NEW
DELHI - No dramatic declarations have resulted;
even some of the announcements that could reasonably be
expected from this week's talks between the foreign
secretaries of India and Pakistan about new
transportation links in Kashmir have been deferred. Yet
there is optimism in the air. The mere fact that India
and Pakistan could stick to the schedule set by the
previous Indian government for talks on the final
resolution of the 57-year-old dispute over the state of
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is considered good enough.
A beginning has been made and from all accounts
it is a good beginning. From years of "talks about
talks", the two countries have finally moved to
discussing "solutions" for J&K. Though officials of
both countries are unwilling to offer an opinion, there
seems to have been give and take. India has again
committed itself to a "peaceful negotiated settlement"
of J&K in a formal acceptance of its "disputed"
nature, while Pakistan has accepted the "bilateral"
nature of the dialogue and dropped the insistence on a
plebiscite and third-party mediation.
Kashmiris
will be encouraged to talk among themselves; their
mutual interaction will be promoted through new bus
routes and they will be consulted by both countries in
some form, though there is no agreement on holding
tripartite talks. Pakistan foreign office spokesperson
Masood Khan expressed the view that "what will satisfy
Pakistan will ultimately satisfy Kashmiris".
The
confidence-building measures (CBMs) announced include
advance notification of missile tests, reopening of
consulate generals in Mumbai and Karachi, restoration of
high commission strengths to 110, as well as the release
of fishermen held in custody by one country to the
other. The countries also proposed a comprehensive
framework for conventional CBMs aimed at enhancing
communication, coordination and interaction. Areas
designated for composite dialogue include Siachen, Sir
Creek and the Tulbul navigation project.
Indian
External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh won a victory of
sorts, with Pakistan Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokhar and
Indian Foreign Secretary Shashank signing a joint
statement after two days of talks earlier this week
reiterating their determination to implement the Shimla
Agreement in letter and spirit. This is something on
which Natwar Singh has been insisting ever since he was
appointed minister. Pakistan, on the other hand, was not
so keen on mentioning this agreement as this was made
following its defeat in the 1971 war and many in
Pakistan think it is a document imposed on them by the
victor in that war.
It was, however, able to get
in a commitment to "the principles and purposes of the
charter of the United Nations" included in the text. The
determination to implement the Shimla Agreement in the
statement also endorses the UN role as article 1 of the
agreement specifically provides that "the principles and
purposes of the charter of the United Nations shall
govern the relations between the two countries". Though
this has been presented as a new development, even the
Lahore declaration signed by previous Indian and
Pakistani governments made a one-sentence mention to
both Shimla and the UN Charter. The UN charter goes with
Shimla easily as the 1972 document itself mentions the
UN charter.
Interestingly, and to the
consternation of Yashwant Sinha, external affairs
minister in the previous government and now a spokesman
of the main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the
joint statement does not mention the Lahore Declaration
signed by former prime ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee
and Nawaz Sharif and gives little importance to the
joint press statement of January 6 this year, though
both countries had described it at the time as
"path-breaking".
There is some disquiet among
observers in India over the mention of the UN charter
along with Shimla Agreement, as the two appear to
contradict each other. The 1972 accord signed by late
prime ministers Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
called for a bilateral resolution of all disputes. Some
analysts are calling this "a major shift in Indian
policy under the new Congress-led government", which has
moved Kashmir back into the realm of the UN charter.
Fears are being expressed that this can open the doors
for "self-determination" and Security Council
intervention to resolve a "dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security". India has denied the
UN a role in Kashmir consistently for close to three
decades. But, according to some observers, it would now
appear to have suddenly decided to follow Pakistan in
reiterating its "commitment to the principles and
purposes of the charter of the United Nations" in the
joint statement the foreign secretaries of the two
countries signed on Monday.
Some Indian analysts
are saying that the shift could amount to a major
concession for Pakistan, which has been steadfast in its
demand for implementation of the UN charter in J&K.
India has consistently said that the state was an
"integral part of India" and not a dispute. However, the
nuclear tests conducted by the Vajpayee government in
1998 changed the situation dramatically and
internationalized the dispute as Pakistan, too, followed
suit and conducted its own nuclear tests within a
fortnight. This turned Kashmir into a nuclear flashpoint
in the eyes of the international community, which
started demanding and pressurizing both countries that a
quick solution to the Kashmir dispute be found.
