might fuel the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, it is not quite clear yet how far the
intense bilateral negotiations have succeeded. The media
have not even been told exactly what transpired in the
recent meeting between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee and Bush on this score.
In view of the
three decades political baggage that the two countries
have to contend with, the task cannot be easy. India
exploded a nuclear device in 1974, resulting in
sanctions on high technology transfers. A series of
nuclear weapons tests it conducted in May 1998 brought
another series of sanctions against high technology
transfers from the US. Three sensitive issues have
defined the limits of India-US bilateral relationship
since 1974: transfer of civilian nuclear technology;
cooperation in space research; and sale of dual-purpose
technology, which could be diverted to military use.
India, which became the first nation to welcome Bush's
ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans in May 2001, also
hopes to get a share of the technology.
A short
round of negotiations that has taken place so far is
clearly not enough for resolving issues of such
far-reaching consequences. Senior officials of the two
countries have been busy in the past weeks preparing a
broad framework of a nuclear and high technology
transfer regime that will allow America to ease
restrictions on high technology trade with India in
return for credible assurances that New Delhi will
prevent the outflow of sensitive technology and material
from its soil and put mechanisms in place to preclude
the use of imported technology for military purposes.
Though nothing concrete appears to have come out so far,
these negotiations do reflect a serious political
commitment to deal with a long-standing problem in
Indo-US relations.
One important casualty of the
Western desire to monopolize nuclear weapons is public
safety. Earlier this year, on March 6, the Indian
parliament was informed that India and the US were
discussing a mutually-agreed program on nuclear safety
cooperation in the direction of resumption of nuclear
cooperation between the two sides. Replying to a
question, Minister of State in the Department of Space S
B Mukherjee said that discussions had taken place on
resumption of Indo-US nuclear cooperation between the
respective regulatory bodies on a few selected topics.
"Our objective is to develop mutually-beneficial
international cooperation in the area of nuclear power,"
Mukherjee said. In the area of nuclear safety
cooperation, a mutually-agreed program was being
discussed, he said.
India and the US revived
talks on nuclear safety cooperation with the three-day
visit of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairman
Richard A Meserve at the end of February this year. The
talks, initiated in 1994, had been suspended following
India's nuclear tests in 1998. But following
Vajpayee-Bush talks in November 2001, the two sides
agreed to resume the process. The focus of Meserve's
visit was cooperation in safeguarded nuclear facilities
and identification of specific areas of Indo-US
cooperation in the hi-tech areas of peaceful
applications of nuclear energy and space research.
Several nuclear experts have pointed out from
time to time that decades of denying India nuclear
technology has forced the country to pursue an
indigenous but secretive program which poses the threat
of a Chernobyl-type disaster. As India does not accept
full-scope international safeguards for its nuclear
activities, it has been denied access to technology or
equipment from Western countries that follow rules set
by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Even the
Russian-supplied two light-water reactors for a 2,000 MW
nuclear power station in southern Tamil Nadu state did
not come with the safety control and instrumentation
systems designed by the German engineering giant
Siemens, which has set up a plant in Moscow especially
for the Russian nuclear equipment industry.
The
US and its European allies have kept India under various
technology transfer regimes since 1974. The May 1998
tests resulted, predictably, in further tightening of
technology control regimes. But this has only forced
India to develop its own nuclear power technology and
safety standards. Despite sanctions, India plans to
produce 20,000 MW of nuclear power by the year 2020.
India has consistently refused to sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear
non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) despite enormous US
pressure particularly from former president Bill
Clinton's administration. India may be able to withstand
the isolation, but fears about dangers to public safety
have inevitably grown. A resumption of nuclear
cooperation dialogue with the US, therefore, has
enormous public safety implications as well.
One
of India's strategic goals is to be accepted at least as
a de facto, if not a de jure member of the nuclear club.
From the substance and style of the recent discussions
it would appear that this has already happened. At the
very least there is a radical shift in the tone and
tenor of American interlocutors. Not long ago Clinton
announced his intention to "freeze, cap and roll back"
the nuclear capabilities of countries like India.
But US Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation
John Wolf stated earlier this year in July that "there
is no near-term prospect of getting India and Pakistan
to relinquish their nuclear weapons and missiles".
American diplomats have also been saying in private that
their government is no longer in the business of telling
India not to build a nuclear arsenal. Unlike the more
doctrinaire Clinton era, Washington appears now to be
promoting in the case of India at least a "one shield,
few missiles" doctrine that it also advocates for the
US.
The implication for India is that it may
already have been accepted as a respectable member of
the nuclear club, though the US will not give any public
indication of that for fear of encouraging other
countries that may want the same status. India itself
has never aroused fears of nuclear technology
proliferation. It has been recognized as a conservative
country when it comes to technology export.
India's evolving and already close strategic
relationship with Iran is, however, another matter. Iran
is clearly a nation that wants to and perhaps needs to
become a nuclear weapon state in order to retain its
sovereignty in a world in which it thinks the sole
superpower is a rogue gone berserk.
The US has
already short-listed Iran as an evil power. No wonder
visiting Israeli premier Ariel Sharon objected to
Indo-Iranian relations. India, however, considers its
ties with Iran non-negotiable. But the present Indo-US
nuclear talks are also to determine if India will be
allowed to buy the Israeli-made Arrow missile-destroyer.
While there is a general acceptance in
Washington and Tel Aviv of India's credibility as a
non-proliferating nation, there is nevertheless
reluctance to export sensitive technologies to a country
with such strong ties with a member of Bush's "axis of
evil". Incidentally, the remaining member of this famous
axis (with Iraq "tamed") is North Korea, with ties to
India's bete noire Pakistan.
Also, there is
concern in Washington that if the US makes India an
exception to the various non-proliferation regimes,
other nuclear powers like Russia, China and France may
all use this as an excuse to sell their missile systems
or export other high technology items.
What then
is going to be the outcome of these talks? Will the two
countries be able to sort out the complex issues
involved? So far all this remains shrouded in mystery.
The only hopeful sign is the relaxed atmosphere in which
these negotiations are being held, unlike previous
occasions when nuclear talks always used to be tense.
The differences between the Indian and US
positions flow from the NPT and New Delhi's reluctance
to accept "full-scope" safeguards for its nuclear
installations. A joint statement issued after the talks
between Indian and US officials' talks said that the US
had "expressed its readiness to broaden relations in
civilian space cooperation".
The joint statement
said: "The two sides also exchanged views on civilian
nuclear cooperation. To this end, the two sides
identified proposals which could be operationalized in
the near term." The parameters of the current dialogue,
it was stressed, "reflect the determination" of the top
leadership of both countries. India is taking hope from
several media accounts that US officials have uncovered
a number of legal loopholes that may allow the US to
help India dodge much of the multi-layered sanctions
regime.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co,
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