The
United States' 9-11 National Commission Recommendations
Act (Law 2845) provides for the implementation of all
the recommendations of the National Commission relating
to the intelligence and security apparatus, as well as
the diplomatic strategy for the future conduct of the
"war against terrorism" in general, and Islamist
terrorism in particular.
The US Congress has
approved the biggest overhaul of US intelligence
agencies in more than 50 years, sending the bill that creates a
new director of national intelligence, demanded after September
11, 2001, to President George W Bush for his
signature. In addition to a new spy director, the
legislation creates a national counter-terrorism center
to plan and help oversee security operations. It also
includes measures to improve border security and give
law enforcement new anti-terror tools.
The media have focused mainly on the act's
provisions for the revamping of the US intelligence
community and made it appear as if it is essentially an
act for intelligence reforms. Yet reform of the physical
security apparatus of the US and the future conduct of
US diplomacy vis-a-vis Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which
are the main epicenters of jihadi terrorism, occupy an
equally important place in the act.
The
provisions of the act relating to US relations with
Pakistan should be of greater interest to Indian
policymakers than those having a bearing on the reform
of the US intelligence and security apparatus.
Those who carefully read the text of the report
would have noticed that while bringing on record all
reports regarding Pakistan's links with the Taliban and
al-Qaeda, the commission had, at the same time, made
appreciative references to the post-September 11 role
played by President General Pervez Musharraf in helping
the US in its "war against terrorism" and to his efforts
to curb Islamic extremism in Pakistan, at tremendous
risk to his life.
The commission was, therefore, inclined
to treat what had happened pre-September 11 as a
closed chapter and to encourage Musharraf to vigorously
implement the policy of enlightened moderation,
which he has been advocating in recent months.
In a recommendation on policy toward Pakistan as
part of the United States' counter-terrorism strategy, it had
said: "If Musharraf stands for enlightened moderation in
a fight for his life and for the life of his country,
the US should be willing to make hard choices too and
make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of
Pakistan. Sustaining the current scale of aid to
Pakistan, the US should support Pakistan's government in
its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive
effort that extends from military aid to support for
better education, so long as Pakistan's leaders remain
willing to make difficult choices of their own."
The act seeks to give effect to this
recommendation through Section 4082, which states as
follows:
Section 4082. United States commitment to
the future of Pakistan. (a) Sense of Congress
- It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should, over a long-term period, help to ensure
a promising, stable, and secure future for Pakistan,
and should in particular provide assistance to
encourage and enable Pakistan. (1) To continue and
improve upon its commitment to combating
extremists; (2) To seek to resolve any outstanding
difficulties with its neighbors and other countries in
its region; (3) To continue to make efforts to
fully control its territory and borders; (4) To
progress towards becoming a more effective and
participatory democracy; (5) To participate more
vigorously in the global marketplace and to continue
to modernize its economy; (6) To take all necessary
steps to halt the spread of weapons of mass
destruction; (7) To continue to reform its
education system; and (8) To, in other ways,
implement a general strategy of moderation. (b)
Strategy - Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this act, the president
shall transmit to Congress a detailed proposed
strategy for the future, long-term, engagement of the
United States with Pakistan. The strategy required by
this subsection may contain a classified annex.
Thus the act not only
seeks to address Pakistani complaints that the US looks
on it only as an ally of convenience and not as a
strategic partner, but also provides the necessary
congressional authorization for the continuance of the
present preferential policy of the Bush administration
toward Pakistan, under certain conditions, and calls on
the president to submit to Congress within 180 days a
paper outlining a strategy of long-term engagement with
Pakistan. The act is not a carte blanche
to the president to provide assistance to
Pakistan on a long-term basis. The long-term commitment
to Pakistan would be dependent on Pakistan continuing to
serve the US national objective of combating jihadi
terrorism and Islamist extremism.
It also calls
on the administration to provide assistance to Pakistan
to encourage and enable it "to seek to resolve any
outstanding difficulties with its neighbors and other
countries in its region". Though no countries have been
named, the obvious reference is to India and
Afghanistan. Indian policymakers should be prepared for
a continuation and even enhancement of US military aid
to Pakistan as a quid pro quo for its cooperation
in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban and for an
intrusive US interest in the dialogue between India and
Pakistan on various issues, particularly Kashmir.
Whether the United States' now-assured long-term commitment to
Pakistan, which Islamabad has always been demanding, and
its constant nudging of Islamabad with regard to its
talks with India will make Pakistan more flexible or
more obdurate remains to be seen.
While the act
provides incentives to Pakistan to continue on its
declared path of enlightened moderation, it refrains
from talking of any disincentives or punitive measures
should it fail to do so.
