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Qualified gains against terror
By K P S Gill
The sum of insurgent and terrorist violence in South Asia - measured in terms
of fatalities - remained roughly constant across the years 2003 and 2004,
though the secular decline that has been witnessed over the past three years
was nominally maintained. According to available data, 6,584 persons lost their
lives to terrorism and insurgency in 2004, as against 6,577 in 2003 (the actual
numbers may, indeed, be higher, since a media clampdown on reportage in areas
of conflict in Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan makes information flows from
these countries particularly unreliable).
This apparent statistical "stability", however, masks radical transformations,
both across the region and in patterns of violence within the countries that
comprise it. Crucially, total fatalities saw a dramatic fall in India, from
4,171 in 2003, down to 2,897 in 2004, with the most significant decline in the
state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K, 2004: 1810; 2003: 2542). Declines in
total fatalities were also witnessed in the Indian states of Assam (2004: 354;
2003: 505); Tripura (2004: 167; 2003: 295); Meghalaya (2004: 35; 2003: 58); and
in the widespread left-wing extremism which now registers a presence in as many
as 13 states (2004: 259; 2003:
 539).
Marginal increases were, however, registered in Manipur (2004: 214; 2003: 198)
and in Nagaland (2004: 58; 2003: 37).
It is the "blowback" in Pakistan and Bangladesh that accounts for the most
significant escalation in the region, and it is developments in these two
countries - as well as largely unrelated events in Nepal - that have ensured
that South Asia remains one of the world's most volatile regions. In Pakistan,
total fatalities in terrorism-related violence rose to 878 in 2004, from 154
the previous year. Bangladesh saw a rise from 88 to 249 over the same period.
Clearly, states that have sought strategic gains in the terrorist enterprise
are finding the undertaking increasingly unprofitable, though it is far from
clear that they have the power, capacity or intent to put the genie back in the
bottle.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, both the North West Frontier Province (NWFP;
the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) alone have seen at least 595
killed) and Balochistan (at least 103 killed) have spun progressively out of
control, though sectarian violence has also been high in Sindh; political
disturbances have been noticeable, with a number of persons killed and arrested
in the Northern Areas; and sectarian violence has also penetrated the hitherto
untouched Punjab province, Pakistan's power-center. The rumblings of a new
source of dissent, the Seraikis of South Punjab, have also been more audible,
and if instability continues to mount in the country, this could well be
another locus of dissident violence and state repression in the foreseeable
future.
With both the Maoists (the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist) and the state
forces dramatically escalating violence after the breakdown of the ceasefire
and the "peace negotiations" in August 2003, the year 2004 registered an
increase in total fatalities in Nepal as well (2004: 2451; 2003: 2105).
And despite the three year long peace process in Sri Lanka, there are growing
signs of deterioration and apprehensions that the mediated peace may not be
sustainable. As many as 109 persons have been killed under the present
"ceasefire" in 2004 (primarily political assassinations executed by the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the internecine conflict with the
break-away Karuna faction), as against 59 in 2003 and just 15 in 2002.
The numbers alone, however, do not communicate an accurate picture of the scale
and scope of instability and violence in South Asia. The geographical spread
and extension of movements of radical violence - even in theatres where total
fatalities have shown a decline - is among the most disturbing facets of the
situation in this troubled region. More than half the geographical expanse of
South Asia has, today, passed over into areas of present or potential insurgent
and terrorist conflict, and the trajectory of the past year has demonstrated a
rapid augmentation of afflicted territories. Crucially, while no area affected
by such extremist movements in 2003 actually "fell off" the conflict map in
2004 - that is, no major conflict in the region was "resolved" - large
territories have been added to the regions of disorder.
Nevertheless, the initiation or persistence of a number of processes of
negotiation with terrorist and insurgent groups through 2004 was responsible
for some - though in many cases, possibly temporary - relief. Circumstances
emerging from the qualified Indo-Pak d'etente have made the erection of an
effective fence along the Line of Control and international border in J&K
possible, and this, along with the increasing difficulty of maintaining
"deniability" on Pakistan's support to terrorism, has been the primary factor
that has resulted in the very significant decline in fatalities in J&K.
According to the Minister for Home Affairs, infiltration in the state had
declined by as much as 60% during the year.
Parliamentary elections were also held in the state in April and May 2004, and
were marred by a campaign of terrorist intimidation and violence to impose a
boycott. A total of 31 persons were killed during the four phases of polling,
and there were as many as 109 incidents of terrorist violence across the state
during this period. Despite the campaign of terror, intended to discredit the
elections, a voter turnout of 35.11% was registered in the state. The Manmohan
Singh government, which assumed power on May 22, 2004, continued efforts to
push forward a dialogue with separatist elements in J&K, but the All
Parties Hurriyat Conference and the splinter group headed by hardliner Syed Ali
Shah Geelani, the Tehreek-e-Hurriyat, have refused to come to the table.
Pakistan has also made significant efforts to forge unity between the Hurriyat
factions to strengthen its own position in the dialogue with India, but has
also failed to secure its end.
The peace process in Nagaland in India's northeast has held out for nearly
seven years now, and the Indian government is actively seeking engagement in
peace processes of a number of other insurgent groups in this troubled region.
