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India: Whose government is it, anyway?
By Ramtanu Maitra

To identify the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as a Congress party-led government would be altogether wrong. The government has at least three power centers - the first is the Congress party under Sonia Gandhi, the second is Railway Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav and his Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), and the third is the left of all stripes.

Because of its weakness, the Congress is unable to stem the tide of either Yadav or the left-wing faction, and it is almost a certainty that more power centers within the government will begin to surface in the near future.

Does this mean the UPA will collapse like the proverbial house of cards? Not necessarily. As long as Manmohan Singh can make policy concessions, even if they are token concessions, without hurting the Congress, the boat will remain afloat. Whether this boat will be able to get to the riverbank to deliver anything is another matter, however.

There is another reason the government will not disappear in a hurry: there is no opposition to replace it. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) resembles Humpty-Dumpty. It will take more than the Vishva Hindu Parishad, the Bajrang Dal, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and other hardline Hindu organizations and the saner heads within the party to put Humpty-Dumpty together again. This will give the UPA time.

The importance of political stature
All of this is not to say that the previous multiparty coalition government, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) under Atal Bihari Vajpayee, was highly functional. It was not, and that was underscored by the Indian electorate in the April 20-May10, four-phase parliamentary elections. Despite the similarity between these two governments in their lack of effectiveness, there is nonetheless an important difference: the NDA prime minister had real political stature. Vajpayee did not always have the political strength, but he had the personal political standing to fend off potential power-grabbers and prevent the formation of additional power centers within the government.

The difference between Vajpayee and Singh in this regard is simple: Vajpayee is a politician and Singh is not. Despite the ideological distortions he inherited because of his total immersion in the RSS, Vajpayee worked all his life with the people, with his feet firmly on the ground, his eyes closed perhaps, but his ears picking up people's words. Vajpayee's political experience did not translate directly into sound economic policymaking. He never had any real understanding of the economy. But, as he came to realize toward the end of his term, the issue is in any case not the complicated operations of the financial world but the straightforward, people-oriented physical economy that consists of the country's physical infrastructure, its transport, health care, education etc.

The ideological gobbledygook of globalization, even when declaimed by a man of his stature and political maturity, he found, does not carry far. It is perhaps this understanding that led him to make the excellent push for rapid development of national highways and to propose interlinking of the rivers to end the annual drought-and-flood cycle that haunts almost all Indians.

Vajpayee's political maturity was a more obvious asset in the area of foreign policy. There is no question that during the five years of the Vajpayee-led NDA administration, India exhibited the most mature foreign-policy framework since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru when India gained independence in 1947. The understanding of the colossal importance of both China and Russia being close allies of India; the wholehearted effort to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir dispute with Pakistan; and initiation of a dialogue toward developing strategic relations with the United States - all this showed a political maturity and statesmanship not seen in New Delhi for more than 30 years.

Manmohan Singh is not a politician. His understanding of foreign policy is broad, and not fine-tuned. One may say that he has able lieutenants in K Natwar Singh and National Security Adviser J N Dixit. But without the ability to make creative input into the foreign policy of a country of more than a billion people, the stature of the prime minister is lowered and, in essence, another power center is created, however positive and friendly that power center may be.

Pro-poor policies?
Manmohan Singh is, however, an economist. He was the architect and implementer of India's liberalization policy in 1991 under the guidance of former prime minister P V Narasimha Rao. Now, for political reasons, he is entrusted with a different economic task. With the help of his team, he will have to guide the economy away from a strict growth orientation to encompass policies that are more helpful to the poor than to the middle class or the rich. This is a much more difficult task than simple growth generation. Unfortunately, he is not likely to get a whole lot of help on this from the Congress power center, Sonia Gandhi. She likes the poor and would like to ease their burden, but has little idea how 300 million Indian people can be delivered from poverty.

