NEW
DELHI - Several high level contacts between India and
Japan this month are set to ensure a major boost to
bilateral ties. This is welcome, particularly after the
chill produced by Japan's negative response to India's
nuclear tests in May 1998. But the Indian foreign policy
establishment is still at a loss to fully understand the
whys and wherefores of the Japanese ambassador's
suggestion earlier this year for an India-China-Japan
trilateral axis, and its noticeable welcome in the
official Chinese media.
Looking for foreign
policy initiatives of its own while continuing with
follow-ups on the previous coalition government's highly
successful tenure, the new United Progressive Alliance
government in New Delhi is, however, considering this
possibility quite seriously, particularly in the context
of the diminishing influence of the United States in the
region following the mess it has made of its "war on
terrorism" in Iraq and Afghanistan and the widely felt
need to counter-balance America's global hegemony. Also,
it is a measure of how far Asia's economic integration
has already advanced, Indians argue, that China has
become Japan's largest foreign market, replacing the US.
Greater China, including Taiwan and Hong Kong, is
India's third largest-trading partner after the US and
the European Union.
Japanese Foreign Minister
Yoriko Kawaguchi visited New Delhi just over a week ago,
and ministers for information technology and for
economy, trade and infrastructure are scheduled to visit
later this month. Kawaguchi was visiting India for the
second time in two years. She called on Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, among others, and held "warm and
cordial" discussions with him. An official release said
both sides agreed that there was vast, untapped
potential for close bilateral relations. It went on,
"They agreed to identify major projects on which both
sides can cooperate so as to exemplify in a visible
manner this vast potential. They underlined the need for
stronger Japanese business presence in India."
Kawaguchi also informed the prime minister that
the two sides had agreed they would extend mutual
support to each other for permanent membership of the
United Nations Security Council. A Japanese statement on
the foreign minister's visit said separately that India
and Japan had agreed to "exchange views and cooperate in
the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery", which posed an
imminent danger to the international community.
Clearly, Japan is doing its utmost to find a way
out of the cul-de-sac in which it had trapped itself by
going out of its way in opposing India's nuclear
ambitions. The 1998 nuclear tests severely affected
India's relations with Japan, that had been hitherto
singularly free of any kind of dispute - ideological,
cultural or territorial. Indians continue to greatly
respect Japan for its support to Netaji Subhash Chandra
Bose and the Indian National Army in their fight for
independence from British rule, and partly because
Japan's disastrous occupation of the "liberated" Andaman
and Nicobar islands and the egregious atrocities its
army perpetrated there are not so well known on the
mainland. It is also recognized that a car revolution
could not have taken place in India without Japanese
transfer of technology, at a time when the West did not
favor modernization of Indian technology. The 800cc
Maruti (Suzuki) car has remained India's most popular
car for almost three decades.
Indians also
greatly admire Japan for its fortitude and resilience in
rebuilding the country after the devastation of World
War II in which millions were killed and the nuclear
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had almost completely
destroyed them. They can thus understand Japanese
abhorrence of nuclear weapons. But they do not see why
Japan should have been so bothered about India acquiring
nuclear weapons, though the two countries have never had
any disputes and Japan's closest ally is the world's
greatest nuclear power, the only power to have used
nuclear weapons and that, too, against Japan itself.
According to an Indian diplomat posted in Tokyo, S
Jaishankar, "Japanese reaction to the Indian nuclear
tests was surprisingly swift and exceptionally harsh."
It not only imposed sanctions of its own but utilized
every possible international forum to heap scorn on
India.
This was unfortunate because by 1998
India-Japan economic and even political ties were
visibly improving following the Cold War interregnum in
which both countries found themselves on different sides
of the world divide, despite India's professed
non-alignment. At one point in the Cold War, high level
political interaction had not taken place for as long as
21 years. But it started with contact in 1995 leading up
to a foreign minister visiting New Delhi after a gap of
a decade in 1997.
In the late 1990s, India was
able to discuss larger political and security issues
with Japan under the umbrella of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations as well. Even bilateral security
dialogue was being contemplated. The naval chiefs of
both countries were able to exchange visits in 1997-98.
Similar progress was taking place on the economic front.
In 1997, Japan's foreign direct investment commitment,
though still less than 1% of its total global
commitment, had reached a peak of US$532 million.
