BANGALORE - Another complicating dimension has
been added to Sri Lanka's beleaguered peace process
following a formal split in the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). While the division is expected to
weaken the LTTE's military capacity, it could lead to
the organization hardening its position at the
negotiating table.
On Saturday, the LTTE
"discharged" its eastern military commander
Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (aka "Colonel" Karuna),
accusing him of "acting traitorously to the Tamil people
and the Tamil Eelam national leadership" "at the
instigation of malicious elements". Karuna's discharge
came a couple of days after reports from the island's
Eastern Province indicated that simmering differences
between Karuna and LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabakaran
had exploded into a nasty rift.
Karuna, who has
been with the LTTE for two decades, is the only regional
commander in the LTTE to hold the position for 17 years.
Until recently, he was in charge of the LTTE's
Batticaloa-Amparai area. A hardliner, he is known for
his military prowess and ruthlessness, and is credited
with chalking out the strategy for several Tiger
operations against the Sri Lankan armed forces over the
years. He was part of the LTTE negotiating team at last
year's peace talks with the Sri Lankan government.
Karuna hails from the eastern district of
Batticaloa and has battled to further the interests of
Tiger cadres from the Eastern Province in the Northern
Province-dominated LTTE. His revolt against the LTTE
leadership is not surprising as it has its roots in
long-festering grievances against the northern Tamil
leadership.
It appears that Karuna's revolt was
triggered by a demand from northern leaders, based in
Wanni, that he send 1,000 of his combat troops to Wanni.
Karuna is said to have turned down the request on the
grounds that the redeployment would weaken the LTTE in
the Eastern Province.
In a letter addressed to
Prabakaran on March 2, Karuna, while describing
Prabakaran as a "god" for Batticaloa-Amparai cadres,
demanded complete autonomy for the Batticalao-Amparai
district within the LTTE administration.
Prabakaran's response was swift. He discharged
Karuna and replaced him with Ramesh, the special
commander for the Batticaloa-Amparai district and a
Prabakaran loyalist.
While admitting the crisis
in the organization, the LTTE described it as a
temporary one. Tamilchelvam, the leader of the LTTE's
political wing, dismissed the split as "a problem
concerning a single leader". But it is much more.
Unlike the overwhelmingly Tamil Northern
Province, the Eastern Province is an explosive mixture
of Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims. The eastern districts
have seen some of the worst bloodshed since the start of
the armed conflict two decades ago. For years, Karuna
and the LTTE's eastern wing have nursed the grievance
that while it is the eastern cadres that do most of the
fighting - most of this fighting has been to defend LTTE
positions in the north - and dying, it is Tigers from
the north who occupy the top decision-making posts in
the organization. Around 60 percent of the LTTE's
"martyrs" are from its eastern wing; most of them were
killed fighting in the north.
Of the LTTE's 32
departments or divisions, only one was headed by an
easterner - Karuna. It is said that eastern Tigers have
always resented the fact that all important decisions
were made by the northern Tigers, even on those issues
that were of central concern to the east - such as
relations with Muslims, for instance.
Karuna's
breaking away from the LTTE has dealt a big blow to the
LTTE's monolithic image. While this is not the first
time that the LTTE has faced dissension, the
implications of the current rift are far-reaching. Few
have dared to defy Prabakaran. Those who have differed
with him simply quit the organization or were killed.
Any seeming challenge to Prabakaran's leadership has
been swiftly crushed. Rifts within the LTTE have never
resulted in a chunk of the organization breaking away.
That has become a real possibility today.
Some
analysts believe that the current crisis is likely to
split the LTTE along regional lines, with the eastern
wing rallying behind Karuna. Karuna controls a third of
the LTTE's approximately 18,000 strong cadre. He is said
to have considerable support in the east and is seen as
someone who has raised issues of concern to eastern
Tamils. There have been large demonstrations in
Batticaloa town protesting his dismissal. For the first
time, Tamils in Batticaloa burnt effigies of Prabakaran
and his intelligence chief, Pottu Amman.
