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'Brothers' in
arms
By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - Pakistan has admitted that the
former head of its nuclear weapons program Abdul
Qadeer Khan gave Iran centrifuges for enriching
uranium. While this is merely confirmation of what
the world already knows, it is the first time that
Pakistani officials have publicized details of
what nuclear materials the scientist passed on to
Iran.
But as in the past, the government
continues to distance itself from the sale of
nuclear technology to Iran and other countries.
While admitting Khan's sale of centrifuges to
Iran, Pakistan's Information Minister Sheikh
Rashid Ahmed said, "He helped Iran in his personal
capacity, and the Pakistan government had nothing
to do with it."
Few, however, would accept
the veracity of the Pakistan government's claims
that it was not aware of/not involved in/did not
authorize the sale of nuclear technology. It would
have been impossible for Khan to conceal his
actions from the government.
Gaurav
Kampani, senior research associate at Monterey
Institute of International Studies' proliferation
research and assessment program, points out Khan
"could not have engaged in nuclear transfers for
nearly two decades without sanction or tacit
acknowledgement from sections or individuals
within the Pakistani government".
The
military's "tight control over the nuclear weapons
program, multiple layers of security surrounding
it, the exports of machinery and hardware from
Pakistan, as well as rumors, leaks and past
warnings about Pakistan's nuclear cooperation with
Iran and North Korea by Western intelligence
agencies" makes it hard to accept that the
military was not aware of the transfer of nuclear
technology.
On the face of it, the nuclear
cooperation between Pakistan and Iran is not
surprising. After all, Pakistan had the nuclear
technology and was willing to put it on sale. And
Iran had the money to pay for the technology. Both
countries have often drawn attention to their
"long-standing brotherly relations". Islamabad has
often described Iran as a "brother Islamic
country" with whom it has "close friendly ties".
Indeed, Pakistan and Iran enjoyed a close
relationship up to the late 1970s. They were on
the same side during the Cold War. Both were close
and crucial allies of the US, part of the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO). Things soured,
however, with the Islamic Revolution and the fall
of the Shah in Iran in 1979.
A close
examination of Iran-Pakistan relations reveals
differences and many difficulties. Both might be
Islamic nations, but Pakistan is Sunni-dominated,
while Iran is overwhelmingly Shi'ite. This
difference would assume critical importance in
their bilateral relations with the 1979 Iranian
Revolution. Relations between the Pakistan's
military dictator General Zia ul-Haq and Iran's
new rulers were poor right from the start. Iran's
rulers viewed Zia with deep suspicion. How could
they forget the fact that the general had traveled
to Iran in 1977-78 to shore up the Shah's regime.
What contributed further to the
deterioration in Pakistan-Iran relations was Zia's
Islamization initiative that was set in motion in
1979. This drive claimed to have a universal
Islamic vision. In reality it was based on a
narrow Sunni interpretation of Islamic theology
and law. It was therefore unacceptable to Iran's
Shi'ite clerics. As Zia's government pressed ahead
with its sectarian agenda – it took a series of
measures that gave a fillip to Sunni extremism,
even encouraging the setting up of Sunni militant
organizations –the Iranian government pushed ahead
with exporting Shi'ite extremism, encouraging and
arming Shi'ite extremism to counter Sunni
militancy in Pakistan.
In the process,
Pakistan became an important battleground between
Sunni and Shi'ite forces in the region. This had
serious impact on Iran-Pakistan relations. The
impact of this backing of Shi'ite and Sunni
extremism by the Iranian and Pakistani governments
is felt to date in the region.
This mutual
suspicion would deepen as the crisis in
Afghanistan erupted and worsened. Zia's cozying up
with the Americans and the way he welcomed the
American military presence into
Pakistan/Afghanistan and therefore the region was
deeply resented by Iran's anti-American rulers.
While Iran was uneasy with the proximity of the
Americans to its borders, it was just as unhappy
with the irreligious Soviets' occupation of
Afghanistan.
Iran armed and funded Shi'ite
resistance groups throughout the 1980s and
maintained links with them after the Soviet
withdrawal in late 1989. The rise of the Sunni
Taliban in the mid-1990s in Afghanistan triggered
great alarm in Iran and Pakistan's role in this
development naturally plunged Iran-Pakistan
relations further. It simultaneously led to a new
warming in India-Iran relations, contributing to
heightened suspicion in Pakistan of Teheran's
intentions towards Islamabad.
With Iran
and India backing the Northern Alliance and
coordinating its anti-Taliban strategy in
Afghanistan, Pakistan's wariness of Iran deepened.
In August 1998, Iran was enraged with Pakistan for
not preventing the killing of several of its
diplomats who were captured by the Taliban in the
northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif. It did
seem for a while that Iran would even militarily
retaliate for the death of its diplomats and that
Pakistan would not escape Tehran's wrath.
Post-Taliban, Iran-Pakistan ties seem to
have improved. Iran's concerns with regard to
Pakistan's backing of the Taliban seem to have
been allayed somewhat with the Pakistani
government reversing its earlier policy of support
to the Taliban. Tehran and Islamabad have taken
big strides with regard to a proposed pipeline
from Iran's oilfields through Pakistan to India
and the two have recently agreed to conduct joint
naval exercises.
These, however, seem to
be incidents of tactical cooperation between Iran
and Pakistan. Mutual suspicion persists. Tehran
blames Pakistan for the American presence in
Afghanistan and Central Asia. It suspects Pakistan
of cooperating with the US against Iran.
Pakistan suspects an Iranian hand in the
turmoil in Balochistan. It believes that Iran is
wary of the emergence of Gwadar port as a serious
competitor to the strategic significance to the
Iranian port city of Chabahar. And it is wary of
Iran's warming ties with its number one enemy,
India.
For all their claims of "brotherly
ties", therefore, Iran and Pakistan have been
deeply suspicious of each other for decades. It is
therefore difficult to understand the nuclear
cooperation between these two bitter rivals. It
does seem that while they were on the one hand
busy arming rival militias, they were also holding
hands - albeit clandestinely - on the nuclear
issue.
Pakistan and the US courtship
alarmed Iran. But that did not prevent Tehran and
Islamabad from exploring forbidden interaction
with regard to transfer on nuclear technology.
Sources in India's Ministry of External
Affairs point out that while the Pakistan-Iran
clandestine dealings stretch over two decades, the
height of the engagement on the nuclear issue took
place between 1989 and 1995. With the Soviets
leaving Afghanistan in 1989, Washington's use for
Pakistan waned and the ardor of Pakistan's ties
with the US had declined. While the Taliban
emerged in 1994, its true face and the extent of
the threat it posed to the region became apparent
only by 1995-96.
Despite their intense
bilateral differences from 1979 onwards, Pakistan
and Iran were more than willing to engage on
nuclear issues in the relatively tension-free
1989-95 period. Both stood to gain from the deals.
Pakistan's military made much money from the
transfer of technology. It also quietly got back
at the US for having used it in Afghanistan and
then neglected it thereafter. Iran's rulers gained
access to technology for which they were
desperate.
The Pakistan-Iran nuclear
cooperation saga underscores that countries have
neither permanent friends nor enemies; only
permanent interests. In the murky world of nuclear
proliferation, it does not matter who you purchase
from or who you sell your technology to.
Despite their deep differences, the
individual interests of Iran and Pakistan saw them
come together on the question of nuclear
technology. Pakistan was willing to sell nuclear
technology to Iran, a country whose intentions it
did not trust. And Iran purchased the technology
from someone it did not really regard as a friend.
Sudha Ramachandran is an
independent journalist/researcher based in
Bangalore.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times
Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us
for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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