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Pakistan-India: Same game, new
rules
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - A ceasefire between Pakistan and India
along three of their borders went into effect at
midnight on Tuesday. The million-dollar question
everyone is asking, though, is how long this United
States-sponsored initiative will last. The answer, it
appears, is not long.
The ceasefire agreement
covers the India-Pakistan international border, the Line
of Control (LoC) that divides the those sections of
Kashmir administered by the two countries, and along the
Actual Ground Position Line in the Siachen Glacier.
Developments leading up to the ceasefire
actually started several weeks ago when, under immense
US pressure, Pakistan's Inter-Services-Intelligence
(ISI) shut down its "Forward Section 23" in Pakistan's
Azad (Free) Kashmir, which meant the closure of all
training camps and ISI operations offices in that
region.
Not only this, but also under US
pressure, Pakistan was asked to provide access to its
national data base and records of those involved in
terror activities, which, according to the US
definition, includes militancy in the name of jihad. For
this purpose, a special wing was established in the
Federal Investigation Agency of Pakistan (FIA), which
normally handles matters related to white-collar crime.
This special investigation cell is jointly
headed by Fareed Nawaz of the FIA and a member of the US
Federal Bureau of Investigation. This is a clandestine
operation to fight terror, and information relating to
it has been obtained by Asia Times Online, it has not
been officially disclosed.
The cell has the
mandate to compile records of those involved in terror
activities, collect their fingerprints and other
details, and then enter the data into a mainframe system
connected to all FBI offices and US immigration
facilities world-wide. As a result of this operation,
banned militant outfits that had resumed operations
under another name were re-banned, and a number of
activists arrested. This time there was a difference,
though. The entire records of all suspects and
organizations were seized for entry into the "terror
database".
According to sources close to the
Pakistani administration, the US leaned heavily on the
Pakistani leadership to force the ISI to abandon its
Kashmir operations in mid-stream. Just recently, a new
recruitment campaign for militants - to be used in
cross-border raids into Indian-administered Kashmir -
was started in all big cities. And militant
organizations were given huge funds to mobilize their
activists and attract new recruits.
And, it is
said, President General Pervez Musharraf held meetings
with jihadi leaders in which he assured them that he
supported "jihad in Kashmir" with his "heart and soul".
After these assurances, the Jamaatut Dawa (formerly the
Lashkar-i-Toiba) was encouraged, with all means and
resources, to stage a large gathering in Mureedkey,
Punjab, where thousands of jihadis gathered and vowed to
liberate Kashmir. Maulana Masood Azhar of the Khuddamul
Islam (effectively the Jaish-i-Mohammed) was also
invited to address the gathering.
Before that
gathering, Azhar paid frequent visits to the port city
of Karachi to revive 32 units out of about 148 that had
existed until the Jaish-i-Mohammed was banned. Before
the last visit, a big publicity campaign started, with
about Rs 50,000 (US$870) paid for wall posters alone.
Subsequently, Azhar attracted about 7,000 people to
north Karachi's famous Batha mosque. Azhar was visibly
protected by local police.
At this point, a big
operation in Kashmir appeared imminent in which it was
hoped to force the Indian leadership to resume dialogue
on the disputed territory on Pakistan's terms. Delhi,
however, responded by applying all its good offices with
Washington. As a result, the ISI's Mumbai connection,
Indian underworld boss Dawood Ibrahim, was declared a
"global terrorist" by the US, and the ISI took the
decision to close its base operations in Kashmir. The US
even said that Dawood resided in Karachi, although he
has not been seen there for some time.
And then,
with the US beginning a new round of pro-Indian
posturing, Pakistan committed itself to a change in its
mode of operations. Traditionally, jihadis have
penetrated into Indian territory from Kashmir, but now
the "launching" apparatus has been moved to Karachi for
militants to cross the border from Sindh province into
India, from where they will either make their way to
Kashmir or seek out soft targets in India.
Why Pakistan cannot stop anti-Indian
operations
Many thousands of Pakistanis have
fought in Afghanistan (during the anti-Soviet campaign
of the 1980s) and Kashmir over the past decade or more
as members of jihadi outfits. After the US attacked
Afghanistan in late 2001, it was largely predicted that
these outfits - which are loyal to the Taliban and
al-Qaeda - would rush back to lend their support, and
that they would also rebel against Musharraf.
This assessment proved to be a huge
misconception. The jihadi outfits were in fact a part of
the ISI's operations and the brainchild of late dictator
General Zia ul-Haq and General Akhtar Abdul Rehman. The
purpose was to develop a para-military force that would
assist the Pakistan army in the event of war. However,
in the course of the 1989 uprising in Kashmir, these
jihadis played so vital a role that they outdid the
army, so in the 1990s it was decided that they would act
as a front-line force in any India-Pakistan war.
First-hand observations by this correspondent in
Azad Kashmir camps confirm that the jihadi outfits are
in fact paramilitary troops. Each unit has a commander
who reports to an army officer. Each jihadi commander is
given funds and the brief to devise a strategy for his
unit's combat operations. The commanders have lap top
computers in which they store their data, from which
they generate summaries of their operations for their
military officers. The summaries include targets,
operations and results. The jihadi commanders and army
field officers always coordinate their efforts.
Pro-jihadi clerics, like Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, are
used to deliver sermons, and they are not allowed to
utter a single word more than the topic on which they
have been told to speak.
After September 11,
2001, ties between the army and the jihadis were at a
crossroads, but they emerged as friends. Meetings were
held at ISI offices in Karachi, where Shamzai and others
were told the limits of their anti-US demonstrations.
These clerics always abide by such guidelines. Shamzai
was also taken by the ISI to North-West Frontier
Province when tribals had blocked highways in support of
the Taliban, and he forced them to remove all blockades.
Interestingly, some diehard jihadis with
"original" thoughts came out in favor of Osama bin
Laden, including Maulana Abdul Jabbar of the
Jaish-i-Mohammed. Their jihadi fellows pointed this out
to the ISI, which advised him against such support. When
he did not give up, he was detained.
The ISI
reasoned with the jihadis that they had to compromise on
al-Qaeda as Pakistan did not have any strategic
interests with the network. However, Pakistan did
have interests with the Taliban, the ISI pointed out, so
it would persuade the US to give them a role in the
government in Afghanistan. In essence, then, the
so-called jihadi-clerics are no more than the ISI's
proxies, rather than committed "ideologues".
Major army interests in Kashmir
Apart
from strategic interests, the Pakistan army has
interests in the "jihad of Kashmir", from
non-commissioned officers right up to the major-general
who looks after Forward Section 23. It has funds to run
training camps, including recruitment (Rs 10,000 for
each recruit), and transportation and accommodation
costs. It also has a special fund for each "mujahid"
when he enters into Kashmir (Rs 20,000). Should he die,
there is a special fund for compensation (Rs 50,000 in
the first year and Rs 24,000 in next two years) for the
bereaved family.
For Pakistan then, the ISI, the
jihadis and the army are in one mind that the struggle
in Kashmir will continue. All that is happening for now,
under US pressure, is a shift in tactics, with Karachi
becoming a center of activities. Realistically, the
ceasefire along the Line of Control in Kashmir cannot
therefore be expected to hold.
(Copyright 2003
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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