|
|
|
 |
In Sri Lanka, no war, no
peace By Ameen Izzadeen
COLOMBO - Sri Lanka has been fortunate
enough to survive without war for the past three
years, and a sigh of relief passed over the
country as it marked the third anniversary of the
cease fire agreement signed between the government
and the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) on February 22, 2002. Even ardent opponents
of the truce acknowledge that the cease fire and
the absence of a full-scale conflict over the past
three years has saved valuable lives and property.
Behind this positive picture is a
different and melancholy story - a story of lost
opportunities and lack of progress. Three years
ago, there was enthusiasm all round, with peace
talks resuming at the Thai naval base Sattahip.
There was an economic boom riding on the
expectation that the curse of two decades was
finally over. Three years later, there is no
peace, no war, and no talks. The only reality is
the cease fire agreement, which the two parties
continue to adhere to for strategic reasons,
despite cease fire violations by both sides.
Meanwhile, efforts to bring them together have not
ceased, with Norwegian peace facilitators making
regular visits, shuttling between Colombo and the
LTTE base in Kilinochchi and also between Oslo and
London where the LTTE's chief negotiator, Anton
Balasingham, is domiciled.
The Norwegian
special envoy, Erik Solheim, was in Sri Lanka last
week for yet another effort to bring the two sides
face-to-face. This time, his effort was aimed more
at reaching an agreement on a joint mechanism to
handle the tsunami aid and relief work in the
north and east, than the peace process per se. But
there was no breakthrough, and he had to leave
empty-handed - a situation the Norwegians have
become accustomed to - after listening to
complaints from both sides.
Both the
government and the LTTE need the foreign funds to
bolster their respective positions. The LTTE is
also eyeing a big share of the
multi-billion-dollar aid package, which the
international community has promised - though much
of this aid remains only a distant promise. There
appears to be significant donor pressure on the
government to come to some sort of a deal with the
LTTE on the tsunami relief work before they
release any funds. Earlier the donors had linked
the release of a US$4.5 billion aid package to the
resumption of the peace process.
A
desperate government, caught in a catch-22
situation, cannot accede to the LTTE's demands
without risking its narrow parliamentary majority.
On Wednesday, February 23, the government's
Information Department issued a statement
declaring that the Colombo was prepared to resume
talks to set up, first, an interim arrangement to
handle the urgent humanitarian needs of the
people, and then to proceed to discuss the final
solution to the prolonged ethnic crisis. The
remarks drew an angry response from the coalition
partner, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP),
which threatened to walk out of the government if
the talks on the interim authority took place
before a final solution to the ethnic conflict was
found. The main opposition United National Party
(UNP) welcomed the government's statement and
offered its unstinted support.
But just as
President Chandrika Kumaratunga defied the JVP
threat and agreed to go the extra mile for the
sake of peace, the LTTE appears to have toughened
its stance and escalated demands. The LTTE's
position was that the talks should focus only on
its proposals for an interim self-governing
authority for the north and east. But in the
aftermath of the killing of the LTTE's eastern
leader, E Kaushalyan, on February 7, the rebels
are now demanding that the government dismantle
all paramilitary groups - an obvious reference to
the breakaway Karuna faction. The LTTE accuses the
government of complicity in the Kaushalyan killing
and strongly believes that the military is
providing shelter to renegade LTTE cadres loyal to
Karuna.
On February 14, Tiger ideologue
Balasingham told Solheim at a meeting in London
that the Sri Lankan government had to take steps
to restore confidence in the peace process, in
particular by disarming paramilitaries working
alongside its armed forces, and to establish a
joint mechanism with the LTTE for post-tsunami
aid. The two new demands have not only made the
Tiger's stance tougher but also made the
government's search for peace difficult. The
president's response to Tiger allegations came in
a statement on Friday, February 25 which quoted
Chandrika Kumaratunga as having told Solheim that
there were no paramilitaries working with the
armed forces and unreservedly condemned the
killing of Kaushalyan. She also expressed her
government's commitment to discuss "a working
arrangement with the LTTE for the equitable
allocation and implementation of post-tsunami
aid".