The main
provision regarding the revamping of the intelligence
apparatus relates to the creation of a post of
national intelligence director (NID), who will perform
the following tasks (as indicated in a congressional
summary of the act):
Serves as the head of the United States
intelligence community and acts as the principal
advisor to the president, the National Security
Council, and the Homeland Security Council for foreign
and domestic intelligence matters relating to the
national security.
Ensures the effective execution of the annual
budget for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities.
Facilitates the management and execution of funds
appropriated for the national intelligence program.
Ensures the sharing of and access to information
within, with special emphasis on detecting,
preventing, preempting, and disrupting terrorist
threats and attacks against the US.
Ensures that appropriate agencies and departments
have access to and receive all-source intelligence
support needed to carry out their own missions as well
as to perform independent, competitive analysis.
Establishes a National Intelligence Council to
produce national intelligence estimates and evaluate
intelligence community-wide collection and production
of intelligence.
Receives funds for the National Intelligence
Program (NIP) and allocates those funds to the
intelligence community.
Approves annual budgets for the intelligence
community and develops and presents the annual
intelligence budget request for the approval of the
president.
Establishes a civil liberties protection officer,
appointed by the NID, to ensure policies and
procedures for civil liberty protections; also reviews
and assesses complaints.
Establishes an Intelligence Community Information
Technology Officer to assist the NID in sharing of
information and developing and implementing an
integrated information technology network.
Establishes a National Counter Terrorism Center to
serve as the primary organization for analyzing and
integrating all US intelligence pertaining to
terrorism and counter-terrorism.
There has
been much hype about the creation of the post of the NID.
The media have projected him as the intelligence czar
of the US and the post's creation as a revolutionary
change in the US intelligence community since the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was created. The idea
of a separate post of intelligence coordinator and
adviser to the president is nothing new. Even in the
present set-up, there is a post of director of central
intelligence to act as the coordinator and the adviser
to the president. But, under the present setup, the
post is held as an additional charge by the director of
the CIA.
For many years, there has been a
criticism that this dual charge comes in the way of the
CIA director's ability to act effectively as the
intelligence coordinator. Moreover, according to
critics, the fact that the coordinator is also the head
of the CIA tended to affect his objectivity, thereby
creating a perception that he was not even-handed in the
allocation of resources and responsibilities among the
various agencies of the intelligence community.
Since the early 1990s, some sections of
policymakers, non-governmental experts and congressmen
have been demanding the separation of the two posts and
the creation of the post of intelligence director, with
enhanced powers of supervision and coordination. They
could not succeed in their efforts to have this post
created due to strong opposition from inside the
intelligence community. The heads of individual
agencies, including the CIA, were worried that this
could reduce their importance. The heads of the
technical intelligence agencies of the Defense
Department, which consume nearly 75% of the total budget
of the intelligence community (currently US$40 billion),
were reluctant to cede control to anyone outside the
Pentagon.
Those in favor of the creation of a
director have taken advantage of the public shock over
the failure of the US intelligence and security agencies
to prevent the September 11 terrorist strikes to have
this proposal approved by the 9-11 Commission and pushed
through Congress. The CIA officers, who were in the
forefront of the opposition in the past, have not been
able to prevent it this time because of their negative
image in the eyes of the public and Congress due to
their perceived poor performance with regard to
September 11 and Iraq.
The technical
intelligence agencies of the Pentagon, through their
supporters in Congress, did put up a fight against the
proposal, but they too could not succeed because US
public opinion, mobilized by the relatives of those
killed on September 11, has been strongly in favor of
the implementation of the recommendations of the 9-11
Commission in total.
A group of congressmen
headed by Duncan Hunter, the chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, strongly opposed the bill. Hunter
said he feared the new bill would give too much power to
the new director, preventing battlefield commanders from
having timely access to necessary satellite
intelligence. He gave his support to the bill only after
a modification in it directed the president to issue
guidelines for the director "in a manner that respects
and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of
the heads of the departments". Assurances have been
given to those opposing the bill that the Pentagon will
retain control over battlefield intelligence assets.
What it apparently means is that the president,
while laying down the charter of the director, will
restrict his powers of supervision over the technical
and other intelligence agencies of the Pentagon in areas
of conflict or in the battlefield areas such as
Afghanistan and Iraq, where the powers of supervision of
the defense secretary will have primacy over those of
the NID.
Supporters of the bill have made it
appear as if there would have been no September 11 if
only there was a director at that time. "We are going to
create a more aggressive, a more vibrant and a more
organized intelligence community that is going to give
policymakers the information that they need to make the
appropriate decisions," said Peter Hoekstra, House
Intelligence Committee chairman. He added: "It's also
going to give very, very good information to our war
fighters."
