BOOK REVIEW Demilitarize or
perish Rethinking the National
Security of Pakistan by Ahmad
Faruqui
Reviewed by Chanakya Sen
Always trust an economist to prick balloons of
national security floated by militarists. Economic
consultant Ahmad Faruqui's commentary on demilitarizing
Pakistan offers an alternative vision for priming human
development, the road that rulers in Islamabad never
took. Published when generals are yet again preferred
instruments of Western intervention in Pakistan, this
book warns of dire consequences if new paths are not
hewn.
A Faustian bargain Faruqui's central
thesis is that most of Pakistan's socio-economic
problems originate from the heavy emphasis on national
defense and military spending. Pakistan's unconditional
support for the US's "war against terrorism" after
September 11, 2001 has augmented this lopsided stress.
President General Pervez Musharraf has been handed "an
enduring rationale for continuing as president under
Kelsen's law of necessity that has served all prior
military rulers". (p xix). He is less inclined to take
any major initiatives to pursue peace with India.
Military expenditure continues to absorb the lion's
share of the government budget and no major overhaul of
Pakistan's military organization is likely. The endemic
problem of military dominance in Pakistan has been
perpetuated with the mutual embrace of the West and
Musharraf.
More harm than good has accrued when
Musharraf short-sold Pakistan to the US. To prevent the
"Islamic bomb" from falling into religious terrorist
hands, the American 15th Marine Expeditionary unit is
ready to "neutralize" Pakistan's weapons of mass
destruction even at the cost of engaging Pakistani
troops. The arrest of Pakistani nuclear scientists for
passing know-how to al-Qaeda was done to please the US
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Changes in the Pakistan
army high command and the Inter-Services Intelligence
were carried out to curry favor with the Central
Intelligence Agency. India has succeeded in throwing
flashlights on terrorist training infrastructure in
Pakistani Kashmir. The victory of the Northern Alliance
in Afghanistan is a major setback to Pakistan due to the
former's closeness to Iran and India. Pakistan's economy
is deteriorating, with sliding per capita incomes lower
than 1%, and foreign economic assistance evaporating
after the Taliban were dislodged from Afghanistan.
Musharraf's decision to ally with the US turns
out to be a Faustian bargain, not a bright tactical
move. It is similar to the 1999 Kargil war with India
planned by Musharraf. Initially praised as "an act of
military brilliance", Pakistan lost both the political
and military battle for Kargil. It had to withdraw in
humiliating circumstances since "the world chose to
accept the Indian version of events". (p 16)
History of militarism Pakistan's
governance travails stem from dictators who are
"specialists in violence rather than in economics". (p
19) Small cabals have acquired disproportionate
organizational and collusive power under successive
military regimes. The landed oligarchy, the bureaucracy
and the jihadis are the main beneficiaries of Pakistan's
"political economy of defense". (Ayesha Jalal) Their
fortunes have been peaking through policies exacerbating
inter-class and inter-regional inequalities.
General Ayub Khan nurtured a class of robber
barons with gigantic concentration of wealth in a
handful of families. West Pakistan's per capita income
was 61% higher than the East's under Ayub. Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, a feudal lord himself, was unable to rise above
his roots. He transferred resources from public
enterprises to private individuals and income
distribution worsened under his so-called socialist
tenure. General Zia ul-Haq mass-appointed retired and
serving army officers to top public sector positions and
allowed one fifth of the US$3.2 billion American aid for
Afghanistan to be pocketed by the military-civil service
elites. Benazir Bhutto doled out franchises to thugs and
convicted murderers and triggered a new arms race with
India due to her respect for the Pakistani military's
"autonomy". Nawaz Sharif, Zia's protege, misused public
funds for favoritism and kickbacks and followed his
mentor's promotion of orthodox militancy.
Musharraf's coup in 1999 occurred when "the
army's corporate interests were threatened". (p 35) He
has named manifold ex-generals as diplomats and many
senior-serving officers to civilian duties for which
they have no core competency. He has not touched the
lucrative contracts and sinecures of the defense
coteries and has failed to rein in religious militias
waging jihad.
Misreading India Pakistan's present and past national security
strategies are premised on fear of being reabsorbed into
India. The Pakistan army has convinced many citizens
that India never reconciled itself to the partition of
1947. To counter this perceived Indian threat
militarily, "no economic sacrifice is judged to be too
much". (p 42) Pakistan's claim to Kashmir is the main
legitimating potion of its ruling class and the hawks in
its security establishment. This obsession has
misbegotten four costly wars and countless acts of
subversion that proved fruitless.
Pakistan's
military planners have projected India as "a pushover
adversary that is cowardly because the Hindu has no
stomach for a fight". (p 44) They have raised very high
expectations about the superiority of Pakistan's armed
forces, illusions repeatedly shattered by defeats. In
spite of enjoying tactical successes, Pakistan has
consistently failed to achieve strategic objectives in
wars with India. Often, Islamabad has "completely
misunderstood Indian intentions and capabilities" and
jumped the gun with hubris and folly. In 1971, General
Niazi believed that India would merely conduct a minor
incursion into East Pakistan (to become Bangladesh) to
set up a puppet regime, though Indian responses to
provocation have always been aggressive, like those of
other states of similar power and size in the
international system.
