Iraq and the lessons of
Punjab By Siddharth Srivastava
NEW DELHI - What does Punjab have to do with
Iraq? Observers here in India have been drawing
comparisons between the hostile situation that reached a
flashpoint recently in Fallujah and the terrorism that
had infested India's western state of Punjab during the
1980s.
The discussions (especially in the
seminar circuit) were set off by a recent article by
noted columnist Swaminathan S Anklesharia Aiyar in The
Times of India that correlates the situation in Fallujah
(and by extension the rest of Iraq) and what took place
in Punjab. Given the volatile situation that the
coalition troops face in Iraq, and by comparison the
peace now reigning in Punjab, there are lessons to be
learned about dealing with an increasingly sensitive
population. Below are some jottings from the ideas
making the rounds.
Terror and religious
shrines This is a tricky situation, as an attack
on a religious shrine translates into an assault on the
entire community. Reports from Fallujah indicate that
the minaret of a mosque was destroyed by US forces when
it was suspected that armed rebels were holed up inside.
These are the kinds of actions that provide grist to
people looking to influence young minds into joining the
ranks of Islamic militancy.
Such a mistake was
made in Punjab in 1984 when then-prime minister Indira
Gandhi ordered troops into the most religious shrine of
the Sikhs, the Golden Temple at Amritsar. Code-named
Operation Bluestar, the army successfully flushed out
the terrorists, but at a huge cost - scores of pilgrims
trapped inside were killed in the crossfire and the
sanctorum of the temple was damaged. The Sikhs saw the
assault as an attack on their dignity. Gandhi paid the
ultimate price when two of her own personal security
guards (both Sikhs) assassinated her. What followed were
mass killings of Sikhs by Hindus that drove terrorism in
Punjab to its worst levels.
A similar situation
happened again in 1988 under prime minister Rajiv
Gandhi. Rajiv, however, did not repeat the mistake of
his mother. In what was code-named Operation Black
Thunder, pilgrims were given time to move out, the
morale of the militants was broken by cutting off food,
water and electricity supplies, while care was taken not
to damage any portion of the temple. The operation was
hailed as a victory. Religious shrines hold immense
symbolic value and terrorists should not be allowed to
gain sanctuary inside them.
Violation of
civil rights In an operation of the scale in
Iraq, the innocent are bound to suffer. With tempers
frayed, a sense of insecurity and people dying on both
sides, situations such as what happened at the Abu
Ghraib prison are waiting to take place. This is not to
condone or justify such behavior, but the fact it was
perpetrated by US soldiers (read outsiders) makes it
worse. Associated with this argument are the differences
over who should exercise control over US troops under
the new interim government in Iraq.
Terrorism in
Punjab was finally tackled by a police officer named K P
S Gill, a Sikh, who achieved cult status as a man who
literally browbeat the malaise. As head of the Punjab
police force, he was given a free run by the political
establishment. He turned the Punjab police force into a
group of henchmen owing personal loyalty to him and
resorted to extrajudicial killings and torture. Many
innocents died, but so did terrorism, and the mass
public opinion slowly turned in Gill's favor as normalcy
returned.
The crucial factor here is the fact
that Gill was a Sikh and hence had an acceptance level
that no person from an outside community could have
enjoyed. In his book Punjab: Knights of
Falsehood, Gill argues strongly that terrorism in
Punjab was defeated not by some mystical force called
"popular will" but by force of arms. Voices emerging
from Iraq suggest that people would have preferred to be
tortured under the Saddam Hussein regime rather than by
US forces. This is a significant psychological factor.
There seems to be a realization of this fact in
Fallujah, where Saddam's former policemen have been
entrusted with the authority to bring order. You need
local thugs to handle local thugs.
Military
versus police strategy Terrorism in Punjab was
solved when the military pulled back and the police were
handed the authority to maintain law and order. There
are several differences between the methods of operation
of the military and the police. The personnel of the
military do not belong to the local community and hence
are unaware of cultural and social sensitivities. The
police force, on the other hand, is recruited from
within the area, with members sharing filiations as
friends and relatives. The mode of operation of the
military is through tanks and rocket-launchers that may
kill a militant but cost the lives of scores of
civilians as well. The police rely on local intelligence
and word of mouth to pin down the adversary.
As
long as tanks and armored vehicles patrolled the streets
of Punjab, militancy only became worse. The police under
Gill developed a very strong intelligence network. They
may have erred several times, but there was a fear in
everybody's mind that the next-door neighbor was an
informer. No terrorist could melt into the crowds and
feel secure. This is the kind of local networking that
will be needed in Iraq for the coalition forces to
succeed, even if it requires the renomination of those
who were security personnel under the Saddam regime. One
of the reasons attributed to the failure to tackle
terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir is the large presence
of the army and paramilitary forces considered aliens.
Institutions matter While the police
went about their business in Punjab, a strong democratic
foundation was being simultaneously laid. Despite years
of the president's rule when the state was under central
control, elections were held periodically to allow the
people to choose the government of their liking. The
Akalis, who enjoyed popular support of the Sikhs as
having a true understanding of the aspirations of the
people of the state, were elected. So was the Congress
party, the other main political force in the state.
In the past decade both the Akalis and Congress
have intermittently enjoyed power. Both parties know
that the people of Punjab will not tolerate terrorism or
atrocities by the police. Development is the keyword,
and Gill has retired and since returned to Delhi.
A similar exercise needs to be implemented in
Iraq wherein a tough police force (that harks back to
the Saddam regime) will play an interim role until true
democratic institutions take over. Only then will the
forced nostalgia associated with the supposed good times
with Saddam be exorcised for good.
Siddharth Srivastava is a New
Delhi-based journalist.
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