US tied over nuclear
kingpin By Kaushik Kapisthalam
The United
States is selling the theory that the Pakistan-based
nuclear proliferation ring has been broken up and its
mastermind, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, has been "brought to
justice". He is under house arrest in Pakistan.
Unfortunately, as much as the Bush
administration would like to wish away the Khan
issue, it continues to dog two of the biggest foreign-policy
crises for the US.
The first one is Iran. With
the re-election of President George W Bush, the
neo-conservatives within the administration want to
ensure that the Bush second term looks at every option,
including a military one, to prevent Tehran from
developing and deploying nuclear weapons.
But
then again, the neo-conservatives do not want to talk
directly to the hardline Iranian regime, and have let
Britain, France and Germany do the negotiations with
Iran, in conjunction with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) doing the verification. But so far,
the Iranians have been playing a clever game of
hide-and-seek by agreeing to stop uranium enrichment one
day, and denying it the next. And IAEA inspectors,
mindful of the Iraq weapons of mass destruction
assessments, have been cautious about giving conclusive
findings on Iran's nuclear weapons program. In this
ambiguity, Iran could stall and dodge its way into
presenting the world a set of nukes as a fait accompli.
One man holds the key to this puzzle - Khan. It
now appears that Khan not only sold advanced
uranium-enrichment centrifuges to Iran; he likely sold
it an actual nuclear weapon design along with nuclear
fuel material, according to a report issued by the US
Central Intelligence Agency on November 23.
A
direct testimony from Khan, with corroborating evidence
obtained by IAEA inspectors, could provide the US and
the Europeans with clinching evidence of Iran's
violation of its Non-Proliferation Treaty pledge and
lead to a showdown with the United Nations Security
Council. Faced with global condemnation, the Iranian
clerics in this scenario may choose to back down and
agree to intrusive inspections.
But this could
only happen only if Pakistan allows IAEA inspectors to
interrogate Khan. Official IAEA reports on Iran reveal
that agency's frustration at not being able to nail Iran
because of Pakistan's obstructive tactics.
Interestingly, other IAEA reports reveal that even the
supposedly concluded investigation into Libya's nuclear
program hit a roadblock thanks to Pakistan's
non-cooperation.
On the other side of Asia, the United
States' blow-hot, blow-cold crisis with North Korea appears
as calm as a dormant volcano, but is liable to erupt at
any time without warning. Prior to the US presidential
elections in November, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il
had been stalling for time, hoping perhaps for a John
Kerry victory, which could have resulted in direct
negotiations with the US. But with a Bush victory, the
Korean peninsula is once again headed toward a possible
showdown. Here too, the ambiguity about the North's
nuclear program has been a big hindrance for the US.
The bone of contention with North Korea is its
clandestine uranium-enrichment program, whose existence
it denies. The North contends, not too credibly, that it
kept to its end of the 1993 framework agreement and
therefore deserves direct talks with the US. In
addition, the release of news of an earlier secret South
Korean nuclear-weapons program (since abandoned), gives
the North a much-needed lever. The North's main patron,
China, has long demanded to see proof of the uranium
program, even though it should know about it for sure.
No prizes for guessing who holds the key to the secret
door hiding Kim's uranium program - it's A Q Khan again.
It has emerged that Khan was the main figure
behind what is now believed to be Pakistan's nukes for
missiles barter deal with North Korea in the late 1990s.
Khan's eponymous lab in Kahuta, Pakistan, has been
producing the Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile,
which is in fact a repainted North Korean No-Dong
missile. Part of the payment for this illegal missile
transfer is believed to be a complete uranium-enrichment
kit from Khan's nuclear bazaar. In addition, the only
nuclear device that Khan was entrusted to explode during
Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests is now believed to be a
North Korean plutonium bomb, which Pakistan tested as a
returned favor for North Korean missile transfers.
Interestingly, former Pakistan army chief General
Jehangir Karamat, whom many experts claim oversaw this
deal with North Korea, is now the Pakistani ambassador
in Washington.
The European Union has enough
belief in this claim to officially ask Pakistan about
the test. Of course, for the US to accept this would
lead it to face the fact that at least the North Korean
side of Khan's business portfolio had state sanction in
Pakistan - a situation it desperately wants to avoid.
This brings us to how US policymakers
justified their decision to accept at face value Pakistan's
"blame it all on Khan" show put on by Pakistani
President General Pervez Musharraf and the accompanying
televised confession by Khan. The official US stance was
best explained by Robert Oakley, a former ambassador to
Pakistan, who told the Associated Press soon after the
Khan confession, "The most important thing is to get as
much information possible as to where the links [to
accomplices] were ... we have to make sure it doesn't
happen again."
