MANMOHAN SINGH'S SPOILED CHILD - Part 1
The inhumane face
of India's reforms
By Kunal Kumar
Kundu
MUMBAI - With the architect of
India's economic reforms, Manmohan Singh, now at the
helm of the brand new coalition government that has been
in power for over 100 days now, it is perhaps time to
take stock of what the much-vaunted reforms have
delivered.
Overall, in
terms of certain macro-economic parameters, the economy
is surely on a much stronger base. Interest rates have
been at an all-time low and inflation is under control
(the recent spurt notwithstanding, as the point-to-point
nature of calculation leaves the inflation numbers more
prone to short-term shock). India's external sector has
started showing an admirable degree of strength and
resilience. Forex reserves have crossed the $100 billion
mark, rising merchandise and service exports have led to
a surplus in the current account balance after decades
of deficit. Increased emphasis on non-debt-creating
forex inflows have reduced the vulnerability
of the economy to external shocks, with India's
short-term external debt as a percentage of total
external debt reduced to less than 5%. The issue,
however, is while reformers of all hues have gone
overboard talking about reforms with a human face, how
humane has it turned out to be so far?
To put
things in perspective, let's compare the GDP growth data
during the 1980s and the post-reform period to date.
During the 1980s (the period under consideration being
1980-81 to 1990-91), India's GDP grew at a CAGR
(compounded annual growth rate)of 5.62%, while in the
post-reform period, it was 5.71% - an increase of a mere
nine basis points. Surprisingly, the impact of reforms
on GDP growth has not been a few percentage points but a
few basis points, and that, too, in single digit.
Surely, after one-and-a-half decades of reforms, one
would expect better numbers. In China, while the
pre-reform (prior to 1978) economy had seen an annual
growth of 6%, the post-reform average real GDP growth
has been more than 9% annually.
Even more glaring has been the
performance of the agricultural and the manufacturing
sectors. There has been a marked deceleration in the
growth rates of both during the post-reform period
vis-a-vis the immediate pre-reform decade. While the
average growth rate of the manufacturing sector during
the 1980s was as high as 7.57%, it fell to 5.92% during
the post-reform period. Similar has been the experience
in the agricultural sector, where the growth rate fell
from 3.43% to 2.7%.
Clearly, the booming service
sector has made all the difference to India's economic
growth in the post-reform period. The contribution of
this sector to GDP rose by a whopping 10% in this
period, thereby drastically reducing the contribution of
the two other major sectors. A sectoral analysis reveals
industrial revolution has bypassed India as it jumped
from a predominantly agrarian economy to a service
economy - a paradoxical situation of a developing
economy showing signs of a developed economy.
Can a country, 70% of whose population depends
on agriculture and 35% is illiterate (that, by the most
conservative of estimates), afford to have a development
skewed against employability of its millions? It's
simply impossible to provide alternative employment to
an unemployed farmer in the services sector.
Clearly, the reforms process has failed to
deliver. The aim of the reforms was to ensure
sustainable growth in agriculture and manufacturing, the
two major sectors on which most Indians depend for their
livelihood. The impact of the services sector was more
incidental than intended. Of course, had the services
sector not grown the way it did in the 1990s, we would
end up with the bizarre situation of reforms pulling
down the growth rate.
As things stand, reforms
in India have failed to ensure a more equitable economic
development. Can a country with such vast unutilized
resources afford to have growth with rising inequity as
the agricultural and the manufacturing sectors continue
to languish? The answer is an unqualified no.
When a controlled economy is liberalized, the
government should play the role of the facilitator. An
important reason why the reforms failed to deliver has
been the government's failure to do so. For a
capital-scarce country like India, the government should
have ensured more development expenditure, either
through its own or by encouraging private participation.
But in reality, Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) in
the economy grew at a CAGR of 6.92% between 1980-81 and
1990-91, while the same during 1990-91 until 2001-02
dipped to 5.33%.
