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Reluctant India drawn toward Sri
Lanka
By Sudha
Ramachandran
BANGALORE - Almost 15 years after it
accused India of meddling in Sri Lankan affairs and
backed it up with a bloody campaign to remove Indian
security forces from the island, the Janata Vimukti
Peramuna (JVP) or People's Liberation Front, a radical
Sinhalese nationalist group, has expressed support for
strengthening relations with India. The turnaround comes
less than a month after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) called for a new, creative relationship
between the Tigers and India.
In a telephonic
interview to the Asian Tribune website ahead of his
return to Sri Lanka from London, JVP leader Somawamse
Amarasinghe said that the JVP "warmly embraced the
proposed defense pact" between India and Sri Lanka.
While criticizing the country's foreign policy and
calling for a return to its former non-aligned policy,
Amarasinghe endorsed a strengthening of ties with India.
The defense pact "should be made an important aspect of
our [Sri Lanka's] foreign policy", he said. He warned
that a breakup of Sri Lanka was not in India's interest.
"India couldn't afford a Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, since
it was against the strategic interests of India's
regional security," he pointed out.
The JVP has
recently entered into an alliance with the Sri Lanka
Freedom Party, a core constituent of President Chandrika
Kumaratunge's Peoples Alliance. The alliance is aimed at
increasing the president's election chances. On
Saturday, Kumaratunga dissolved parliament in a surprise
move and called fresh elections in April, four years
ahead of schedule. National ballots for the 225-member
legislature will be held on April 2.
Amarasinghe's comments mark a significant shift
in the JVP's policy toward India. "Anti-Indian
imperialism" was an important tenet of the JVP, right
from its inception. In 1971, the JVP launched an armed
insurrection against the Lankan state. Military support
from India and China to the Lankan government's
anti-insurgency operations contributed to the crushing
of the uprising. Thousands of its cadres were killed.
In 1989, the JVP spearheaded a violent campaign
against "Indian occupation" of the island. Under an
agreement signed by the Indian and Sri Lankan
governments, India had deployed its soldiers in the
country's Tamil areas - the north and east - to crush
the LTTE, which was opposed to the political settlement
of the ethnic conflict as envisaged under the agreement.
The JVP, though anti-LTTE, called for the expulsion of
the Indian peacekeeping forces. It pointed to Indian
military presence on Sri Lankan soil as evidence of
India's expansionist intentions. It called for a boycott
of Indian goods, and enforced it by unleashing terror
and violence in the country. But its anti-India rhetoric
notwithstanding, it did not engage the Indian troops in
a direct military confrontation.
Now the
JVP seems to have come around to viewing close ties
with India as necessary for Sri Lanka's
territorial integrity. India and Sri Lanka are expected to sign
a defense agreement this month. Sri Lankan security
forces are already being trained in India. The pact will
deepen the relationship - increased training and sales
of non-lethal military equipment. India is also expected
to strengthen the Palaly air base in the Jaffna
Peninsula in northern Sri Lanka. The Jaffna Peninsula
has been the traditional bastion of the rebel LTTE. This
deepening military relationship between India and the
Colombo government that is being welcomed by the JVP
rattles the Tigers.
While India has
adopted a "hands-off policy" toward Sri Lanka after its
unhappy peacekeeping experience in the island's
northeast in 1987-90, it remains an influential and
interested actor in the crisis and ongoing attempts to
resolve the conflict. Both the Lankan government and
Norwegian interlocutors have kept India briefed on
developments in the peace process.
Kumaratunga
and her arch rival, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe,
made several trips to India last year, courting Delhi's
support to their differing approaches on how to make
peace with the LTTE. The now-suspended peace process was
Wickremesinghe's initiative. He seemed determined to
reach agreement with the LTTE, whatever the cost.
Kumaratunga has been expressing concern that the costs
are too high - Wickremesinghe's strategy, she fears,
might lead to the division of the island. She is
concerned about the government's move to hand over the
entire northeastern province in Sri Lanka to the LTTE
under a proposed interim administration for the
Tamil-majority region.
While India backs a
negotiated settlement and is supportive of the talks, it
shares some of Kumaratunga's concerns, particularly the
move to hand over control of the northeastern province
to the LTTE. And while India might not overtly be taking
sides, it is evident that Delhi is not pro-LTTE. India
is keen that any settlement of the ethnic conflict
should address the aspirations of the island's Tamils.
But it is keen that the solution is within a united Sri
Lanka. Delhi is opposed to the creation of an
independent Tamil state called Eelam that the LTTE wants
to set up in the northeast of the island.
Delhi's relationship with the LTTE has seen many ups
and downs. In the early to mid-1980s, Tamil rebels
received weapons and training in India. Then relations
between India and the LTTE soured when the latter
rejected the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accord, prompting
India to launch military operations against the Tigers.
The operations broke the back of the LTTE. Relations
between them worsened when Indian prime minister Rajiv
Gandhi was assassinated in 1991 by the Tigers.
Subsequently, India banned the LTTE - the first country
to do so.
Since Gandhi's assassination, the LTTE
has made several quiet efforts to patch things up with
Delhi. It sought to make Chennai, Bangalore or
Tiruvananthapuram in southern India the venue of peace
talks. But with sections in India perceiving this Tiger
request as an attempt by the LTTE to gain a legitimate
return to Indian soil, Delhi turned down the request.
The LTTE wants countries such as the United States and the
United Kingdom to stop treating the organization as a terrorist
group. But that is unlikely to happen so long as Delhi's
ban on the LTTE remains.
In December, the LTTE's
London-based theoretician, Anton Balasingham, called on
India to "adopt a new, creative approach and initiate
friendly relations" with the LTTE. "It should not treat
the LTTE as a hostile force," he said. "We want friendly
relations with India," Balasingham said. "Both sides
have made mistakes in the past. Let us put the past
behind and look forward," he added. He assured India
that the LTTE would "not act in any way prejudicial to
India's geopolitical, strategic and economic interests".
Reporting for the Indo-Asian News Service, M R
Narayan Swamy (who is also the author of two books on
the LTTE) points out: "With Sri Lanka enveloped in a
political quagmire that could well result in a
resumption of war, India is slowly emerging as a major
factor - despite Delhi's virtual hands-off policy of the
post-1990 period ... So the LTTE - like the JVP, but for
different reasons - is publicly saying that it wants to
do business with India."
The
courting of India by
the president, the prime minister, the LTTE and the JVP
is a recognition that India has a crucial role to play
in the island's affairs. Now it is up to Delhi either to
accept this role or to maintain its low-key
hands-off approach.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times
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