As the
"shock and awe" related to the surprising, indeed,
stunning victory of the Congress Party in India sets in,
United States-India relations are most likely to remain
strong. In fact, one can prudently bet that the ties
will grow, regardless of what kind of "shock and awe"
the American voters are likely to produce in their own
country come November's presidential elections. However,
there are certain contradictions between India's role
under the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
and its position under the old days of the Congress
Party that might be revisited as the Congress' current
leaders take the helm of government. Equally important
is the careful management of a few potential glitches
between the world's most powerful democracy and the
largest democracy in the coming months and years, with a
view to avoiding deleterious tensions.
The BJP
consistently operated for the past seven or more years
on the principles of pragmatism, balance of power and
realism, based on post-Cold War global realities.
However, no one can state with certitude that India was
very much at ease with those principles. It is not clear
whether India's status as a rising power is essentially
in harmony with the profound moralistic strand of its
national character, its role as a champion of the
non-aligned movement (NAM), and its untiring advocacy in
the 1950s and 1960s for liberation, unity and economic
development of the former colonized nations of Asia and
Africa. In that role, India seemed to have found its
true calling, and its strategic niche. As a nuclear
power, it appears ill at ease about its new role. In
this sense, India continues to reflect contradictions
and paradoxes that are essential aspects of its highly
intricate personality as a nation.
India is
decidedly a rising power, yet it remains leery of how
its role is perceived by the world. Even as a
practitioner of pragmatism and balance of power, the
moralistic streak of its strategic culture continues to
pull India toward idealism. At times, it appears
uncomfortable in its newly developed trait of pragmatic
foreign policy. Even after becoming a nuclear power in
the late 1990s, it has remained serious in its
commitment to see a nuclear weapons-free world. At the
same time, it, more than others, remains mindful of the
contradictory nature of its position related to the
potential use of nuclear weapons.
While fully
aware of the competitive nature of its strategic affairs
with its equally paradoxical neighbor, China, India
still wants to evolve a genuine friendship. At the same
time, the humiliation related to China's 1962 invasion
of its territory continues to serve as a chief obstacle
to trusting that country once again as a peaceful
neighbor. Still, India is pulled between its normal urge
for cooperation and the strategic reality, indeed, the
agonizing necessity, of competition with China.
Regarding Pakistan, India's ties are drenched in
a long and bitter history of mistrust, ambivalence and
even paranoia. One must hasten to add that Pakistan
manifests similar emotions and complexes toward its
larger and more powerful neighbor. In addition, Pakistan
can never forget that India was largely responsible for
the dismantlement of its eastern wing (present
Bangladesh). Despite such feelings, there has been a
frequent surge (or even urge) in India to "normalize"
relations with Pakistan. However, the paradoxical aspect
of that surge is a refusal to find a solution of the
Kashmir issue, based on territorial adjustment or
compromise. Both South Asian nations have remained
prisoners of this reality. Thus, the political
resolution of the Kashmir conflict remains a mirage, and
their inability for its resolution a major source of
animosity and friction. These contradictions and
paradoxes are likely to remain unresolved toward China
and Pakistan under the rule of the Congress.
The
role of the United States in Southern Asia is
inextricably linked to these paradoxes and
contradictions. Washington's presence in South Asia is
primarily driven by its intense preoccupation with its
global "war on terrorism". The expectation on the part
of the Bush administration is that China, India and
Pakistan will continue to bring about adjustments and
accommodations in their respective strategic affairs in
response to Washington's requirements of the "war on
terror". Therein lies the rub.
Under the
government of outgoing prime minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee, India was willing to accommodate America's war
on terrorism-related predilections and preferences,
especially since those characteristics also served as
pressure points on Pakistan. As Pakistan continues to
crack down on its Islamist parties, India is not likely
to be sure how close the US and Pakistan will become in
the coming years. Despite the sustained evolution of
US-India strategic ties, Indian leaders - irrespective
of their party affiliations - envision America's ties
with India and Pakistan on the basis of a zero-sum game,
where gains made by Islamabad roughly equal losses
absorbed by India, and vice versa. Pakistan holds
essentially similar perspectives regarding its ties with
the US.
No matter how much US decisionmakers
remain mindful of this reality, they are not likely to
adjust the policy of their own country to suit Indian or
Pakistani strategic preferences. In the coming months,
this reality promises to remain unchanged.
Notwithstanding the complexities related to the
preceding, under Congress rule, the issue of India's
erstwhile commitment to the NAM is likely to become an
issue of potential disagreement, or even contention.
Even though this movement is regarded in the West as
moribund and irrelevant, Indian officials might once
again become nostalgic about it under Congress. After
all, it is part of the shining legacy of one of its
stalwarts and India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru. How far the current leaders of the Congress would
go in pressing the NAM as a new emphasis of India's
foreign policy will depend on what else is at stake at a
given time.
A potentially more troubling issue
between Washington and New Delhi under Congress might be
the resurgence of India's long-standing tradition of
pursuing an independent foreign policy, another legacy
of the Nehru era. It is important to note that this
particular tradition has not entirely vanished from
India's foreign policy, even under the Vajpayee
premiership. One noteworthy example was New Delhi's
refusal to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq, despite
heavy pressure from Washington.
Given its
special ties with the regime of Saddam Hussein, India
did not support the US invasion of Iraq. However,
considering the significance it attached to its
strategic ties with Washington, it decided not be become
too vocal in its opposition to that development. But
when the Bush administration was in dire need of India's
show of support through the commitment of its military
force in Iraq, leaders in New Delhi flatly refused to do
so. Of course, other reasons governed India's refusal.
But the end result was that it did not, thereby
underscoring its tradition of pursuing independent
foreign policy. With the Congress becoming the lead
ruling party, this tradition of independence is likely
to be manifested frequently. How the US will react to
such divergence of foreign policy perspectives remains
one of the unknowns of US-India ties in the coming
months.
Ultimately, it is safe to conclude that
US-India ties might have reached a point when honest
disagreements (or even major incongruities) between
friends will not create irreparable damage to their
fledgling strategic relationship. The new Indian leaders
are likely to be extra careful to sustain creative
momentum in their country's relations with the US. They
have to be mindful that China and Pakistan will be
watching from the sidelines, looking for openings to
gain maximum benefits for their respective interests,
especially when it comes to undermining India's
advantages vis-a-vis the lone superpower.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