The Pakistan position articulated every year at
the UN by its permanent representative has been in favor
of the implementation of the UN charter for the
resolution of J&K. The Vajpayee government continued
to resist UN intervention, with at least two offers by
UN secretary general Kofi Annan to send special envoys
to New Delhi being rejected by the government. The Agra
Accord that couldn't be signed due to a last-minute
hitch and the January 6 joint press release endorsed by
both Vajpayee and Pakistan President General Pervez
Musharraf did not carry a single reference, either
direct or indirect, to the UN. Obviously, India has
agreed to mention Pakistan's continued demand for a UN
role in Kashmir after hard negotiations, though in a
sense it had become inevitable with its insistence on
bringing in the parameters of Shimla accord.
Interestingly, just two days after India had
accepted the role of the UN charter in the joint
declaration, Pakistan, too, made a departure from its
oft-stated position and asserted there was no need for
third-party mediation to resolve the Kashmir issue with
India as talks between the two countries on it were in
progress. "Pakistan is not asking for any mediation. It
is not necessary," Pakistan Foreign Secretary Riaz
Khokhar told Pakistan Television on Wednesday. Earlier,
Pakistan always called for third-party mediation by the
US, the UN or by European Union countries.
With
the joint declaration mentioning the Shimla pact and the
UN charter in the same breath, it would appear that both
countries have agreed to appreciate each other's
position. But the Shimla pact that is so passionately
favored by the Indian foreign minister is not without
its critics. Indeed, its most vocal critic is former
foreign secretary J N Dixit, who is now the national
security adviser. In his considered view, as expressed
in his book India's Foreign Policy 1947-2003,
"The Shimla Agreement, in effect, allowed the Kashmir
issue to be kept alive with India acknowledging that it
is a dispute still to be settled. This Indian stand
vis-a-vis Pakistan is also in profound contradiction of
the basic Indian position that the status of Jammu and
Kashmir is not debatable, and that in terms of the India
Independence Act and subsequent political and
constitutional developments, J&K is an integral part
of India."
Dixit writes: "It was a failure of
India's foreign policy to have allowed Jammu and Kashmir
to be acknowledged as a dispute. India should have
insisted on Pakistan giving up its claims on Jammu and
Kashmir or at least fully acknowledging Indian
jurisdiction over those portions of Jammu and Kashmir
which India controlled as an integral part of itself."
In his view, India lost a valuable opportunity for
resolving the J&K problem at the time. He says: "We
did not take advantage of our military victory in 1971."
In contrast, Bhutto was able to fulfill "three crucial
objectives" from Pakistan's point of view through the
Shimla Agreement. These were the release of Pakistani
prisoners of war, the vacation of Pakistani territory by
the Indian armed forces and, finally, "he kept the
Kashmir issue alive as a bilateral dispute".
The
expected agreement over a bus service between the
capital cities of the states of J&K under Indian and
Pakistani control has been deferred. Both sides agreed
in principle to the desirability of the proposal for the
bus from Srinagar (in Indian-administered Kashmir) to
Muzaffarabad (Pakistan-administered Kashmir) but could
not agree on some technical details. India is adamant
that it will not accept documents other than a passport
for travel across, while Pakistan remains insistent that
this is not acceptable as it would amount to the
acceptance of the Line of Control [LoC] that separates
the two territories as an international border. The
dates for technical-level talks have not been fixed as
yet. Neither side was able to say if these talks would
be held before the foreign ministers meet in August for
the first political-level review of the progress.
People-to-people contacts India seems
to have finally understood the value of people-to-people
contacts as an essential tool for maintaining the
atmosphere of bonhomie that is propelling the two
countries towards peace. New Delhi proposed a slew of
Kashmir-specific initiatives, including the radical
cross-LoC transport links so as to build confidence
between people living on both sides of the line. As the
Pakistani interlocutors insisted that the "wishes of the
Kashmiri people" must be taken into account, the Indian
side argued, the best way to do so would be to allow
Kashmiris from both sides of the LoC to meet each other.
Going beyond its dramatic proposal of running a
cross-LoC bus from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad it also
proposed a bus link from Suchetgarh to Sialkot. The
Pakistani side requested that it "be given more time" to
study the proposals made by New Delhi.