In the state of Andhra Pradesh - long the heartland of left-wing extremist
(Naxalite) violence, particularly by the erstwhile People's War Group
(Communist Party of India - Marxist-Leninist - People's War, now renamed
Communist Party of India-Maoist following its merger with the Maoist Communist
Center in September 2004) - the most significant actors in the insurgency are
currently in negotiations with the state government. However, the Naxalites
continue to exploit the opportunities of the "peace" to consolidate and expand
their activities across dramatically wider areas, and have repeatedly
reiterated their commitment to "armed revolution".
In Sri Lanka, the "peace process" survived through its third year, though here,
again, the LTTE has been using the opportunities of the peace to consolidate
its activities. There have been continuous reports of recruitment - both
voluntary and coercive, including the widespread recruitment of children - and
training, arms smuggling, expansion of military bases, as well as a campaign of
selective assassination and violence to confirm the LTTE's position as "sole
representative" of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka. The peace process, in the
meanwhile, has remained frozen for well over a year now. There is,
nevertheless, an acute sense of relief on the survival of the peace process -
despite its ambiguities - since the years preceding it saw annual fatalities in
the thousands (2001: 1822; March - December 2000: 3791).
By and large, the future of the various peace processes in South Asia will
depend on the relative strengths of the parties in engagement. If the
terrorists are able to widely consolidate their positions and secure an
advantage over the state - as is the case in Sri Lanka - they will be an
irresistible temptation to escalate demands to the point of a breakdown, and a
reversion to violence. On the other hand, if these groups weaken with the
passage of time as a result of both internal and global factors, they will be
inclined to use the opportunities of the peace process to rejoin the
"mainstream" with some negotiated advantages.
Nepal remains the state most vulnerable to the threat of imminent collapse in
the near term, with violence by both the Maoists and the state forces
escalating substantially. Fatalities increased significantly among civilians
(2003: 214; 2004: 380) and security forces (2003: 307; 2004: 481), though they
remained at roughly the same level in the "terrorist" category (2003: 1584;
2004: 1590) indicating that a degree of fatigue had possibly taken over the
Royal Nepalese Army and the Armed Police Force.
The question that remains crucial to the near-term prospects of peace over the
wider South Asian region and its neighborhood relates to the intentions and
capacities of the two primary state sponsors of terrorism in the region -
Pakistan and Bangladesh. The major conflicts in India - with the exception of
the Naxalite movement, which accounted for just 8.9% of total fatalities in
2004 - rely directly on support from these states. This is true of the
insurgency in J&K which is directly propped up by the Musharraf regime, and
the multiple insurgencies in India's northeast, which receive succor from
Bangladesh, as well as from Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence through
Bangladesh's Directorate General of Forces Intelligence.
The enterprise of Islamist extremist terror is, of course, destined to eventual
failure, even as it increasingly targets Muslim populations as well as elements
within its sponsoring states. Nevertheless, the decisions of its current state
sponsors and sympathizers will remain critical in determining how long it will
take to arrive at its predestined termination, and how many lives it will
consume before it does so. It is clear that the state sponsors of Islamist
terrorism in the South Asian region remain, at present and at best, ambivalent
in their attitudes to the activities of the Islamist terrorist enterprise, and
supportive of its ideological presuppositions.
The external environment has been crucial in making such ambivalence and
support possible, even as it will be in creating the potential spaces for wider
terrorist activities. Within factors located outside the immediate region, the
successes or failures of US policy in Iraq will prove pivotal in defining the
future capacities of Islamist terrorism in South Asia. The experience in Iraq
has, over the past year, been a severe disappointment for the US and for
various nations that have a stake in the success of the global "war on
terrorism", even as it has been a source of encouragement to Islamist terrorist
forces across the world. These trends have been compounded by the indulgence
that has been extended to Pakistan over the past years, not only in terms of
the very significant and unhampered access to financial and (increasingly)
military aid, but also in the tolerance of its two-faced approach to terrorism
and Islamist extremist mobilization.
Pakistan simply brushed under the carpet the entire issue of its illegal
nuclear proliferation, and the efforts of prominent national scientists to
provide nuclear know-how even to al-Qaeda, with President General Pervez
Musharraf shielding and exculpating nuclear kingpin Abdul Qadeer Khan, "the
hero of the country" and its primary proliferator, in February 2004. The
much-celebrated "madrassa reforms" and the reform of state-sanctioned
text books in the public education system have also failed comprehensively, and
the ideology of jihad continues to be taught in a majority of educational
institutions in the country even today. Extremist forces in Bangladesh have
also flourished under the shadow of the international community's benign
neglect.
There are lessons in all this. Clearly, nations that create terrorist camps and
exploit the instrumentalities of terror for strategic advancement have found
that, eventually, their own people - and the leaders who create these
Frankenstein monsters - become their targets. A corollary is that these
entities evolve capacities of their own, and do not remain subservient
instruments of their state sponsors in perpetuity. Significantly, while
terrorism can be contained, even defeated, democracies have, by and large,
found it difficult to amass the political will, the resources and the
strategies of response that are necessary if they are to prevail over terror.
Thus, even while we celebrate the decline in violence in some parts of South
Asia, it is necessary to understand that the war is infinitely far from being
won and, indeed, that, aided by general political and military incompetence,
this could - in many cases - easily prove to be the lull before the storm.
K P S Gill, publisher, South Asia Intelligence Review; president,
Institute for Conflict Management.
Published with permission from the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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