Failures in the higher
direction of war have been matched by diplomatic fiascos
and leadership blunders. Pakistan expects its foreign
allies to bail it out of difficult situations against
India, but these hopes have rarely materialized. In the
Kargil war, China, the vaunted "perpetual ally", did not
support Islamabad owing to fear of Islamic extremism.
Counting on China as a counterweight to India is also
chimerical because "the Indians have made it plain that
they will not be routed a second time and intend to
return any Chinese 'lesson' in kind". (p 90)
Nuclear fallacies Pakistan's advocacy
of nuclear deterrence is meaningless since it has not
capped its program after developing a few atomic bombs.
In the year following its nuclear tests of 1998,
Pakistan had to increase defense spending by 10%,
nullifying the publicized benefits of a "nuclear
dividend". Nothing changed in the day-to-day life of
common Pakistanis, even though nuclear scientists and
generals commercialized weapons of mass destruction for
personal gain. Cash-strapped Pakistan is incapable of
matching the Indian increases in defense budgets, but
the vanity of weaponizing "even if the people eat grass"
(Z A Bhutto) has not receded.
Pakistan's nuclear
program cost an estimated $10 billion up to 2001 and set
back development indices by more than years.
Post-nuclear US sanctions caused Pakistan's economy to
suffer a gross domestic product fall of 2.9%. The
exorbitant opportunity costs of Pakistan's nuclear white
elephant have actually diminished the country's national
security.
Retrenchment strategies The
solution to Pakistan's security deficit suggested by
Faruqui is to balance its economic resources with
strategic ambitions. What is needed is a "lean and mean
military organization, without becoming a drain on the
national treasury and undermining the non-military
dimensions of security". (p 115) The comparative
experience of Israel, which depends on reservists for
defending territorial integrity, is a lesson. To defend
Pakistan against external aggression, a force level of
300,000 troops is enough, ie half of the present
strength. Demobilization can be carried out by offering
golden handshakes and compensation packages for
converting swords into ploughshares. Small force levels
do not imply weak defense.
At present, Pakistan
is incurring a price tag of $110 million a year for
pumping the insurgency in Indian Kashmir and thereby
earning the ire of the international community. Faruqui
prescribes a more active "third party catalyst" role for
the US to provide incentives for peace over Kashmir,
though how a superpower interested in running off
democratic India against China can be expected to be an
honest broker over Kashmir is left for the reader's
imagination. Faruqui's reading of post-Cold War
realities and US-China equation are confusing.
Economic aid, debt write-offs and conversion to
zero-interest loans are also recommended to encourage
defense spending cuts in Pakistan and India. Faruqui
makes assumptions that Indian security is purely
Pakistan-centric by adducing two-country game theory
models to prove that economic diplomacy works.
Bilateralizing concentric multilateral threat
perceptions is too simplistic.
Faruqui's
proposals for reforming the Pakistani military are on
firmer ground. To improve national security by lifting
the people's confidence in the military, the latter
should provide a transparent analysis of its fiscal
expenditures. Pakistan's defense spending has been free
from scrutiny or audit, thanks to the guiding philosophy
of "defense for the sake of defense". Only two lines in
the official budget (defense administration and defense
services) represent the huge military expense bill, with
no explanation of what these two items stand for.
Pakistan should switch from exorbitant "offensive
defense" to "defensive dominance" strategies that
involve civilian participation. The military must
formalize rigorous self-evaluation of combat
effectiveness and be willing to accept failings.
Do or die Pakistan's poor economic
situation is linked intrinsically with faulty defense
and foreign policies. Faruqui offers Pakistani leaders
the example of Deng Xiaoping, who converted China's
foreign policy of confrontation into one of economic
cooperation. Pakistan's savings and investment ratios
are among the lowest in the world, mainly due to defense
spending and corruption, both severe drains. It spends
6% of its gross domestic product on defense, while
health and education stagnate at 1% and 2%.
Faruqui argues for correct, accurate and
realistic threat evaluations, not exaggerated and
unrealistic ones. These would also bring home the
futility of massive arms importing and free resources
for public welfare. Military spending in Asia as a whole
has declined from the end of the Cold War and helped
power investment and per capita incomes in the long run.
Disarmament is feasible and practical, as examples from
both developing and developed countries reveal. For
Pakistan, which is on the edge of the precipice, there
is no choice but to pragmatically take a leaf from
Deng's famous dictum that strength is primarily
economic.
But for a disappointing reliance on
International Monetary Fund and World Bank formulas for
poverty alleviation, Faruqui's study is a fine blend of
strategic revision and economic prognosis. The
million-dollar question is whether Musharraf reads this
honest reappraisal of what Pakistan requires to be
really secure.
Rethinking the National
Security of Pakistan. The Price of Strategic Myopia
by Ahmad Faruqui. Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot.
ISBN: 0-7546-1497-2. Price US$79.95,190 pages.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
support for the US's "war against terrorism" after
September 11, 2001 has augmented this lopsided stress.
President General Pervez Musharraf has been handed "an
enduring rationale for continuing as president under
Kelsen's law of necessity that has served all prior
military rulers". (p xix). He is less inclined to take
any major initiatives to pursue peace with India.
Military expenditure continues to absorb the lion's
share of the government budget and no major overhaul of
Pakistan's military organization is likely. The endemic
problem of military dominance in Pakistan has been
perpetuated with the mutual embrace of the West and
Musharraf. 