The next
ticklish issue, the reduction of troops in the Valley,
according to Pakistan spokesperson Masood Khan, was not
discussed as "we did not get that far". Pakistan
appeared happy that India was finally at the negotiating
table on the issue of J&K. Khan replied to a
question about the state being an integral part of India
by asking "why are India and Pakistan talking about
Kashmir, why is it on their agenda". He obviously wanted
to indicate that New Delhi no longer considered J&K
as an integral part of India. He said both sides had
decided to discuss solutions to the J&K issue and,
"in our view, the Indian leadership's policy is positive
and focused on a solution of the problem". Indeed, India
has not spoken of J&K as an integral part of the
country for close to four years now. Even the previous
coalition government led by the Hindu fundamentalist BJP
did not make any reference to this.
Some of the
best CBMs are those concessions that remain unspoken,
unmentioned in any document. Like India dropping its
"integral part" chant, Pakistan has tacitly approved the
security fence being erected along the LoC in J&K.
New Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee pointed out
on Wednesday: "Of course, if Pakistan is not creating
hurdles in the erection of the fence like opening fire
to deter work as it would do in the past, one can infer
the fencing has the neighboring country's tacit
approval. Indeed, the ceasefire itself is an indication
of moving in a positive direction. The resumption of
talks too is a signal that we are moving in the right
direction. I would not like to draw any conclusions
right now. But at the same time, I will say these are
encouraging developments."
Grounds for
optimism One of the main grounds for optimism in
the tough negotiations ahead is that the Congress-led
government will not face the kind of pressure it used to
face from the Hindu supremacist BJP. Though the BJP has
decided to go "back to the basics", that is hardline
Hindutva, following its defeat in the recent polls, as
far as a negotiated final settlement of Kashmir is
concerned, its ability to hamper negotiations will now
be limited. BJP leader and former premier Vajpayee
originally started the process by extending a hand of
friendship to Pakistan from the soil of Kashmir, that,
too, after trying his hand at the toughest possible
"pro-active" lines, from toying with "hot-pursuit of
cross-border terrorists" and tough action by security
forces to keeping almost the entire army eye-balling
Pakistani armed forces for almost a year. Vajpayee may
have been sidelined from the party now, but until the
last moment in the elections and throughout his rule, he
was projected by the party as its tallest, unquestioned
leader and a great statesman.
Across the border,
the Pakistan army and Muslim fundamentalists in Kashmir,
too, seem to have learned a lesson from the 57-year-old
confrontations, including the 15 years of militancy and
a virtual proxy war waged by Pakistan. Musharraf has
shown realism by virtually abandoning insistence on a
solution based on UN resolutions of 1948 that India and
most of the world considers obsolete. The chief patron
of Pakistan's Muslim fundamentalists and head of the
powerful six-party coalition of Muslim fundamentalist
parties in Pakistan, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, also known
as the "Father of the Taliban" and supporter of Osama
bin Laden, himself visited India in July last year and
surprised many by his moderate language in a quest for
peace and efforts to reach out not only to Vajpayee, who
has cultivated a moderate image, but even to hardline
Hindu fundamentalists, including the leaders of the
Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh who were ruling the country
by proxy at that time. (See India sits up and listens, Jul
24, 2003.)
It is in the climate of peace created
by Musharraf's repeated calls for dialogue, Pakistani
fundamentalists' moderation and realism in the face of a
bigger threat, the US army that is stationed in the
immediate neighborhood and operating sometimes within
the country, Pakistan's foremost columnists and
academicians, like Ayaz Amir and Pervez Hoodbhoy, are
able to call for LoC-based solutions to the Kashmir
dispute. This used to be anathema to Pakistan.
This realism is in evidence in all sections of
Pakistan. Amir is most articulate on this point. He says
in the influential Dawn newspaper: "The 1965 [war] was a
strategic defeat, because setting out to liberate
Kashmir, the Pakistan army found itself defending Lahore
and Sialkot ... Far from focusing attention on the need
for a Kashmir solution, it [Kargil war] put the
spotlight on Pakistan's sponsorship of cross-border
terrorism. After September 11, a combination of American
and Indian pressure compelled General Musharraf to give
assurances about rolling up jihad in Kashmir.