Japanese industrial giants like Toyota, Honda, Sony,
Mitsubishi, Matsushita, Fujitsu and YKK had begun to
establish their presence in India. Japanese banks,
insurance and securities companies were waking up to the
Indian market, and Japanese airlines (JAL and ANA)
established direct flights to India.
India's
nuclear tests in 1998, however, put an almost complete
end to this burgeoning process. Japan announced, in two
stages, what it described as "economic measures". These
included the freezing of grant aid for new projects
(except for emergency, humanitarian and grassroots
assistance), suspension of yen loans for new projects,
the withdrawal of Tokyo as a venue for the India
Development Forum, a "cautious examination" of loans to
India by international financial institutions and
imposition of strict control over technology transfers.
India diplomacy noted that in contrast, only part of the
grant aid to China was frozen when it tested in 1995.
The Japanese ambassador to India was recalled
temporarily for consultations and then prime minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto stressed his determination to get the
forthcoming G8 summit at Birmingham to send a clear and
strong message against India's nuclear tests. These
tests were described by the Japanese government as an
intolerable challenge to international society. Going
even further, the Diet described the tests as acts of
destruction of the global environment and ecosystem and
constituting a threat to the survival of human beings.
Japan also cancelled a number of official dialogues
planned earlier, virtually breaking all communication.
More than these steps, however, what hurt India
most was an intense Japanese international campaign
targeting India, its determined equation of India with
Pakistan, and its advancement of a "nuclear flash point"
theory calling for a quick resolution of the Kashmir
dispute. Unaware of the complexities of India-Pakistan
relations and the Kashmir dispute, Japan, too, found
inexplicable the vehemence of India's reaction to its
suggestion of mediation or even facilitation of dialogue
between the hostile South Asian neighbors so as to
eliminate the new "nuclear flashpoint".
New
start Mercifully, this phase is now over and
both countries seem to realize the need for closer
dialogue at the political and security level to reduce
the possibility of such misunderstandings in the future.
Yet, why Japan would want China to be included in a new
axis with India is still not fully understood in New
Delhi. While making the suggestion, Japanese ambassador
Yasukoni Enoki said it "had been discussed informally
with the Indian side and will help India correct its
positioning in Japan's diplomacy". According to
diplomatic sources, External Affairs Minister Natwar
Singh exchanged views on the subject with his Japanese
counterpart when they met on the sidelines of the Asian
Cooperation Dialogue in China on June 22. Both leaders
felt it was an interesting proposal and it would be
worthwhile to take it forward.
Indian mandarins
feel that the Japanese proposal is a response to its
view of the likely changes in the future standing of
different countries on the world stage. An earlier
proposal from Moscow for developing a Russia-India-China
axis had a similar meaning. The fact that China welcomed
the Russian proposal and is by and large not averse to
the Japanese idea either means that Beijing agrees with
the Russian and now Japanese assessment of what the
future world scene is going to look like.
Japan
is already trying to play a larger role on the
international stage by crafting a multilateral
resolution of the Iraq crisis. New Delhi has no problem
accepting Tokyo's desire for a more visible
international role so long as Japan acknowledges India's
own interests in this regard. The declaration by both
countries at the end of Kawaguchi's visit that they will
support each other's candidature for the United Nations
Security Council "to enhance the effectiveness and
credibility" of the UN is being seen in this context.
Above all, the Japanese proposal reflects the
famed Japanese penchant for pragmatism. It sent troops
to Iraq despite its self-imposed post-World War II rule
never to deploy its military on foreign soil in order to
remain in the good graces of today's sole super power.
It is now trying to develop close ties with China and
India to face the challenges of a multipolar world
scenario in which its Asian neighbors are likely to play
important roles and the US influence is diminished.
Already Japan and India recognize China's
growing military strength. Indian and Japanese media
published in succession two reports on the subject
recently. An evaluation report by the Secretariat of the
Indian National Security Committee asserts that China's
military strength ranks second in the world next only to
the US. The report was compiled by a research group led
by Professor Satish Kumar of the Jawaharlal Nehru
University. Ranking 50 countries on the basis of five
main indices, namely, national defense capacity, gross
national product, humane developmental level, research
developmental level and population index, it put the top
ones in the following order: the US, China, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Sweden, Russia, Germany, India,
France, Britain and Israel.