This is all
wishful thinking. September 11 and Iraq happened because
the US intelligence officers, due to their over-dependence
on technical gadgetry, had lost the ability to win
over, raise and run human sources, particularly in an
alien culture, and over the years the analytical
capabilities of the intelligence community and the staffers of
the National Security Council have been allowed to
be weakened. Matters were made worse by a
political leadership that came to office with preconceived ideas
of threats to the United States' national security and was
not prepared to accept and act on any analysis that was
not in conformity with its preconceived ideas.
In such an environment, an additional post of a
director would not have made any difference. What ails
the intelligence communities all over the world,
including in the US and India, is a lack of an
intellectual humility and a lucidity in thinking in
intelligence officers and their unwillingness and
inability to admit their inadequacies and take measures
to correct them. Intelligence officers tend to think
they are the cat's whiskers. Osama bin Laden and his
horde of jihadi terrorists have shown them that they are
not.
The lack of coordination and sharing of
actionable intelligence highlighted by the commission is
not a disease only in the US intelligence community. It
is there in the intelligence communities of all
countries, including India. Turf battles among different
departments and agencies are nothing unusual, nor found only
in the intelligence community. They are there everywhere
in the government and in the corporate world too. But
turf battles and ego clashes in the intelligence
community damage national security and cost the lives of
people. Dog eats dog in all professions, but dog eats
dog with relish in the intelligence profession. To think
that one director with high-profile and enhanced powers
will cure the community of this disease is to live in a
make-believe world.
To revamp the intelligence
apparatus, what is required is not more posts, more
money and more powers, but a spell of introspection by
all intelligence officers regarding their inadequacies
and how to correct them. Any revolutionary change in the
working and performance of intelligence agencies has to
come from within the agencies. It cannot come from
outside.
The annexure gives a summary of the
other provisions of the act. This has been taken from a
congressional website.
B Raman is
additional secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat,
government of India, New Delhi, and currently,
director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and
distinguished fellow and convenor, Observer Research
Foundation, Chennai Chapter. E-mail:corde@vsnl.com.
Annexure
Tracking 'lone
wolf; terrorists
Authorizes federal officials to target and track
"lone wolf" terrorists who act individually and free of
any terrorist organization.
Changes the law so that federal officials can
monitor independently operating terrorists even if
he/she does not have a demonstrable connection to a
foreign terrorist organization.
Example of a "lone wolf": Convicted felon Richard
Reed, who attempted to blow up an American Airlines
flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001 with a bomb
in his shoes. He operated alone without assistance from
any terrorist organization.
Stopping
terrorist hoaxes
Makes it a crime for an individual to intentionally
pull a terrorist hoax or fake the death of a US soldier.
Such acts siphon off valuable resources, manpower and
equipment away from those trying to respond to real
threats.
Example of a terrorist hoax: Danny Hogg sent a
letter to the family of a US soldier fighting in Iraq
falsely informing them that their son was dead.
Cutting off material support for terrorists
Clarifies current law, stipulating that those who
provide material support to terrorists or terrorist
organizations will be prosecuted and imprisoned.
Defines "material support" or "resources" as
currency or monetary instruments or financial
securities, financial services, lodging, training,
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false
documentation or identification, communications
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other
physical assets. This definition illustrates the breadth
of resources that terrorists may need to carry out a
successful attack, and the many ways in which their
supporters can contribute to the spread of violence.
Targets and seeks to dismantle the entire terrorist
network, from the frontline killers, to those in
terrorist training camps, to the fundraisers and
facilitators.
Example: Terrorists need not only weapons, but also
the training to use them, the money to buy them, and the
personnel to wield them. And while planning and
preparing for their attacks, terrorists need safe places
to stay, expert advice on targets and methods of attack,
communications equipment to keep in touch with each
other, means of transportation, and identity documents
to cross borders.
Strengthening laws against
weapons of mass destruction
Clarifies criminal activity about weapons of mass
destruction.
Expands current law to include chemical weapons and
the development of nuclear weapons as grounds for
criminal prosecution.
Continuing to crack
down on money laundering and terrorist financing
Strengthens bipartisan improvements to current law
making it harder for terrorists to secure financing.
Further improves the tools available to law
enforcement to investigate and prosecute money
laundering.
Mandates better safeguards in the financial industry
against financial fraud by terrorists and criminals.
Enhancing airline security
Trains all federal law enforcement officers with
in-flight counterterrorism procedures.
Allows qualified federal law enforcement officers to
assist with airline security while not on duty.
Improves the current passenger pre-screening system
that more accurately targets suspected terrorists.
Border security/terrorist travel
Enhancing border security
Doubles the current number of border patrol officers
and triples the number of immigration enforcement
agents.
Improving security identification
Makes it more difficult for terrorists to falsify
identification to gain admission and remain in the
country to plan and plot terrorist acts.