The prime minister's economic colleagues - Finance Minister P Chidambaram and Planning Commission deputy chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia - are also unlikely to provide much assistance. Educated with "Washington Consensus"-bred economic policies, Manmohan Singh's top economic officials believe growth is the panacea. Growth creates a trickling effect; if the growth is higher, the trickle effect is stronger. And that strong trickle, instead of losing its way, may even reach the most unskilled and poorest of landless Indians. Chidambaram and Ahluwalia know very well how to utilize the skilled and educated people to generate growth, but they have no credentials whatsoever when it comes to getting the poor out of their numbing illiteracy and hapless poverty.

Chidambaram told parliament on July 8 when he presented the budget that boosting investment was vital to achieve his growth target and to fight poverty: "It is my goal to make the environment in India attractive to investors," he said. But the 2004-05 budget contained few major concrete measures that would suggest the finance minister is serious. It imposes a 2% levy on all taxes, an additional 10% surcharge on people earning more than US$19,230 a year and raises corporate taxes by an extra 2.5%.

Spending was lifted $2.2 billion over the previous government's interim budget in February. The increase is largely to deliver the Congress-led coalition's promised "new deal" for rural India, which brought it to power. But in this, too, there is a caveat. For instance, as pointed out by former prime minister Chandra Shekhar in an op-ed in The Hindu on July 14, Chidambaram "spoke at length about reviewing and developing water bodies". The aim was to address the concerns of rural India, where water is a life-and-death issue. But in the end, one finds the finance minister has allocated just $22 million, in place of the NDA's last budgetary allocation of about $16 million, for the entire country. "How many of India's water bodies and watersheds does the finance minister think he can renew with this paltry amount?" asked the former prime minister. "This is nothing but the most cynical tokenism," he concluded.

But Manmohan Singh cut his economic teeth during the Nehruvian days of the Indian economy, when the public sector was declared to be India's commanding heights. He was not directly involved in it, but is fully conversant with the green revolution that saved the nation and developed a viable agricultural sector. He can, if he wants to, guide his financial whiz-kid colleagues to formulate policies that would positively affect the poor.

But if he tries to do that, he could be checkmated by at least two other power centers, and perhaps create new ones. The greatest problem would come from the left wing, with its 61 parliamentarians supporting the government from outside. The left "owns" two of India's states - West Bengal, fully, and Kerala, partly. Its objective is to maintain the ownership of these two states, both of which are very poor, forever and ever. The left claims to support a pro-poor economic policy to ensure greater allocation of money to the poor from India's annual budget. But the left insists that allocations must be disbursed through the states, because the left wants to control the money in the states it "owns". Any attempt by New Delhi to try to alleviate poverty directly would result in the left pulling the government down. The left has already made clear that the UPA's economic policy must have its approval, or else.

The muscleman
The third power center is represented by Laloo Prasad Yadav, a self-proclaimed socialist who outwits everyone with his caste politics using sheer native Bihari cleverness. He is a loose cannon. It is impossible to figure out in which direction he will fire next. He needs money because he wants to "own" Bihar as the left "owns" West Bengal. He is not there yet, but he would like to use his muscle, and his stick, to get New Delhi's help to get there. It is evident that Laloo Yadav is no one's patsy. But once he is in an alliance, unless the alliance leader has the political acumen to straitjacket him, Laloo Yadav will remain a power center of his own, no matter what.

Bihar is arguably the poorest state in India, and lawlessness reigns supreme all over the state. The poverty and the anarchy are controlled by the powers-that-be. Today, as it has been for a few years, one of the controllers of poverty and anarchy is Laloo Prasad Yadav. New Delhi is fully aware that if any attempt is made by the central government to alleviate poverty or bring back law and order in the sate, it will have to confront Laloo Yadav. The UPA will not do that because Laloo Yadav's support is essential to maintain its majority in the Lok Sabha, or Lower House.

The UPA has no reason to collapse. The BJP will take a long time to figure out why the NDA lost the elections and who was responsible for the defeat. Even if it figures that out, it could take years to put the right people into the right places to make a comeback. Hence the BJP is not a threat. There is really no threat to the UPA's survival. The question is: what kind of survival will it be?

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)


Jul 22, 2004



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