Violent turn for 'Pakistani
al-Qaeda' By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Despite Pakistan's efforts as a key ally
in the United States' "war on terror", terror rings endure,
from South Waziristan tribal agency to the port city of
Karachi.
The killing by Pakistani security
forces of 26-year-old former Taliban commander Nek
Mohammed in June was termed a major milestone in
attempts to flush out foreign militants from Pakistan -
Nek had acted as an important facilitator between the
Taliban in Afghanistan and foreign elements.
However, eliminating Nek was not the end of
the problem. On the weekend, another charismatic fighter,
Abdullah Mehsud, was behind the abduction of two Chinese
engineers and a paramilitary man in the tribal areas,
showing the serious threat that still exists to
Islamabad's writ, despite a strong military presence and
several offensives.
Wang Ende and Wang Peng were
working on Pakistan's Gomal Zam Dam project for China's
state-run Sino Hydro Corp when they were abducted in the
Chagmalai area of South Waziristan. Abdullah Mehsud
appeared before the international media after Pakistani
authorities claimed that the kidnappings had been done
by al-Qaeda. Abdullah spelled out that insurgent tribals
under his command were responsible as a reaction to the
military operations in Waziristan, not al-Qaeda.
Abdullah's real identity
is Mohammed Alam Mehsud. He fought alongside the Taliban
for many years and lost his right leg in late 1999, since
which time he has used an artificial limb. His spirit
as a guerrilla leader was undiminished, though, and
he pitched himself against US-led forces when they
attacked Afghanistan in late 2001. He was subsequently captured
and sent to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, but he was
released early this year after the Pentagon said he was no longer a threat
to the US and had no intelligence value. As soon as
returned, he joined up with Nek to fight Pakistani forces
in the tribal areas.
After Nek's death he
regrouped the tribals, and drew in some Uzbek and
Chechan fighters to continue the resistance, which
became so strong that Pakistan was forced to strike a
10-day ceasefire to give dialogue a chance. However, as
tribal councils (jirgas) sat, militants noted a
gradual mobilization of troops in violation of an
agreement. As a result they abducted the Chinese.
Abdullah made clear in a statement that the
Chinese were friends and there was nothing personal
against them - they had been taken to be used as
bargaining chips to prevent military advances into the
tribal regions and, according to some reports, to demand
the release of two Uzbek al-Qaeda militants.
Abdullah hails from an educated family.
His elder brother, Major Asghar, is a serving officer in
the Pakistani army, posted in Kohat cantonment. Abdullah
was born in 1975 in the village of Paroond Salimi Khail
in South Waziristan and received a diploma in commerce
from the Government Commerce College Peshawar in 1990-91.
In his college days he was associated with
Islami Jamiat-i-Talaba, a student organization that takes its
ideological inspiration from Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan.
In 1995, he joined the Taliban movement and fought in
the eastern Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, Gardez
and Paktika.
Fresh wave of violence The past few weeks have been particularly bloody in
Pakistan, and according to top security experts the
carnage is likely to continue.
The current wave
of violence began with the killing late last month of
Amjad Farooqi in the southern city of Nawabshah.
Farooqi, a suspected senior al-Qaeda figure, was gunned
down by security forces, setting off a chain reaction.
First there was a bomb blast at a Shi'ite
mosque in the central city of Sailkot, in which more than 30 people
were killed and more than 100 wounded. A few days after,
a car bomb killed almost an equal number of Sunni
activists of the defunct Sepah-i-Sahaba (renamed
Millat-i-Islamia), who had gathered in the central city
of Multan to commemorate the anniversary of their slain
leader and member of the national assembly, Maulana Azam
Tariq.
The high-profile Mufti Jameel Ahmed Khan
was then murdered in Karachi, most likely as a reaction
by Shi'ites to the killings at their mosque. A top
security official told Asia Times Online that "though
Jameel was not associated with any sectarianism, he was
an available soft Sunni target, so he was hit".
Jameel hailed from Peshawar and was close to
Taliban circles. He was the official spokesperson of 22
religious organizations and operated a countrywide
chain of schools (which offer a syllabus of Islamic
learning, in addition to general studies, including
math, English and social studies).
On September
11, 2001, he was in London and tried to catch a flight to
Karachi, but British security officials identified him
as "a close figure" to Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden
and handed him over to the US. However, on the special
intervention of Pakistani authorities he was released.
As a Pakistani leader of the opposition and as an
ordinary cleric, all opined at his funeral in Karachi
that in the cover of sectarian violence, a most powerful
pro-Taliban link had been eliminated. There was loud
thinking in the circle of pro-Taliban clerics that it is
only a matter of time before they become targets.
As Jameel's body was laid to rest on Sunday, a
suicide attack in the central city of Lahore killed five
people at a Shi'ite mosque. Had security guards not
reacted earlier, many more people would have died.
On Monday, the chief secretary of Sindh
province personally called several high-profile clerics of both
the Shi'ite and Sunni sects and asked them to restrict
their movements as they had been tipped off about killer
gangs.
Major flaw in operational plans The blueprints for Pakistan's anti-terror operations
are prepared by the US, and they do not reflect local
conditions, especially in the tribal areas.
For instance, it is a ground reality that apart from
perhaps a very few, there are no longer any foreign elements
in Pakistani territory. Initially, foreigners lived
in South Waziristan, but they were then shifted to
areas that are not technically part of Pakistan. This was
relayed to US forces.
After shifting the foreign
militants to Afghan areas, whether it is Darey Nishtar
or areas near Razmak, Pakistan should have announced
that since militants no longer lived in Pakistani
territory, it would abandon its operations in the tribal
areas and man checkposts and guard the borders, and
leave the foreign militants for US and Afghan troops to
deal with. But Pakistan did not do so, and continued
futile operations in the tribal areas, succeeding only
in bombing locals and raising their anger even further.
After the fall of the Taliban in late
2001, several dozen Arab families fled to Pakistan, where
they remained. Initially, Pakistani authorities turned
a blind eye when they tried to go back to their countries
of origin or such places as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi
Arabia. But later, under immense US pressure, they
changed their policy and started to hunt for the "Arab
Afghans". Had Pakistan continued its policy to give a
safe exit to the Arab Afghans to leave Pakistan, the
situation would not have been as complex as it is now.
Many Arab Afghans were forced to take refuge in
Pakistani cities. In due course they came into contact
with local groups. These groups used the faces of the
Arab Afghans (as Pakistanis were sympathetic toward
them) to collect donations to fuel the Afghan
resistance, and then forced them to take part in actions
against the Pakistani establishment.
When
Pakistan launched its serious operations on these
networks, several returned to the tribal areas in search
of a safe haven. In a matter of a few months they
regrouped and restored their financial links with the
outside world, and initiated recruitment drives for
fresh blood.
As a result, hundreds of jihadi
cells have been born and they have produced for the
first time a "Pakistani al-Qaeda" with the sole aim to
create maximum anarchy through any form of violence.
They want the country to face maximum destabilization,
and their supporters in institutions like the army will
then have the chance to dismiss the present leadership
of President General Pervez Musharraf and take over
power.
And unlike in the past, when the
Pakistani establishment - despite its denials - had
close contacts with jihadis, today's new breed of
jihadis remain largely anonymous, just waiting for their
chance to strike.
Syed Saleem Shahzadis
Bureau Chief, Pakistan, Asia Times Online. He can be
reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
