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Fighting the proliferation
syndrome
By Ehsan Ahrari
The
constant dribbling of news about Pakistan's nuclear
scientists' role in the proliferation of nuclear
know-how to North Korea, Iran and Libya is likely to
damage the United States' ties with Pakistan. The
surprising aspect of this development is that Islamabad
has shown a certain amount of insensitivity, if not
outright ignorance, about the seriousness that the Bush
administration attaches to non-proliferation, especially
since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United
States.
Right now, the focus of Washington's
attention is the global "war on terrorism", in which
Pakistan plays a prominent role. Once that war looses
its current primacy, Washington is likely to unleash its
criticism, scrutiny and even sanctions against the South
Asian nation, unless it clamps down hard now on all
potential sources of nuclear proliferation from within.
Recent reports indicate that the transfer of
nuclear knowledge to Iran from Pakistan took place in
the late 1980s. The father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb -
Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan - was reportedly involved. Other
Pakistani nuclear scientists are also reported to have
assisted Iran under a secret agreement between the two
countries. That agreement was supposedly limited to the
sharing of peaceful nuclear technology.
Pakistan
has launched its own investigation on the foreign
involvement of its nuclear scientists under US pressure,
and also because of a complaint launched by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last November.
That complaint alleges that Pakistani scientists played
a prominent role in the development of centrifuges used
to enrich uranium, a key ingredient in nuclear weapons.
The US alleges that Pakistan has played a similar role
in North Korea, and even in Libya.
President
General Pervez Musharraf has finally publicly conceded
that his country's nuclear scientists have been involved
in the proliferation of nuclear technology for "personal
gain", but rejected any notion of an official
sanctioning of their role. He said: "There is no such
evidence that any government personality or military
personality was involved in this at all."
The
government of Pakistan has identified a second prominent
scientist, Dr Mohammad Farooq, in nuclear proliferation
activities. He has been under government custody since
November 22 of last year and is expected to be charged
under Pakistan's Official Secrets Act. He is reported to
have implicated Khan under questioning. These events are
said to have taken place many years ago.
Washington has thus far accepted Musharraf's
assurances that all cooperative activities between his
country and North Korea have been suspended. However, it
continues to watch the pace and scope of this inquiry
inside Pakistan.
Musharraf's dilemma is how far
he should go in investigating the role of Pakistan's
nuclear scientists, and what punitive measures, if any,
he must take. Of course, Washington will be delighted to
see Khan, Farooq and others receive some sort of
punishment; however, they - especially Khan - are
regarded as national heroes and cannot be
unceremoniously put even under house arrest without a
public backlash and resentment. Islamist groups have
already shown their rage on the "humiliation" of
Pakistani national heroes, and have accused Musharraf of
conducting the inquiry to appease the Bush
administration.
The very fact that Pakistan's
intelligence agency - Inter-Service Intelligence - is
conducting the inquiry has already ensured that no
ranking past or present military officer will be charged
with any involvement in the transfer of nuclear know-how
to other countries. In fact, the former chief of army,
General Aslam Beg, who, during his tenure (1988-1991)
publicly advocated a military alliance with Iran, now
denies authorizing the transfer of nuclear technology.
He depicts all allegations of his involvement as "part
of the conspiracy against me".
Former prime
minister Benazir Bhutto has pitched in her own share by
maintaining from exile that the military sustained total
control of all nuclear matters during her
administration, thereby implying that the military was
involved in nuclear proliferation to Iran. A former
official during her successor Nawaz Sharif's government
is also blaming the military of deciding in the 1990s to
transfer nuclear know-how to Iran. Even though Iran has
not directly named Pakistan in its acquisition of
nuclear know-how, the IAEA has surmised that Iran's
centrifuges were probably based on Pakistan's designs.
Undoubtedly, Pakistan, despite official denials,
is not exactly an innocent party in this nuclear
proliferation syndrome. As the inquiry of nuclear
scientists and the blame game continue, the US will be
content for now if Pakistan ceases all proliferation
activities, officially sanctioned or otherwise. Aside
from Washington's determination to bring about global
nuclear non-proliferation, the international community
appears equally resolute to disallow the repeat of the
North Korean example of nuclear blackmail.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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