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Promise and
problems
By Dr Jing-dong Yuan
April 2005 marks the 55th
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic
relations between China and India. It is a major
milestone for the two ancient civilizations,
neighbors, and rising powers. Over the past five
and half decades, the bilateral relationship has
witnessed the warm "Hindi-Chini
bhai-bhai"
brotherhood and the famous
Panch Sheel or the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence in the 1950s but it has also
been overshadowed by the 1962 border war and the
acrimonious spat in the wake of India's May 1998
nuclear tests.
Sino-Indian relations today
are enjoying a period of stability and growing
economic ties. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's
forthcoming visit to India From April 9-12 will
build on the positive momentum generated by the
June 2003 visit by Indian prime minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee. However, there remain unresolved
disputes and emerging conflicts between the two
countries - ranging from boundary issues to energy
security - that require strategic vision,
diplomatic skill and mutual accommodation.
Rebuilding ties after Pokhran II
nuclear tests
Beijing reacted strongly to
New Delhi's accusation that the Chinese threat was
the key rationale behind its May 1998 nuclear
tests. China retaliated by canceling the scheduled
Joint Working Group meeting on boundary issues and
played an active role in pushing through United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 calling
for nuclear rollback in India and Pakistan.
Beijing's relentless diplomatic campaigns to
isolate New Delhi eventually induced the latter to
seek rapprochement. Sino-Indian relations
gradually thawed and Indian policymakers publicly
retracted the China threat rhetoric.
In
May 1999, Kashmiri militants, with the support of
the Pakistani military, crossed the Line of
Control into the Kargil area in the
India-controlled state of Jammu and Kashmir. The
Indian army launched military operations seeking
to repel the intrusion. As the conflict escalated,
threatening a major military confrontation between
the two nuclear states, both New Delhi and
Islamabad were seeking international support.
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Foreign
Minister Sartaj Aziz went to Beijing soon after
the crisis broke out and sought to secure Chinese
support; however, their requests were turned down.
Instead, the Chinese leaders advised the Pakistani
visitors to seek a peaceful settlement with India.
Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh subsequently
visited China in June 1999 as the Kargil crisis
reached the boiling point.
International
pressure on Pakistan, including unequivocal
warnings by the administration of US president
Bill Clinton to Sharif, eventually brought the
crisis to an end in July. China's apparent
neutrality in the dispute gained much appreciation
from India. The two sides have since then on many
occasions publicly announced that they do not view
each other as a security threat. Improvement in
the bilateral relationship continued with Indian
president K R Narayanan's visit to China in May
2000 to mark the 50th anniversary of the
establishment of Sino-Indian diplomatic relations.
Chinese parliamentary head Li Peng and premier Zhu
Rongji visited India in January 2001 and 2002,
respectively, further consolidating the bilateral
relationship.
Of all the key events over
the past few years, perhaps the most important
would be Indian defense minister George Fernandes'
week-long visit to China in April 2003 and prime
minister Vajpayee's June 2003 visit. The former
was more symbolic while the latter ushered in
important milestones. Fernandes' China trip was
significant in three respects. First, the visit
was the first by an Indian defense minister to
China in over a decade. Second, the visit, coming
from someone who five years earlier had been
widely quoted by the media as describing China as
India's "security threat No 1" just prior to
the Indian nuclear tests, signified just how much
the two countries had mended their fences. Third,
at a time when China was embroiled in the crisis
over Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and
when many international events originally
scheduled to be taking place in China had been
canceled, Fernandes' visit was much appreciated by
his Chinese hosts.
While no major
breakthrough was achieved during Vajpayee's visit
- and indeed no such expectation had ever been
entertained - there was nevertheless significant
progress in four areas that deserve closer
scrutiny. The first is the growing consensus and
converging interests between Beijing and New Delhi
over a wide range of bilateral, regional and
global issues. The two countries issued a joint
declaration on principles for relations and
comprehensive cooperation and vowed not to view
each other as a security threat. They reaffirmed
their determination to resolve their disputes
through peaceful means. This is a far cry from the
suspicions and hostility between the two Asian
powers in the wake of India's May 1998 nuclear
tests.