The basic difference between
achievements of the reforms in China and India has been
the unbelievable pace of growth in China's
infrastructure. In India, though everybody realizes just
how inadequate the physical infrastructure is, there has
been more rhetoric than real action on the ground. The
government has not only failed to galvanize the private
sector into infrastructure development but has also
failed to do so itself. On top of it, rather than aiming
to reform itself by reducing wasteful expenses, the
government has gone the profligate way in all the wrong
places.
With the expenses of the government
rising faster than its income, the revenue deficit rose
at a CAGR of a whopping 16.31% between 1991-92 and
2003-04. Clearly
this is eating up the resources that the government can
utilize to create assets. So much so, that the revenue
deficit as a percentage of fiscal deficit in India rose
from 44.90% in 1991-92 to as much as 75.62% in 2003-04,
meaning that more than three-fourths of government
borrowings are used to finance current expenditure and
the remaining one-fourth is used to create assets to
service the total debt.
This is obviously eating up the
resources that the government could have otherwise used
to create assets. And even when the government
undertakes infrastructure projects, the end result
leaves much to be desired. The number of unfinished
projects, such as in irrigation, road works, railways
and power, is mind-boggling. According to some
estimates, as much as Rs1,000 billion (about US$21
billion) may be stuck in unfinished projects. A
substantial part of this investment will be lost for
ever and the remaining will see time and cost overruns
rendering the projects unviable. An example of a state
government project would be a case in point.
In
the 1970s, the government of Madhya Pradesh, a central
Indian state, began to harness Narmada river. It built a
dam near Jabalpur at Bargi, submerged 162 villages,
displaced thousands of people, but forgot to build the
canals. So far, it has spent Rs28 billion on this
project but realized only 14% of its irrigation
potential - just 56,000 hectares have received water
instead of the promised 400,000. Hundreds of thousands
of people in the districts of Jabalpur, Katni,
Narsinghpur and Satna are still waiting for water that
is so near and yet so far. Had another 25% of the outlay
been spent, this vast area would be bursting with
prosperity and become the granary of central India.
Instead, it remains arid and poor.
What went
wrong is that succeeding chief ministers diverted
Bargi's funds for projects in their own constituencies.
The first one started a dam at Bansagar in northeast
Madhya Pradesh. Before he could finish it, the second
deflected Bargi's and Bansagar's funds to his
constituency in Chhattisgarh, a state recently curved
out of Madhya Pradesh. A third came along and rerouted
the funds to his Khandwa district. Had they built canals
simultaneously in Bargi, Bansagar and Khandwa, they
could have completely transformed Madhya Pradesh.
Droughts would have been averted and peoples' incomes
doubled to the levels of Punjab. They spent 75% of the
funds on each project, still the farmers got nothing out
of it.
Any process of sustained economic reform
and investment requires a framework of long-term policy
to which the government can credibly commit itself. But
the political process in India seems to be moving in the
opposite direction. While becoming more democratic and
inclusive in terms of incorporating newer and hitherto
subordinate groups, it is frittering away most of the
structures of economic management because of the
wheeling-dealing of day-to-day politics. There are very
few assurances that commitments made by a government
will be kept by successive ones, or even by itself if
under pressure. A political party that introduces some
reforms is quick to oppose them when it is no longer in
power. What has been described above is a microcosm of a
much bigger picture.
More than five decades
after India's independence and one-and-a-half decades
after reforms, the Indian economy has such inadequate
infrastructure that the monsoon-dependence of the
agricultural sector has almost remained the same. As of
now, Rs500 billion worth of agricultural produce in
India is wasted due to inadequate infrastructure. A
criminal wastage in a country where around 30% of the
population lives in poverty. Every monsoon failure leads
to a spate of suicides by Indian farmers, unable to
withstand the worsening debt burden.
Robust
forex figures are of little use for hungry farmers.
Reforms anyone?
Kunal Kumar Kundu is a
senior economist with a leading bilateral Chamber of
Commerce in India. He has a Masters in Economics with
specialization in econometrics from the University of
Calcutta.
TOMORROW: Dull, and
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