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Pakistan's nuclear dilemma
By Praful Bidwai
NEW
DELHI - Revelations
that Pakistan's scientists may have helped Iran's
and Libya's secret nuclear programs raise worrisome
questions about nuclear threats in South Asia, which
has been described as the world's most dangerous place. They
also suggest that major policy changes and new arrangements for
export controls on nuclear materials, and more
generally, to prevent nuclear proliferation, are required.
These revelations were made when Iran shared
sensitive information about its uranium enrichment
program with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), a United Nations organization, two months ago,
but which have only been made public in the past weeks.
Further disclosures came when Libya held clandestine
talks with US and British officials just before
declaring on December 19 that it would abandon the
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction programs.
The government of Pakistan has not fully denied
reports that some of its scientists tried to sell
nuclear secrets to Iran more than a decade ago, but it
has acknowledged the interrogation - "debriefing" - of
some scientists recently named in stories appearing in
Pakistani and Western papers. This is a significant
departure from Pakistan's past assertion that its record
on nuclear non-proliferation is unblemished and
"impeccable".
Last year, credible charges were
leveled about Pakistan's assistance to North Korea's
nuclear program. Pyongyang itself affirmed its existence
and boasted of its success. But Islamabad denied there
had been a deal involving a trade-off between North
Korea's missiles and Pakistan nuclear enrichment
technology. It stated that its missiles are entirely
indigenous, but independent experts have long been
convinced that Pakistan's Ghauri missile is a version of
North Korea's Nodong. This was confirmed in 2002 by
South Korean intelligence, and by US spy satellites that
recorded a Pakistani cargo plane loading missile parts
in North Korea.
At the center of the North
Korea-Pakistan transactions is the father of the
Pakistani bomb, Abd al-Qadir Khan, who heads Khan
Research Laboratories (KRL). Khan made a number of
visits to Pyongyang during the mid to late 1990s, when
Pakistan faced US sanctions and was keen to acquire
missiles to match India's capability.
Also at center stage today are other KRL personnel and
Khan's close aides, Mohammed Farooq, Yassin Chowhan and
Sayeed Ahmad. US and European officials recently
questioned Khan and reportedly uncovered strong evidence
linking the KRL with Iran's purchase of nuclear
centrifuge designs from Pakistan 16 years ago.
Centrifuges can produce highly enriched uranium, only 10
to 20 kilograms of which is needed to make a
Hiroshima-type atomic bomb.
The Iranian
centrifuge design bears a strong Pakistani impress. The
New York Times, quoting a senior European diplomat with
access to detailed intelligence, says that the Libyan
program, too, had "certain common elements" with the
pattern of technology leaks from Pakistan to Iran.
Confronted with this evidence, the Pakistani
government itself began interrogating KRL directors
Farooq and Chowhan some five weeks ago. But it denies
reports that "unspecified restrictions" have been
imposed on Khan or that he has been interrogated. He "is
too eminent a scientist to undergo a normal debriefing
session", said Pakistan foreign office spokesman Masood
Khan. However, a Pakistan paper reports that Khan was
also questioned.
The official Pakistani line on
the issue of clandestine nuclear deals is a compromise
between pressure exerted by the US, and the compulsions
of maintaining that Pakistan's sovereignty is not
compromised by Western agencies' interrogation of the
KRL scientists. There has been some ultra-nationalist
comment against this interrogation. Khan is something of
a national hero, if not a demi-god, who has brought
"honor" and pride to Pakistan. That makes it hard for
Islamabad to disown him openly.
President
General Pervez Musharraf forced Khan to resign three
years ago under US pressure, but publicly praised him
for having "toiled and sweated, day and night, against
all odds and obstacles - to create, literally out of
nothing - the pride of Pakistan's nuclear capability".
Pakistan is thus caught between a rock and a
hard place. It is trying to make a distinction between
the official nuclear weapons programs and "certain
individual scientists" of its nuclear establishment,
"who may have breached the strict export control
procedures by making unauthorized and irresponsible
contacts with foreign nationals".
For the moment,
Washington has chosen to play along with Islamabad.
It has said that it is satisfied with Pakistan's
denials that it gave any nuclear secrets away - despite
the new disclosures. The pretence is that all such
clandestine transactions took place in the past, before
Musharraf came to power in a coup in 1999.
This repeats the line that US Secretary of State Colin
Powell took in October 2002, after he addressed the issue
of North Korea-Pakistan deals with Musharraf. And
Powell refused last year to get drawn into questions
about Pakistan's past transactions, emphasizing that the country is a
valuable ally against terrorism. But the US role
vis-a-vis Pakistan stands redefined by the new
disclosures, and is threefold.
First,
Washington is the gendarme of South Asia, which demands
and appropriates the right to detain and question other
states' nationals.
Second, the US
government acknowledges Pakistan's crucial position as
Afghanistan's next-door neighbor and its past links with
the Taliban. These give it a special place in the US
"war against terror".
Third, the US
government has a global non-proliferation agenda - and
Pakistan's clandestine transactions with North Korea,
Iran and Libya are incompatible with it. Condoning these
will draw hostile criticism from India, with which, too,
Washington wants to build closer relations.
It
is not easy to reconcile all three roles. After the
recent revelations, Washington cannot possibly maintain
the pretence that Pakistan's shady nuclear commerce
belongs to the past. It will try to engage Pakistan in
serious talks about restricting its nuclear and missile
scientists and engineers' movements, accept tight
controls on exports of nuclear technologies and
components, and make its nuclear facilities safe and
pilfer-proof.
Yet in negotiating this, the US
government will face a credibility problem because it
steadfastly refuses to give up its own nuclear weapons
and set an example. Any coercive or heavy-handed action
by it is likely to further fuel national-chauvinist and
Islamist, anti-US sentiments, and thus strengthen the
resolve of those who would like Pakistan and other
Islamic states to acquire their own weapons of mass
destruction.
The larger question is how to make
weapons of mass destruction unattractive and irrelevant
to the security of all nations. The time has come for
the United States to answer this, rather than continue
with pretences and contradictions.
(Inter Press
Service)
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