Whether the Tigers would accept her
words or insist on action is yet to be seen.
Against this backdrop, a political crisis
is brewing inside the government with Kumaratunga,
who is in the midst of her last year in office,
now apparently regretting her alliance with the
JVP. Two Sundays ago, addressing a public
gathering, she fired salvos at the JVP, accusing
it of being an obstacle to peace and asking it to
leave the government if it did not agree with her
policies.
If the JVP, which has 39 seats
in the legislature, quits, her government can
survive only if she gets the support of her main
rival, the UNP. But, with battle lines being drawn
for a presidential race this or next year, the
UNP's cooperation will not be forthcoming or will
be limited only to the extent of securing
political gains. Adding to the crisis, the Ceylon
Workers Congress, a party which derives its
strength from the people of Indian origin, has
decided to withdraw its support to the government.
If the party carries out its threat, the
government would once again lapse into a minority,
with the joint opposition calling the shots.
The Tigers will certainly be keeping close
tabs on these political developments, since
southern politics is one of the factors that shape
the peace process. The Tigers may also cling on to
the cease fire till the current political crisis
has produced an outcome. The Tigers are also aware
that they can get foreign aid for development only
if they keep away from violence. They are,
however, also aware that if the current situation
of "no war, no peace", continues it will make them
politically and administratively impotent and lead
to the erosion of their support base. In the words
of one pro-Tiger analyst, a politically and
administratively impotent LTTE that cannot deliver
anything socially or economically concrete to the
Tamils should, in theory, crumble inevitably if it
is held for a sufficiently long time in a
no-peace-no-war situation.
The LTTE is not
unmindful of this stock counter insurgency wisdom.
At Kaushalyan's funeral, the LTTE said its
patience was running thin and warned the
government of a "fitting response". On Wednesday,
February 23, LTTE cadres killed a soldier and
wounded another in Killali in the north. The LTTE
did not mince words to claim responsibility for
the incident. "Yes, we did it, so what" was its
attitude.
In the three years of ceasefire,
Wednesday's incident was just another violation.
When the Tigers are accused of cease fire
violations they respond with ease by pointing to
the government's cease fire violations, which are
largely unseen. They claim, for instance, that the
government has not fulfilled its pledges to vacate
all public buildings and homes in the northeast
and to disarm paramilitaries. Besides, the LTTE
claims that the government has also upset the
military balance by buying arms from Iran and
Pakistan under multi-million dollar credit lines,
adding that the flow of tsunami aid has emboldened
the government to take this step.
On the
other hand, the government accuses the LTTE of
covertly building up its military machine even as
the country was grappling with the tsunami
disaster. It is alleged that the Tigers have
obtained military hardware under the cover of
tsunami relief. Tsunami aid cargoes destined for
the LTTE and detected at the airport have included
two helicopters, ammunition and a consignment of
body armor.
The government fears that the
LTTE has grown from strength to strength during
the cease fire. According to defense officials, it
has not only accrued air power, but also swelled
its ranks with child soldiers. As of February
2004, there were more than 1,250 child soldiers in
LTTE camps, but the real figure could be much
higher, according to UNICEF. If a resolution
currently being discussed by the United Nations
Security Council is adopted next month, there
would be targeted sanctions against governments
and rebel leaders who continue to recruit child
soldiers. The LTTE is likely to play the peace
card to circumvent international sanctions.
Thus the no-peace-no-war situation is
expected to continue till the LTTE finds the
correct political and military coordinates to take
its next step. In Sri Lanka's conflict resolution
exercise, it is the LTTE which still calls the
shots.
Ameen Izzadeen, deputy
editor of the Colombo-based Sunday Times and Daily
Mirror.
(Published with permission
from the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism
Portal ) |
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
 |
|
|
All material on this
website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written
permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2005 Asia Times
Online Ltd.
|
|
Head
Office: Rm 202, Hau Fook Mansion, No. 8 Hau Fook St., Kowloon, Hong
Kong
Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
|
Asian Sex Gazette South Asian Sex News
|
|
|