"The Line of Control is thus not a whimsical
line on the map. It marks the farther-most limits of
Pakistani military prowess. Beyond this line we couldn't
go. There can be nothing more concrete than this. We
waged war to bring India to the negotiating table, but
the Dien Bien Phu [weak Vietnamese leaders] our generals
hoped for, never happened. Instead, our wars exposed the
limits of our capability and cast a wan light on many of
our cherished illusions (mostly to do with our valor and
Indian weakness)."
Some solutions It
is in this atmosphere of great goodwill that one of
India's foremost jurists, A G Noorani, is able to
suggest solutions that call for joint sovereignty of
India and Pakistan on some areas presently under the
exclusive control of either country, though they would
not disturb the LoC and instead turn it into an
international border. Veteran Kashmiri leader who
brought the Kashmir Valley into the Indian fold,
convincing his followers to join hands with secular
India rather than Islamic Pakistan, Sheikh Abdullah
suggested on February 20, 1948: "The solution was that
Kashmir should accede to both dominions."
India,
he said, was progressive. On the other hand, Kashmir's
trade passed through Pakistan and a hostile Pakistan
would be a constant danger. The solution, therefore, was
that Kashmir should have its autonomy jointly guaranteed
by India and Pakistan and it would delegate its foreign
policy and defense to them both jointly but could look
after its own internal affairs."
Noorani finds
that joint delegation "a constitutional impossibility".
But, he suggests, Kashmiris can negotiate with both
countries for maximum autonomy possible to each part of
the state, including the right to conduct foreign trade.
The issue of sovereignty resolved, the LoC becomes an
international border with freedom of movement on both
sides, guarantees to human rights, etc. He sights the
South Asian precedent of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty, signed
in Kabul on November 22, 1921, which reaffirmed the
validity of the Durand Line. However, by a collateral
letter given to Afghanistan at the same time, the
British representative wrote: "As the conditions of the
tribes of the two governments are of interest to the
government of Afghanistan, I inform you that the British
government entertains feelings of good-will towards all
the frontier tribes and has every intention of treating
them generously, provided they abstain from outrages
against the inhabitants of India."
Similarly,
Sweden and Finland settled their dispute over the
predominantly Swedish Aaland Islands under the auspices
of the League of Nations on June 27, 1921. Finland
promised "to guarantee to the population of the Aaland
Islands the preservation of their language, of their
culture, and of their local Swedish traditions". It
undertook to enforce its Law of Autonomy of May 7, 1920.
This is regarded as one of the important achievements of
the now-defunct League of Nations under whose auspices
the agreement was negotiated. Also, on September 5,
1946, Italy and Austria signed an agreement under which
Italy undertook to grant its German-speaking Bolzano
province adjoining Austria, and the neighboring
bilingual townships of the Trento province "autonomous
legislative and executive regional power", besides
rights. The details were settled in 1992, including
provision for international adjudication if the autonomy
was violated.
Noorani feels that if these models
are adopted, each country will gain enough to sell the
accord to its people; yet, concede enough to make it
acceptable to other countries as well as to the people
of the state. Kashmiris will acquire double guarantees
of autonomy - domestic and international. Pakistan can
claim: "We have secured azadi [independence] for
Kashmir for which we are a guarantor." India can claim:
"Kashmir's accession is no longer in dispute." The peace
dividends both will reap will be colossal.
Most
solutions to the Kashmir dispute have revolved around
the Dixon Plan calling for partition of Kashmir as well
as a plebiscite in those areas where the outcome was
doubtful. Sir Owen Dixon, the UN representative who came
to the sub-continent pursuant to the Security Council's
1950 resolution on the Kashmir dispute, had come very
close to solving the issue once and for all. Then
Pakistan prime minister Liaquat Khan and top Indian
leaders like Nehru, Sardar Patel and Dr Rajendra Prasad
had come round to accepting it. The proposal fell on the
issue of how to go about organizing a plebiscite. But
besides its unacceptability in India, a plebiscite will
now amount to opening long, festering wounds.
It
should not be beyond the capacity of 21st century India
and Pakistan to find new and creative solutions that
would be acceptable to both their peoples, as well as
the people of J&K on both sides of the LoC. The
solutions will, however, emerge only through dialogue
and free interaction. Let us hope the foreign ministers
meeting in August will bring more good news for the
beleaguered people of J&K. The final aim, of course,
should be to lift the shadow of the gun which is not
doing anybody any good.
(Copyright 2004 Asia
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