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INDIA-US
SECURITY
India
caught in Washington's political
mangle
By Ashish Kumar Sen
WASHINGTON - President George W Bush's intention
of building a "strategic partnership" with India runs
the risk of being consistently undermined by
Washington's powerful non-proliferation faction.
Earlier this month, while in Mexico to attend a
summit of American states, and far from the political
sway of Washington, Bush announced a bilateral decision
to expand cooperation with India. Specific areas of
collaboration that have been identified include civilian
nuclear activities, civilian space programs and
high-technology trade.
"We agree to expand our
dialogue on missile defense," said the president, noting
that cooperation in all these areas will deepen the ties
of commerce and friendship between the two nations,
while increasing stability in Asia and beyond.
But any enthusiasm that this optimistic
statement may have generated was duly squelched in
Washington, where a senior State Department official
pointed out, on the condition of anonymity, that this
cooperation could take months, even years, to play out.
Washington's non-proliferation lobby,
principally entrenched in the State Department and
influential policy think tanks that proliferate in the
city, has been a persistent thorn in the side of
US-India relations.
The significant hurdle posed
by this group was reflected in a recent speech made by
Mitchell Reiss at a conference at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory. Reiss, director of the State
Department's policy planning bureau, said that not only
North Korea, but also India, Pakistan and Israel should
be stripped of their nuclear weapons. He asserted that
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty which all three
countries, along with Cuba, have resisted signing
"should be made universal".
While the Bush
administration has steered a course unencumbered by the
treaty, many American policy analysts believe
non-proliferation concerns will continue to plague
Washington's relationship with New Delhi.
The
differences in perception of non-proliferation issues
underscore the policy rift between the State Department
and the Pentagon. The office of the Secretary of Defense
sponsored a study, "Indo-US Military Relationship:
Expectations and Perceptions" - to explore impediments
to military cooperation between the US and India. Not
surprisingly, many Indian and American interviewees
agreed that the State Department was an "obstacle" to
developing the relationship quickly as it does not share
the Department of Defense's longer-term strategic view.
Another factor cited was the State Department's power to
stall the licensing process for technology transfer.
A senior Indian army official was quoted as
saying: "The attitudes at the State Department must
change if the relationship is ever to progress beyond
low-level service-to-service cooperation into a
well-developed defense relationship."
Pentagon
officials are critical of the State Department's stand
based on past experiences of dealing with the department
and are skeptical about its willingness to abandon its
prejudices, particularly given the ongoing tension in
Kashmir.
Common complaints at the Pentagon
include: Congress and the State Department repeatedly
deploy stalling tactics against India by refusing to
send India even the most benign items, such as spare
parts for low-cost aircraft, even after the Indians have
paid for them.
In New Delhi, officials assert
that the non-proliferation lobby will continue to be an
obstacle to greater cooperation until the US accepts
India as a nuclear power and treats it as a nuclear
"friend".
Conflicting signals from the Pentagon
- which seeks to embrace India as a strategic partner -
and the State Department - which tends to treat India as
a dangerous proliferator - also threaten the Indian
confidence in talk of a "strategic partnership" between
the two countries.
Following the November 2001
meeting between Bush and Indian Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee, "strategic partnership" became the new
mantra of the bilateral relations between India and the
US.
From the American perspective, a strategic
military relationship with India represents a "hedge"
against an uncertain and possibly threatening future in
Asia. Analysts view this partnership as a long-term
process.
One of the recurring arguments in the
Defense Department report was: If China emerges as a
major power, the US needs to have friends - preferably
friends who share the same values (eg democracy). Given
India's strategic geographical location and clout in the
region, this collaboration would give the US access to
Asia.
State Department opposition centers on
concern over potential leakage of technology due to a
lack of export laws and safeguards of technologies in
India. "We have seen India attempting to take steps [to
control such leakage] but in many cases not being able
to finish the process," said a senior State Department
official.
Jon Wolfsthal, an arms-control expert
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in
Washington, is more vocal in his criticism of India.
"India has misappropriated and misused US technology in
the past, and this is the same technology that could be
used for long range interceptor missiles. Until we see
India acting responsibly, we need to be very careful
that we don't provide them with technology that could be
used [by a third party] to target US forces in the
field," Wolfsthal said in a recent interview with the
Washington Times.
The Bush administration has
worked hard to develop ties with India in the face of
such opposition. An American policymaker observed:
"India's nuclear capability is not an obstacle but a
driver of the United States's relationship with India.
We need to cultivate India as a friend to ensure that
its nuclear weapons are not used against the United
States or its friends. Moreover, engagement with India
gives the US more leverage on other issues related to
nuclear proliferation."
The recently announced
initiative, echoed by Vajpayee in New Delhi, will
include expanded engagement on nuclear regulatory and
safety issues and missile defense, ways to enhance
cooperation in peaceful uses of space technology, and
steps to create the appropriate environment for
successful high technology commerce.
In order to
combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
relevant laws, regulations and procedures will be
strengthened, and measures to increase bilateral and
international cooperation in this area will be employed.
"These cooperative efforts will be undertaken in
accordance with our respective national laws and
international obligations," Bush said.
In his
final policy speech as US ambassador to India, Robert D
Blackwill highlighted defense cooperation as one of the
most critical areas in the ongoing evolution of US-India
relations. "In US defense sales to India, we have gone
from zero to almost $200 million in the past 14 months,
and are poised for far more ambitious interaction in
this field, including the possible Indian purchase of
defensive nuclear, biological and chemical equipment,
special forces gear, and P-3 Orion Maritime Patrol
aircraft," Blackwill said. He added: "The Bush
administration perceives India as a strategic
opportunity for the United States, not as an irritating
recalcitrant."
Following the end of US sanctions
imposed after New Delhi conducted nuclear tests in May
1998, Washington sold the Firefinder weapon-locating
radar to India. The delivery of these radars, which can
detect long-range enemy missiles and artillery
projectiles and then retaliate with pinpoint accuracy,
will be completed by September 2006.
"The vision
of US-India strategic partnership that Prime Minister
Vajpayee and I share is now becoming a reality," Bush
declared. Perhaps it was the fact that the president was
away in less politically hostile Monterrey, Mexico, when
he made this bold statement that allowed him to be
oblivious to the lobbies in Washington that haunt such a
partnership.
Ashish Kumar Sen is a
Washington-based journalist.
(Copyright 2004
Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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