Similarly, an
article in a Japanese newspaper, World Daily, based on
similar research, said that China's military strength
will run parallel to that of the US by 2015. A recent
article in the Chinese newspaper People's Daily quotes
at length Japanese military commentator Kyudai Nineo's
paper entitled "Making Preparation for US-China New Cold
War Structure" and seeks to understand the Japanese view
of the future world scenario.
In this view, the
US-China relationship can take three possible turns by
2015. First, a US-China confrontation (entry into a war
state); second, formation of a Cold War structure;
third, formation of an alliance relationship. Of these
three possibilities, the likelihood of the "formation of
a Cold War structure" is the greatest and the
possibility for the "formation of alliance" is the
smallest. As in the US-Soviet Union ties during the Cold
War, America and China, which possess powerful military
strengths in the Asia-Pacific region, will, while
retaining their mutually restrictive global strategic
relationship, continue to maintain their mutually
confronting military strengths and their interdependent
economic relationship. The conclusion is that no matter
how the US-China relationship develops in a decade from
now, the US ally Japan will have to be involved in it.
Hence the need for Japan to be prepared to face an
uncertain future.
One of the few certainties of
the coming decade, apart from China's enhanced military
strength, is the fast developing Indian economy. India's
average economic growth rate has reached 6% for 10
consecutive years. Goldman Sachs of the US predicts that
in light of the present development rate, it is possible
for India to become the world's third largest economic
entity in 2050, following China and the US. What can
also not be ignored is India's ambition for becoming a
major power in Asia that plays an increasingly important
role in world affairs. One has to only peruse the
headlines of some Indian newspapers and other
periodicals to know how keen India is to become a major
player in international politics.
The People's
Daily analyst mentions the general view of Western
countries that China, Japan and India are the three
Asian countries where "conditions for being big powers
are most available". That being so, there is no reason
why they should not come together and counter the
hegemony of the one superpower in the world.
Being in the middle of this trio, China has had
territorial and other disputes with both India and
Japan. Japan and India carry no such historical baggage.
Japan probably feels that India can play a stabilizing
role in its relationship with China. Perhaps China, too,
feels the same way. Hence the need for and viability of
a trilateral axis.
Supporting the idea of an
Asian strategic triangle, Feng Zhaokui, a research
fellow at the Japan Research Institute of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, emphasizes that the three
Asian giants together account for 20% of the world's
gross domestic product. Situated at different levels of
development, they enjoy economic complementarity. He
cites demographics to buttress his contention. Japan's
population has already aged, while the Chinese
population, too, will begin to get older by the next
decade. By 2020, Feng notes, India will have the largest
working and consuming population in the world.
Supporters of the trilateral axis in all the
three countries are united on one point. The notion of
axis should not be understood in its traditional
negative sense. The grouping being proposed is not meant
to confront any country or alliance, and certainly not
the US. In fact, all three are seeking to improve
relations with Washington. It is simply an interesting
idea at the moment designed to bring the three countries
together for mutual benefit. Indeed, while proposing the
axis, Japanese ambassador Yasukoni Enoki described it as
"important for Asia's stability and prosperity". The
Japanese Embassy in New Delhi has hastened to clarify
that all that Enoki meant was simply this: formalized
cooperation and consultation between the three nations
makes eminent political sense.
While the Indian
government is seriously considering this initiative,
there is a lot of resistance to the idea as well. By and
large India's strategic community feels more comfortable
with India developing close strategic ties with the US
and Israel. Many are particularly opposed to closer ties
with China, at least until China vacates thousands of
square kilometers of Indian land it captured in the 1962
war. While India and China are discussing their border
disputes in earnest, a resolution of the complex issues
involved is not expected any time soon. In the meantime,
India is focused on improving trade and other ties.
But the strategic community, particularly the
strong pro-American lobby, lays greater emphasis on past
disputes and their assessment of the inimical intentions
of China. So while many strategic thinkers have no
problem with India developing closer ties with US ally
Japan, they have serious reservations about the idea of
a trilateral axis which includes China. Veteran Indian
journalist Sunanda K Datta Ray commented on this
phenomenon in a recent article, "It is extremely
surprising that the Japanese ambassador's suggestion of
a Japan-China-India axis has not received more attention
in India." However, as the government itself is becoming
more serious about the idea things might change in the
media as well.
Sultan Shahin is a New
Delhi-based writer.
(Copyright 2004 Asia
Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
