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INDIA-US
SECURITY
A partnership of unequals
By Ramtanu Maitra
India-United States
military ties, relatively a new phenomenon, have
advanced rapidly since September 11, 2001. Unlike the
US-Pakistan relationship, which dates back to the 1950s,
India's military connection with the US is new and,
hence, in a nascent stage. Yet during 2002 and 2003, the
US and India held numerous joint exercises involving all
military branches, including unprecedented advanced air
combat exercises.
The bilateral security
relationship has developed so rapidly that some analysts
on both sides have been led to believe that the two
militaries have a common agenda and common concerns. But
while it is likely that both sides can agree broadly on
the threats that stalk the world today, there are
definite limits to the relationship. The perceptions and
expectations of top US and Indian military leaders are,
in fact, divergent on several key issues, in particular
the approach to security in Asia and the Indian Ocean
region.
The divergence is so clearly demarcated
that no compromise can be reached in these areas without
one side giving in to the other's perception. Given the
nature and history of these two nations, it is absurd to
assume that such a compromise can be attained. India has
a democratic setup of a billion-plus people, and the US
possesses the most powerful military in the world.
Though some believe that the nuclear issue may
hinder more fully developed military-to-military ties,
it is unlikely that the issue could actually jeopardize
the relationship. India is a full-fledged nuclear
weapons state - whether the five nuclear weapons states
like it or not. There is absolutely no possibility that
the US or any other country would be able to generate
enough pressure - economic, political or military - to
force India to denuclearize itself. That is a pipe dream
that, one assumes, is not entertained at the highest
level of the American military.
Could the
differences, then, lead to tensions between the two
nations? Though it is difficult to speculate, the
prospect seems unlikely. Much will, of course, depend on
the political leadership of the two countries in the
years ahead.
A success story
The joint
Defense Policy Group (DPG) statements issued following
the group's August 6-7, 2003 meeting in Washington
document the scope and pace of the new Indo-US military
relationship. Established in the mid-1990s, The DPG was
moribund prior to 1998, when it was briefly roused by
India's second round of tests of its nuclear devices.
Still, the organization existed chiefly on paper. Only
after the events of September 11 was it brought to life,
and since then a fast and furious pace has been
maintained to bring the two militaries closer. Three DPG
meetings, out of a total of five meetings held since its
founding, were convened between December 2001 and the
end of 2003.
The August meeting pointed to the
following recent achievements in the Indian-US military
relationship:
A combined special forces counterinsurgency exercise
in northeast India.
A combined air force exercise in Alaska.
Complex naval exercises off the east coast of
India.
Delivery of "Firefinder" radars to India.
Senior-level missile defense talks.
Conclusion of a master information exchange
agreement to facilitate cooperation in research and
development of defense technologies.
Impressive
as this list is, more and bigger cooperation will come,
the DPG told the media. The two sides have agreed to
establish a high-level dialogue on defense technology
security issues, the DPG announced. They have decided to
hold a missile defense workshop in India soon, as a
follow-on to an international workshop attended by US
and Indian delegations at the June 2003 multinational
ballistic missile defense conference in Kyoto, Japan.
The Indian delegation also accepted invitations to the
July 2004 multinational ballistic missile defense
conference in Berlin and the 2005 roving sands missile
defense exercise.
In addition, the two
delegations approved a range of activities for 2004,
including:
Specialized training programs and joint exercises to
be carried out by the armed services of the two
countries, including an air combat training exercise.
A multinational planning exercise to develop
standard operating procedures for both parties to
follow, to be hosted by India in coordination with the
US.
Development of a defense supply relationship,
through the government-to-government foreign military
sales program.
US sale to India of training materials and
specialized equipment to support India's peacekeeping
training capabilities.
A defense planning exchange to permit US and Indian
defense experts to conduct discussions on defense
strategy and planning.
This is an ambitious
to-do list that will certainly sustain the momentum of
the new relationship. But when one turns to the
specifics of the security of the region that directly
concern India, the difficulties emerge.
The
limits of trust
This was documented extensively
in a report on the India-US military relationship issued
last year. The report, commissioned by former Rand
Corporation academic Andrew Marshall's Office of Net
Assessment in the Pentagon, was written by Booz Allen
Hamilton Associate Julie MacDonald. MacDonald presented
the results of her study at an invitational conference
in Washington in early December, "Bridging US-India: A
Defense Perspective".
The Indian military's
historic distrust of its US counterpart because of the
latter's on-going military support to Pakistan, its
record as an unreliable supplier of hardware and the
uncertainty of US intentions is well known. Likewise,
the US military's suspicion of the Indian military based
on India's relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union
and the present Russia, the lack of transparency in the
Indian system and India's weak export control regime is
also relatively well known. But the key divergence
between the Indian and US militaries, MacDonald finds,
is centered on how the two look at Asia and the Indian
Ocean basin.
Not only do the two have differing
perceptions of the threats in Asia, but they articulate
divergent ideas about the ultimate objectives for a
military-to-military relationship, MacDonald states. The
US views India as a longtime military partner that will
take up more and more responsibilities in Asia and
assist with US bases; the US appreciates India's
strategic relations, size and sophisticated military. By
contrast, India envisions the relationship developing
slowly, with tangible and immediate results all along
the way in terms of technology transfer and investment
in defense industries. In the Indian view, the
relationship must be an equal partnership.
India's evolving security policy
It is
likely that as India becomes stronger, this divergence
will prevent further consolidation of military ties, at
least in terms of providing security to the Asian
region. If it has not begun already, India's security
concerns will certainly shift from those of a defensive
nature to preventive action in the coming years. More or
less isolated, India has been worried about weapons
developments in Pakistan and China - two areas
contiguous to India. The close China-Pakistan
relationship heightened India's anxiety. India sought
hardware and training in its use to develop a
counter-strike capability. But those days are behind
India now.
India is now developing a preventive
security system. India is growing, and is in the process
of consolidating its relationships in Southeast Asia and
also in Central Asia. It is a matter of time before
India begins to expand its relationships in eastern
Africa in cooperation with South Africa. Recently,
India, South Africa and Brazil formed a Group of Three
(G-3) to derive economic benefits through mutual
cooperation.
As this policy evolves, the key
will be the Indian Ocean. That India's security, as well
as its prosperity, depends on how well India manages
affairs in the Indian Ocean was driven home by the late
Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi. The subsequent growth of
the Indian navy caused some consternation in the area,
but as long as the Indian navy worked in tandem with the
US navy, neighboring nations breathed easily.
The present Indian naval strength, its
development plans and composition of various carrier
groups and fleets, point to the fact that the Indian
navy is becoming much larger than its immediate defense
needs dictate, and clearly suggest that it is in the
process of securing the next outer ring of security and
positioning itself to play a role in the future to
provide security to its areas of economic interest in
Asia, and perhaps in Africa. Moreover, recently India
has made considerable headway in building its
once-frayed relations with its South Asian neighbors in
a way that is coherent with India's assumption of
responsibility for the region.
Given the crucial
importance of Bay of Bengal for the security of almost
half of Asia, and the Arabian Sea for its importance of
oil supplies to enhance global prosperity, India's
security concerns will certainly remain pinned on the
Indian Ocean as it grows more powerful in the years
ahead.
Tomorrow: The Indian Ocean cockpit
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
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