However, there are early signals that things
might not work in Karuna's favor. Most of his leaders
have deserted him and thrown in their lot with
Prabakaran. Funds remain under the control of the
northern leadership. Karuna is up against the LTTE's
formidable intelligence wing, which again remains under
the control of the northern leadership.
While
the Sri Lankan government has refrained from taking
sides in the feud, it has turned down Karuna's request
for a separate ceasefire agreement with him. And the
army has refused to stop Prabakaran loyalists based in
the east from fleeing to the north with their families.
Nor has it allowed his supporters based in the north to
return to the safety of the east. As the Hindustan
Times' Colombo correspondent P K Balachanddran points
out: "The armed forces have thus sided with Prabakaran."
Karuna might have built up a
political-administrative structure in the east that is
almost on par with that in the north. And while he is a
leader of considerable standing, he is no match for
Prabakaran. The LTTE cadres, indeed many Tamils in Sri
Lanka and in the diaspora, look up to Prabakaran, who
enjoys demi-god status among the Tigers and Tamils. They
are unlikely to shift loyalties to Karuna.
A
section in Sri Lanka seems to believe that the split in
the LTTE is a positive development for the peace
process. According to them, a divided LTTE will be
weaker and hence less intransigent at the talks table.
For instance, the Daily Mirror's Keith Noyahr points out
that the "current rift, unprecedented in the regimented
control of the LTTE, like an act of providence, could
force the Tigers to be more flexible at future
negotiations on the ISGA [Interim Self Governing
Authority] as well as a final solution."
Another
argument is that if the LTTE were to split along
regional lines, it would weaken the Tamil demand for the
merger of the two provinces. Karuna has spoken to the
Associated Press about "full self-administration" in the
east in the future. This raises the possibility of the
demerger of the north and east - something that the LTTE
has traditionally opposed, but Sinhalese and Muslims
living here would support as it would make them less of
a minority.
The split in the LTTE will no doubt
weaken its military capacity in the short run. Karuna's
exit is a loss to the LTTE. And if the LTTE cannot
isolate Karuna quickly, it is likely that the two sides
will seek to eliminate each others' fighters, and the
coming weeks could see much bloodletting. Karuna has
already complained that death squads are hunting him
down.
The likely fratricidal fighting could draw
the Lankan armed forces into the conflict, and that in
turn could result in the ceasefire agreement unraveling.
The current crisis can be expected to push
Prabakaran into adopting a more hardline position if and
when the suspended talks are resumed. Karuna is even
less compromising than Prabakaran, especially on the
eastern question. Previous attempts at a political
solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict have usually
crumbled over the eastern question. And Karuna's
unwillingness to compromise is believed to have been
behind the LTTE intransigence.
Karuna is said to
be opposed to the present peace process too. It is
believed that Prabakaran included him in the LTTE
negotiating team not only because of the significance of
the eastern question, but also to prevent him from
subverting the talks.
In an opinion piece in the
Sunday Leader, D B S Jeyraj points out that "the first
discordant note" in the present peace process "was
struck by Karuna. After functioning briefly as co-chair
of the sub-committee overseeing de-escalation of
military activity, the frank Karuna discovered that the
committee was simply not moving because the armed forces
were not budging from the high security zones.
"Karuna walked out of an 'aimless' meeting and
announced publicly that he will not be participating in
the sub-committee any more as it was pointless. He
reiterated his stance at subsequent rounds of talks and
the sub-committee became defunct. This was more or less
a harbinger of subsequent events."
Karuna
outside the LTTE is likely to criticize the peace
process even more. He can be expected to project any
concession by the LTTE, especially on issues of
significance to the east, as a sellout and a betrayal of
Tamil interests.
The impact of Karuna's exit
from the peace process will depend on how quickly
Prabakaran is able to isolate or eliminate him. The fate
of previous Tiger dissidents shows that Karuna's chances
of surviving Prabakaran's wrath are near negligible.
(The Tigers have already likened Karuna to Cambodia's
Pol Pot, who caused the deaths of an estimated 1.7
million people in his country's "Killing Fields".)
Infighting within the Colombo government
severely undermined the outlook for the peace process.
The biggest revolt ever within the LTTE has now further
jeopardized the already ailing peace process.
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