This stabilizing and maturing
relationship is clearly marked by the two
countries' converging interests in developing a
fair, equitable international political and
economic order, the role for the United Nations,
and support of global disarmament, including
efforts to prevent the weaponization of outer
space. Beijing and New Delhi are seeking to
promote greater equality and fair distribution of
wealth between the rich and poor by working to
improve the current international economic system.
As developing countries, both China and India are
interested in gradually integrating their
economies into the global trading system in ways
that provide the necessary protection and
transition time for their industries to adjust; in
addition, Beijing and New Delhi are also calling
for greater economic assistance from the Northern
industrialized countries to the vast majority of
developing countries in the South.
Likewise, both are critical of US
unilateralism and seek to promote a multipolar
world where they can play a more important role in
global affairs. India is looking forward to
securing a permanent seat in the proposed
expansion of the UN Security Council, and China
has indicated its support of Delhi's aspiration.
India has long championed for nuclear disarmament,
a goal shared by China. Beijing and New Delhi are
also interested in promoting the peaceful uses of
outer space as both are developing their emerging
civilian space programs. Weaponization of outer
space could well put into jeopardy these programs,
threaten existing peaceful use, such as
environmental monitoring and weather forecasting,
and risk inducing an arms race in this new
frontier.
By each appointing a special
representative to oversee the political framework
of border negotiations, the two countries have
clearly demonstrated their determination to speed
up the process of resolving the territorial
disputes. This reflects a consensus reached by
Chinese and Indian leaders that to reach the full
potential of bilateral relations requires the
satisfactory closure of this issue. So far, four
rounds of meetings have already been held and the
change of government in India has not affected the
process.
China and India have made
important - though largely token - gestures toward
each other. New Delhi has shown greater
appreciation of Beijing's sensitivity over the
Tibetan issue by affirming for the first time that
the Tibetan Autonomous Region is part of the
territory of China. Beijing, on the other hand,
has extended de facto recognition of Sikkim being
a state of India, something that Beijing had
refused to do ever since the small Himalayan
kingdom acceded to India in 1975. While Chinese
diplomats continue to characterize the issue as a
historical legacy that takes time to resolve, the
fact that official Chinese maps are showing Sikkim
as part of India suggests that Beijing considers
the issue closed. Indeed, New Delhi is confident
that the de jure recognition will not be long in
forthcoming.
Finally, Vajpayee's visit was
marked by its economic orientation. A large
entourage of Indian business executives
accompanied the Indian prime minister; further, of
Vajpayee's three important speeches delivered
during his visit, two were addressed at business
venues. Indeed, bilateral trade grew to $7.6
billion annually by 2003 and is projected to reach
$10 billion in 2004 and surpass $15 billion by
2007, if not earlier. That target may be achieved
earlier as the bilateral two-way trade already
reached $13 billion in 2004, surpassing the
original goals by over 30%. A Sino-Indian Joint
Study Group on Trade and Economic Cooperation was
formed in March 2004. In addition to growing
bilateral economic ties, the two countries are
also active in exploring potentials for regional
economic cooperation, including the sub-regional
"Kunming Initiative".
The momentum
generated by the Vajpayee visit has continued.
There have been more high-level exchanges between
the two countries, with the Chinese defense
minister visiting India last, the first in almost
a decade, and the first joint Indian-Chinese naval
exercises. India's chief of army staff also
visited China in late 2004 and the commander of
the Indian 4th Army Corps, the unit that was
involved in the 1962 war and is now stationed in
the areas along the Line of Actual Control, paid a
visit to the Tibet Military District Command in
Lhasa.
Rivalry or partnership:
Challenges ahead
The coming months and
years will testify if the goodwill and momentum
generated by Vajpayee's successful June 2003 visit
can be maintained. While the two countries are on
good terms for now and, indeed, their domestic
priorities - economic development and prosperity -
provide strong incentives for them to avoid
conflict, obstacles remain and sustained efforts
at the highest political level are required to
steer the ship of bilateral relationships without
hitting any major shoals. These include the
intractable territorial disputes, even though the
Line of Actual Control has been relatively
peaceful over the last 40 years; mutual suspicions
and the potentials for competition and rivalry;
China's relationship with Pakistan in the regional
context; the China-India-US strategic triangle;
India's eastward diplomacy; and the emerging
energy security issue and potential trade
disputes.