But George Perkovich of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, while
supporting the free pass to Pakistan, warned "there's
always the possibility that you are being played by
Pakistan: that they will give you just enough
information to keep the money flowing, but not enough to
root out the real problem".
Ten months since the
confession, Perkovich's caveat seems to be proving
correct, as evidenced by the Iran, Libya and North Korea
investigations. Even efforts to nab other individuals
involved in Khan's dealings have been stymied. With
Pakistan holding Khan incommunicado, Malaysia, too,
seems emboldened to hold the next person in the Khan
network, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, under wraps, fearful
perhaps of Tahir's ties to influential Malaysian
politicians coming to light should outside investigators
get to interrogate him. Malaysian leaders clearly
operate on the reasoning that the US can hardly press
Malaysia to make a number two man available when they
are mute spectators to Pakistan's denial of access to
the kingpin - Khan.
And then there is the
possibility that the Khan enterprise may not be the only
underground nuclear network around. Even as the Khan
expose was unraveling in early 2004, American
investigators arrested a South African man named Asher
Karni for illegally trying to acquire and sell devices
known as spark-gaps, which are used in hospitals but
which can also be used in nuclear warheads as part of
the triggering assembly. Karni was busted in a sting
operation when he procured and shipped 200 spark-gaps,
which were disabled before Karni acquired them. And the
buyer was a state-owned "lithography" firm in Pakistan,
which is now known to have been a front for that
country's Inter-Services Intelligence. It can be
concluded that Karni was supplying components for
Pakistan's nuclear bombs.
Further interrogation
of Karni has revealed a network spanning many
continents, from South Africa to America to Dubai in the
United Arab Emirates to Pakistan. The Bush
administration, however, has been reluctant to divulge
the details of the Karni investigations for reasons that
are evident. Karni was part of a loose network that
supplied dangerous material to Pakistani state-owned
facilities. Khan led a network that brought in material
for the Pakistani government-owned facilities and then
turned around and sold excess material elsewhere. The
only common link between the Khan network and the Karni
ring is the Pakistani government. So if one were to
focus on a particular person or entity with the aim to
ending nuclear proliferation, what would that be - Khan
or the Pakistan government? Gary Samore, former
non-proliferation expert with the US National Security
Council, recently said that the Khan network was not an
individual matter but a manifestation of "proliferation
as a matter of state policy" by Pakistan.
One
may wonder why Pakistan would risk global opprobrium and
keep the nuclear networks alive. An obvious reason is
that Pakistan needs the black market for the viability
of its nuclear-weapons program. Pakistani journalist
Shahid ur-Rehman, who wrote an insider chronicle of
Pakistan's nuclear-bomb program, recently revealed that
Pakistan is still very dependent on underground networks
for nuclear weapons components.
The second
reason could be that Musharraf feels he is bulletproof
when it comes to this issue because the US is paralyzed
by the general's oft-repeated claim that if he goes, all
(nuclear) hell could break out. In other words, the
American brainstrust has decided that pushing Musharraf
on nuclear proliferation is a bridge too far and will
not even consider it. This gives Musharraf enough
confidence to do nothing more than to display some
activity, without any underlying action regarding the
"investigation" of Khan's dealings.
This is not
to say that the US should take knee-jerk action, like
taking military control of Pakistan's nuclear assets, or
do anything harsh to punish Pakistan. But the Americans
can and should ask Musharraf to justify the lavish
rewards his nation has been receiving from the US (aid,
arms) and not be afraid to bring Musharraf's bad-faith
efforts out in the open. One must recall that even
though the US had been privately pressing Musharraf
since 2001, he allowed Khan to operate until 2004.
As former US Senate non-proliferation expert
Leonard Weiss put it to this correspondent, "Pakistan's
lack of cooperation on the investigations of the Iranian
and Libyan nuclear programs is more likely the result of
not wanting more details of their illicit nuclear trade
to emerge." In the recent past, other prominent
non-proliferation experts, such as David Albright,
Joseph Cirincione, David Kay, Kenneth Pollack and many
others, have publicly called for the US to press
Musharraf to give access to Khan.
For the US to
keep hoping that Pakistan will voluntarily reveal key
nuclear network secrets, many of which likely implicate
key Pakistani figures and state institutions, is
illogical and dangerous.
Meanwhile, the nuclear
underworld is likely morphing rapidly and moving out of
the reach of international investigators. And Iran and
North Korea are happily thumbing their noses at America,
thanks to America's impuissance with Pakistan.
Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance
journalist based in the United States.
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administration would like to wish away the Khan
issue, it continues to dog two of the biggest foreign-policy
crises for the US. 