Requires all drivers' licenses and birth
certificates to bear a set of standard characteristics
thereby cutting down on forgeries.
Reduces the black market for identification
documents where terrorists like sniper John Muhammad
made a living by providing bogus birth certificates and
drivers' licenses.
Standardizes entry requirements for all individuals
coming into the US, asking anyone coming from a country
other than Mexico and Canada to provide a secure
document.
Targeting terrorist travel
Expands pre-inspection programs at foreign airports
to better target suspected terrorists before they enter
the US.
Increases penalties for doctoring existing passports
or forging new ones.
Enhances fingerprinting capabilities used to check
visitors to the US.
Strengthens the ability of consular officers and
immigration inspectors to access the cumulative travel
history of individuals, preventing terrorists from
entering the US.
International
cooperation and coordination Attacking terrorist sanctuaries
Asserts that the US needs to develop and implement a
comprehensive strategy to address current and potential
terrorist sanctuaries.
Amends current US law to allow the president to
restrict sensitive exports to countries that continue to
provide terrorist sanctuaries.
Strengthening
diplomatic ties
Encourages the president to use all diplomatic means
with coalition partners to agree on an effective
approach regarding the detention and treatment of
captured terrorists.
Requires an annual review and assessment of public
diplomacy activities by the Secretary of State.
Requires preparation of long-term strategy in
Afghanistan, encouraging more participation of other
nations in its reconstruction and making available
additional assistance for measures to disrupt the opium
trade in Afghanistan and its growing links to
international terrorism.
Requires the president to develop a strategy for
expanding collaboration with the people and government
of Saudi Arabia, including intelligence and security
cooperation in the fight against terrorism, and on
matters of political and economic reform.
Encourages Pakistan to continue in its commitment to
combat terrorism, modernize its economy, resolve
differences with its neighbors, reform its education
system and make progress in creating an effective and
participatory democracy.
Fostering better
cross-cultural understanding
Creates a scholarship pilot program to provide
opportunities for better cultural understanding and
awareness by students of American-sponsored schools
located in predominately Muslim countries.
Encourages American embassies to counter possible
anti-American sentiment in biased or false foreign media
coverage.
Cutting red tape for America's
intelligence agencies
Reforms the designation process of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs) so that such FTOs cannot use
bureaucratic red tape to their advantage.
Eliminates burdensome regulations so that a new or
different spelling of the same terrorist organization
does not force intelligence agencies to go through the
cumbersome process of reclassifying them.
Cooperating to fight terrorist financing
Improves international cooperation and information
sharing by creating an International Terrorist financing
coordinating council.
Consolidates various resources to track the
financial lifeblood of terrorist organizations.
Government restructuring Providing faster, smarter funding for
first responders
Unclogs the funding pipeline - from the federal
government to local first responders - to help expedite
resources to where they are most needed.
Establishes new guidelines that channel necessary
resources according to threat-based assessment and
formulas.
Strengthening the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)
Allows the FBI to recruit and retain the best
personnel possible to secure America.
Enables the FBI to develop a specialized workforce
with deep expertise in intelligence and national
security.
Provides retention bonuses, retirement age waivers
and higher pay for special skills for those who keep us
safe at home;
Streamlining current security
clearance procedures
Creates reciprocity and standards among federal
agencies so that capable analysts are no longer hindered
from working where they need to be.
Eliminates the wasteful, duplicative process of
re-doing security clearances between different
administrations, enabling the incoming president to have
the best information and intelligence available
immediately.
Protecting individual
privacy
Requires assessments of the impact that proposed and
final rules would have on the privacy of individuals.
Establishes a chief privacy officer for agencies
with law enforcement or anti-terrorism functions, who
would be responsible for ensuring that personally
identifiable information is protected by the agency from
unauthorized or inappropriate use. This privacy officer
is in addition to the Civil Liberties Protection Officer
in the office of the NID.
Enhancing America's
first responders
Makes it easier for first responders (firefighters,
policemen etc) to help those in need across state lines
without fear of being sued.
Implementing
better oversight and coordination
Asks the Secretary of Defense to regularly assess
the adequacy of United States Northern Command's plans
and strategies to ensure effective preparation and
responses to threats within the Untied States.
Asks all levels of government to adopt a National
Incident Management System - a unified structural
framework for federal, state, territorial, tribal and
local governments to ensure coordination during
emergencies involving multiple jurisdictions or
agencies.
Establishes a program and Office for
Interoperability and Compatibility at the DHS
(Department of Homeland Security) to enhance public
safety communications at all levels of government.
Encourages Congress to review the Congressional
oversight of various homeland security and intelligence
functions prior to or at the start of the 109th
Congress.
