Who's behind the LTTE
split? By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - Speculation is rife in Sri Lanka
over who might have engineered the recent split in the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). While some are
pointing to a foreign hand - India and/or the United
States - others are insisting that Colombo might have
had a part in fomenting the rebellion.
Early
this month, the LTTE's eastern commander Vinayagamoorthi
Muralitharan, aka "Colonel" Karuna, raised the banner of
revolt against the rebel organization's predominantly
northern leadership. It appears that he turned down the
LTTE northern wing's request for about 1,000 eastern
fighters for deployment in the north and objected to the
role of the intelligence wing in the areas under his
command. Karuna not only defied LTTE leader Velupillai
Prabakaran but also aired his defiance to the media.
The LTTE's response was swift. It "discharged"
Karuna, accusing him of "acting traitorously to the
Tamil people and the Tamil Eelam national leadership at
the instigation of malicious elements".
Karuna's
rebellion is unprecedented and could culminate in a
vertical split of the LTTE. Few in the LTTE have dared
to defy Prabakaran because the Tiger leader is
intolerant of dissent. Those who have differed with him
have been sidelined, others eliminated unless they opted
to leave the organization and lead a low-profile life
thereafter.
Mahathaya, a former deputy of
Prabakaran, did defy Prabakaran's orders. He was seen to
be a threat to the LTTE leader's authority and
popularity. Before he could rebel and consolidate his
support, Prabakaran had him quickly arrested, isolated,
tried for treason and eventually executed.
It is
unlikely that Karuna would not have thought about
Mahathaya's fate when he decided to speak out against
Prabakaran. He has done what even Mahathaya did not dare
do - wash the LTTE's dirty linen in public. Besides, the
magnitude of his rebellion and its implications for the
LTTE and the Tamil nationalist movement - he has laid
bare the deep rift between the LTTE's northern and
eastern wings and openly challenged the LTTE's claims to
be the sole representative of the Tamils or even of all
Tigers - is immense. Karuna has taken a huge risk by
challenging Prabakaran.
It is unlikely that
Karuna would take such a risk without firm assurances of
solid and sustained support from some powerful agency.
Not only is his personal survival under threat but also
he needs huge amounts of money to maintain his fighters
and to arm and train them. The Tamil diaspora, which
pours money into the Tigers' coffers, is unhappy with
Karuna for splitting the LTTE. It is unlikely to finance
his operations. Neither will Karuna have access to the
LTTE's awesome international resource-raising network.
This has prompted speculation over who might
have provided him with assurances of support in his
battle against Prabakaran.
Some have suggested
that it might be the Americans. After all, there is
little love lost between the US and the LTTE. Washington
has declared the LTTE a terrorist organization and has
refused to remove this tag despite the Tigers engaging
in negotiations with the Sri Lankan government. The US
has in fact openly backed the government and has warned
the LTTE of dire consequences if it walks out of the
peace process. Less than a week before the rebellion,
the US State Department issued a stern warning to the
LTTE, blaming it for the assassination of Sinnathamby
Sunderapillai, the United National Party's Batticaloa
candidate, and the killing of P Yogeswaran, a member of
the Eelam People's Democratic Party.
When it
expelled Karuna, the LTTE blamed "malicious elements"
for instigating Karuna's "traitorous act". It did not
elaborate on the identity of these "malicious elements".
In a subsequent interview to the Associated Press,
Thamilselvan, the LTTE's leader of the political wing,
accused "external forces" for the crisis. Although he
did not identify the external force, he elaborated that
it was one that "did not accept the LTTE's position of
being the sole representative of the Tamil people and
was jealous of the high regard and acceptance it was
enjoying in the international community".
The
description fits India somewhat.
If Thamilselvan
was indeed referring to India, it would not be the first
time the LTTE has blamed India for a rebellion in the
organization. Mahthaya was accused of being an Indian
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) agent to discredit him
in the eyes of the cadres, among whom he had a
considerable following. Incidentally, Mahthaya is said
to have established links with top RAW officials in
Colombo after Prabakaran gave him the green light to do
so.