Despite the generally benign atmosphere
between the two countries, there remain lingering
suspicions and distrust; the scar of the 1962
war has yet to be healed. India claims the Chinese-controlled
Aksai Chin of approximately 35,000
square kilometers as part of the territory in
Ladaakh, Kashmir. Beijing, on the other hand, disputes
New Delhi's possession of more than 90,000
square kilometers in what is now the Indian state
Arunachal Pradesh. Without a satisfactory
resolution of the territorial disputes, there can
never be a "full and complete" normalization of
bilateral relations. Since the early 1980s, eight
rounds of border negotiations and 14 rounds of
Joint Working Group meetings have taken place.
During Vajpayee's visit to China in June 2003, the
two governments designated their respective
special representatives to provide the political
impetus to the process. Four rounds of meetings
have been held so far. However, a solution remains
elusive due to fundamental differences over the
mechanisms of settlement. Clearly, final
resolution of the issue requires not only
political decisions at the highest level in both
capitals but also the political skills to sell it
to their respective domestic constituencies.
A stable Sino-Indian relationship requires
the effective management of the delicate
China-India-Pakistan triangle. For over 40 years,
and specifically in the wake of the 1962
China-India war, Beijing and Islamabad have
developed a close political-security relationship.
Over the years, China has provided both moral and
material support in assisting the latter's rivalry
with India. This "all-weather" relationship was a
key component of China's South Asia policy as
Beijing sought to tie down India and extend its
influence to the subcontinent. Since the early
1980s, as China and India embarked on the path of
normalization, Beijing has shifted to a policy of
balance and made greater efforts to address New
Delhi's legitimate concerns over Sino-Pakistani
ties, in particular in the defense area.
While China's neutrality during the 1999
Kargil crisis demonstrates a more balanced Chinese
South Asia policy, that gesture has yet to
translate into goodwill and confidence on India's
part that the Sino-Pakistani relationship is not
targeted at India. Indeed, China-Pakistan ties, in
particular in the security area, remain a serious
concern to India as reports suggest continued
Chinese missile assistance to Pakistan. New Delhi
remains suspicious of the Sino-Pakistani
relationship and those two nations' resilient
security ties, ranging from the construction of a
strategic outlet for Pakistan in the Gwadar Port
and continuous supplies of military equipment -
these reinforce the specter of strategic
encirclement of India. While China's continuing
support of Pakistan is partly due to containing
India, it is also aimed at maintaining a stable
relationship with an important Islamic country -
and a nuclear weapons state - and therefore
Beijing retains its influence over the government
in Islamabad out of concerns over the Islamic
unrest in its own territory, especially in
Xinjiang.
Despite progress in bilateral
relations over the past few years, mutual
suspicions remain. Partly this is due to the
dynamics of the security dilemma and structural
conflicts between the two Asian giants; it is also
because of the lack of institutionalized and
regular high-level official exchanges. India has
watched China's phenomenal growth in the economic
and military sectors with both envy and alarm.
Beijing's defense budgets have grown at double
digits over a decade and Chinese acquisitions of
advanced weaponry from Russia has resulted in
improved aerial and naval capabilities of the
two-million strong People's Liberation Army.
In addition, China is also modernizing its
strategic nuclear forces. If there is one single
lesson that New Delhi's security analysts have
drawn from the 1962 war, it would be this: power
and strength are the only ticket to the club of
great powers. For many of them, the very fact that
China continues to lead India on many indicators
of power poses a greater threat than its military
defeat 40 years ago. China is also paying close
attention to India's growing military power and
its nuclear and missile development. New Delhi is
purchasing advanced Russian fighter aircraft,
submarines and an aircraft carrier. In addition,
India is expanding its defense contacts with
Israel and has acquired the Phalcon early warning
system that was denied to China. Jerusalem's
proposed sale of the Phalcon system to China was
effectively blocked by Washington in 2000 out of
concerns over its use by the Chinese military
against US interests in the region, especially
around the Taiwan Strait.
Chinese security
analysts are also debating the significance and
implications of a warming US-India relationship.
