Search Asia Times

Advanced Search

 
South Asia

Sri Lanka lays a welcome mat for India
By Sudha Ramachandran

BANGALORE - While India can be expected to view with caution the welcome mat that Sri Lanka's new prime minister, Mahinda Rajapakse, is laying out for Delhi, the invitation, which is aimed at getting India to play a larger role in the Sri Lankan peace process, could signal the start of deepening engagement between the two countries.

Soon after his swearing-in as prime minister on Tuesday, Rajapakse, described as a moderate on the peace process, told the media that "India must come in as soon as possible and get involved in the peace process". He did not, however, elaborate on what he wanted India to "come in" and do - whether he wants India to be diplomatically engaged with the process or to deploy troops to Sri Lanka in the event that faltering peace process collapses.

The ceasefire between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) still holds, but peace talks between the two have been in a state of suspension for several months. Although President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the new prime minister have stressed that reviving the peace process is a priority, there are fears that the peace initiative and the ceasefire will come apart soon.

The peace process was the initiative of former prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. He and the president differed sharply over how to resolve the ethnic conflict. Wickremesinghe seemed determined to resolve the conflict by making peace with or appeasing, as some would say, the LTTE, whatever the cost. Kumaratunga, on the other hand, argued that the costs were too high. Wickremesinghe's approach, she maintained, would lead to the division of the island. She opposed his move to hand over the entire northeastern province in Sri Lanka - what the LTTE claims as the Tamil homeland - to the Tigers under a proposed interim administration for the Tamil-majority region.

Over the past two years, India has refrained from taking sides in the Kumaratunga-Wickremesinghe rivalry. It has done business with Wickremesinghe and supported the quest for a negotiated settlement to the crisis. But like Kumaratunga, India is wary of the LTTE's intentions and has been uneasy with Wickremesinghe's conceding so much ground to the Tigers. Both Wickremesinghe and President Kumaratunga have visited India several times over the past two years to keep its leaders briefed on the peace initiative and their concerns regarding the process.

India's role in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has undergone dramatic changes over the past two decades. Between 1983 and July 1987, India was diplomatically engaged in finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict. At the same time, its external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), was arming and training Tamil militants on Indian soil. In 1987, India deployed troops in the Tamil areas of the island under a bilateral agreement. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was able to break the back of the LTTE but was asked by the Sri Lankan government to leave the island. That unhappy experience has influenced India's policy on the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict ever since, prompting it to adopt a "hands-off approach" toward the island.

India's hostility toward the LTTE worsened with the assassination of Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE. While the IPKF experience made India wary of involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict, the assassination underscored the immense threat posed by the Tigers to Indian security interests, and therefore, the need to contain the LTTE.

It is in this context that Rajapakse's request must be viewed. Kumaratunga and Rajapakse are aware that India, more than any other country, is their best bet to protect the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. (The division of the island is not in India's interest.) Both of the constituents of the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) government - the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) - are of this view.

Rajapakse's invitation to India - it is not an official request yet - is a shift from Sri Lanka's position in the late 1980s, when the Indian role in the quest for a settlement of the conflict was viewed with suspicion. In 1989, massive protests and violent agitations on the streets of the capital, Colombo, led by the JVP demanded the expulsion of the IPKF from Sri Lanka. The presence of the IPKF on Sri Lankan soil was regarded as "evidence of India's expansionist ambitions".

Over the years, Sri Lanka's hostility toward India has diminished. On several occasions, when the Sri Lankan army was in trouble, Colombo did look to India for help. The Sri Lankans recognize that peace in Sri Lanka is not possible without India's cooperation.

The JVP signaled its revised perception of India this year when its leader Somawamse Amarasinghe said the party "warmly embraced the proposed defense pact" between India and Sri Lanka. While criticizing the country's foreign policy and calling for a return to its former non-aligned policy, Amarasinghe endorsed a strengthening of ties with India. The defense pact "should be made an important aspect of our [Sri Lanka's] foreign policy", he said.

Meanwhile, Norway's role as mediator in the current peace process has provoked considerable concern among some sections in Sri Lanka, particularly among the country's Sinhalese majority, where there is a feeling that the Norwegian monitors have not always been neutral and are biased in favor of the LTTE. Many believe they seem prepared to go to any length to humor the Tigers in order to ensure that they do not return to fighting. As for the role of the West, Washington's tough posture toward the LTTE and its refusal to remove the terrorist tag on the outfit is widely welcomed among the Sinhalese. But there is a feeling that the US, Japan and other countries involved in the peace process are keen on the ceasefire only to improve the investment climate on the island.

"The possible division of Sri Lanka and the way in which the LTTE is using the ceasefire to build its military muscle does not bother them much," an official in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) told Asia Times Online. "This is not the case with India," he said, adding that India has been watching with concern the LTTE's recruitment of fighters during the ceasefire, its purchase of weapons and the growing activities of the Sea Tigers in India's neighborhood.

Late last year, the LTTE put forward a proposal for the creation of an interim self-governing authority (ISGA) in the Tamil areas that was widely viewed in India as a blueprint for an separate interim state. The awesome powers the Tigers demanded for the ISGA were seen as a threat to the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and India's security. The control that the LTTE-dominated ISGA would have over the marine and offshore resources of the "adjacent [to the northeast] seas and the power to regulate access thereto" not only implied recognition of the Sea Tigers - the LTTE's naval wing - but meant that the Sea Tigers would be in charge of the waters on one side of Sri Lanka's international boundary line with India. "India cannot ignore these developments which impinge on its security," the MEA official said.

Last year, when questions were raised in Sri Lanka over Norwegian monitoring of Tiger activity in the seas, Rajapakse, then leader of the opposition, called for Indian participation in the monitoring of the ceasefire. He said that the Indian Navy has a clearer idea about the movement of craft in this part of the Indian Ocean, making it a better ceasefire monitor, since most of the allegations against the Norwegian monitors were with regard to the handling of confrontations in the sea.

MEA sources said that "short of troop deployment in Sri Lanka, India would extend help to the government in every way, provided it moves forward on addressing legitimate Tamil grievances". How this help shapes up in the coming months remains to be seen. India is already training Sri Lankan soldiers here. The proposed defense pact between the two countries will see India increase the training and provision of military and equipment. India is also expected to strengthen the Palaly Air Base in the Jaffna Peninsula - in the heart of what has long been regarded as an LTTE bastion.

The LTTE, which is banned in India, has been attempting to patch things up with the country. It has sought to convince Delhi that it would "not act in any way prejudicial to India's geopolitical, strategic and economic interests".

Delhi, however, remains unconvinced.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)


Apr 9, 2004



Sri Lanka's bad moon keeps rising (Apr 6, '04)

Reluctant India drawn toward Sri Lanka (Feb 10, '04)

Covetous eyes on Sri Lanka's strategic jewel
(Jan 31, '04)

 

     
         
No material from Asia Times Online may be republished in any form without written permission.
Copyright 2003, Asia Times Online, 4305 Far East Finance Centre, 16 Harcourt Rd, Central, Hong Kong