As in the case of Mahthaya, the LTTE's
hinting at a RAW link could be to discredit Karuna and
to raise questions over his commitment to the cause of
Tamil Eelam. However, it is just as possible that the
present crisis in the LTTE might be an attempt by RAW to
break the organization. After all, RAW has a two-decade
history of involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict.
Sri Lankans have generally attributed the rise
of the LTTE to RAW's backing of this outfit. Sri Lankan
analysts have often argued that of the several militant
groups that RAW armed and trained from 1983 to 1987, the
LTTE was its favorite.
The relationship between
the two was not that simple or straightforward. While
RAW did indeed provide arms and training to the Sri
Lankan militant groups, including the LTTE, with arms
and training on Indian soil, it was not the LTTE but its
rival, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO),
that RAW was most generous with. Top RAW officials
involved in the Sri Lankan operation in the 1980s told
this correspondent that RAW backed TELO because it
(unlike the LTTE) was a rag-tag army of unruly fighters
who would do as RAW told them to, providing RAW leverage
in the militancy. At the same time, when the LTTE
massacred TELO militants in the summer of 1986, RAW
looked the other way and did little to help TELO. RAW's
strategy of arming all the main militant groups was
aimed at keeping the movement divided so that it would
be in control.
Right from the start, the LTTE
was suspicious of RAW's intentions and while it took
what RAW had to offer and might have conducted some
operations on RAW's orders, it did not allow RAW to
infiltrate it as had other militant groups. The collapse
of the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accord and the subsequent
outbreak of hostilities between the Tigers and the
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was attributed by the
LTTE in part to RAW's continuing supply of arms to its
rivals. The uneasy relationship between the two
deteriorated thereafter.
Although India has
maintained a hands-off approach to the Sri Lankan
conflict after its unpleasant IPKF experience on the
island, RAW has remained active in the Tamil areas. Its
attempts to split the LTTE might have increased in the
1990s, especially after the assassination of prime
minister Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE, when the LTTE came to
be seen as a serious threat to India's security
interests.
Analysts have been arguing that the
rift between the eastern and northern Tamils is the most
serious fault line that the LTTE has had to deal with.
Seeing opportunity in the growing rift along regional
lines, RAW could have established links with Karuna and
encouraged him to rebel.
Denying that RAW was
backing Karuna, a RAW official told Asia Time Online
that sections in Colombo might be backing Karuna in the
hope that his rebellion would weaken the Tigers. He
pointed out that while the Lankan army top brass was
refraining from taking sides in the Karuna-Prabakaran
faceoff, the middle-level officers would be in touch
with Karuna. "Karuna's anger and ambition has provided
the Lankan army or the intelligence with an opportunity
to strike at the LTTE. They will grab at any opportunity
that will undermine the LTTE, however minor the damage
might be," he added.
Muddying the picture
further are reports that Sri Lanka's main political
parties might be fishing in troubled waters. Since the
start of the peace talks, President Chandrika
Kumaratunga has firmly opposed the bonhomie between her
rival, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, and the
LTTE. The possibility that the army, which is under her
control, might be encouraging the split and backing
Karuna cannot be ruled out.
Meanwhile a report
in the Daily Mirror has claimed that one of the main
political parties - the UNP or the United People's
Freedom Alliance (UPFA) - has apparently offered a
cabinet portfolio to a candidate of the Tamil National
Alliance (an alliance of Tamil parties that acknowledges
the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil people)
who is said to have thrown in his lot with Karuna.
It is imperative for the LTTE to externalize the
problem. This makes it seem that the LTTE is a
monolithic organization with no internal differences or
problems. By labeling Karuna as someone who acted on the
orders of an external enemy, it is discrediting Karuna
and showing him as someone who is sleeping with the
enemy and who has loyalties to agencies that are opposed
to the "Tamil cause". For Karuna, it is important that
he is not labeled as a stooge for anyone. He is seeking
to highlight his rebellion as driven by altruistic
reasons - concern for eastern Tamil interests.
The LTTE and the breakaway group led by Karuna
are fighting a bitter propaganda war to discredit each
other. The many conspiracy theories pointing to powerful
patrons backing Karuna that are doing the rounds in Sri
Lanka today indicate that this round of the
Prabakaran-Karuna war is going in favor of Prabakaran.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