Prior to September 11, 2001, there were growing
concerns that the new and growing ties between
Washington and New Delhi could have negative
security implications for China, especially the
apparent attempt by Washington to enlist New Delhi
as a potential counterweight, if not part of a
containment strategy, against China. Within this
context, the growing security ties, including US
military sales to India, joint military exercises,
and regular defense consultations between the two
are of particular concern to China. Washington and
New Delhi were drawing closer to each other than
ever before. There were regular high-level visits
to each capital, and the administration of
President George W Bush briefed the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP)-led government on major policy
initiatives, treating India almost as an ally. New
Delhi, in return, openly endorsed US missile
defense positions. Indeed, even many US allies
were concerned with the strategic implications of
Washington's decisions.
Washington's current focus on combating global terrorism
and the post-September 11 policy shift brought
a renewed engagement of Pakistan and an emphasis
on great power cooperation; this reduced Beijing's
worries about an Indo-US entente against China.
But a China-India-US strategic triangle has
clearly emerged in that policymakers are
increasingly aware of and attentive to policies
taken in the other two capitals and how these may
affect its own security interests. Within this
complex structure, Washington and New Delhi share
normative values (democracy) and strategic
interests, while Beijing's ties with both are more
driven by contingent rather than structural
interests.
Beijing is wary of New Delhi's
eastward strategy of developing greater economic
and military ties with Japan and the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In recent
years, India has launched a new post-Pokhran
offensive diplomacy of engagement and entente with
countries beyond New Delhi's traditional strategic
domain: Japan, Vietnam and, to a broader extent,
members of ASEAN, many of which have ongoing
disputes with China. The Indian defense minister
visited Japan in January 2000, the first such
visit since India gained independence. Japanese
prime minister Yoshiro Mori visited India in
August 2000 and Vajpayee paid an official visit to
Japan in February 2001. Japanese Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi's upcoming visit to India this
month will further consolidate such ties.
India has also broadened its relationship
with ASEAN countries and improved relations with
Myanmar. Chinese analysts note that New Delhi's
Southeast Asia diplomacy could add complexity to
China-ASEAN relations. For example, growing Indian
and ASEAN naval cooperation could impinge upon
China's maritime interests, making a final
resolution of the territorial disputes in the
South China Sea even more difficult. The
Indo-Vietnamese defense cooperation is viewed with
suspicion given that China has unresolved
territorial issues with both countries.
China-India trade has experienced
significant gains in the last few years, totaling
$13 billion in 2004. However, given the sizes of
both economies, the level of economic
interdependence remains low. Both countries have
registered significant growth over the last
decade. There is intense competition for, and
protectionism against, each other in the areas of
foreign direct investment (FDI) and market access.
China is now in a comfortable lead, with $60
billion FDI - 12 times India's total - in 2004.
While leaders in both countries have touted the
complementarities of their industries - India's
software and China's hardware - they have yet to
make significant investments in each other's
economy. How to promote and expand greater
economic contacts and manage competition for
markets and investment and technology imports
would also test the leadership skills and
entrepreneurship in both countries so that their
projected growth could both benefit from and
generate more win-win cooperation instead of
falling into the trap of zero-sum games.
Finally, India and China are both energy
consumers and importers. A net oil importer since
1993, China today is the No 2 oil consumer after
the United States, depending on imports for
two-thirds of its total consumption. While ranking
sixth in the global petroleum demand, India's fast
growing economy and its lack of domestic energy
sources means that it is bound to move up the
imports' ladder, projected to occupy the fourth
place by 2010. On energy security issues, the two
could compete as well as cooperate. Indian and
Chinese oil companies are already involved in
overseas oil field exploitation, extractions and
acquisitions from the Middle East, to the Persian
Gulf, to Latin America. An uncoordinated
competition from the world's most energy-thirsty
countries could drive up prices and rivalry in yet
another field.
Beijing
and New Delhi would both do well in working with
each other to find energy security. Already
the two countries are seeking to cooperate
rather than to compete directly with each other
since the latter strategy is bound to drive up oil
prices. India hosted the first-ever meeting
between major Asian oil-importing countries, including
China, and the Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries
such as Saudi Arabia. Chinese and Indian
oil companies have acquired equity stakes in
Iran's Yadavaran oilfield. In addition, China and India are
also discussing a potential natural-gas pipeline.
Conclusion
The Sino-Indian
relationship is bound to be one of the most
important bilateral relationships in the coming
decades simply by the sheer weight of numbers:
combined they represent 40% of the world's
population and their continuing economic growth
will project them to the second and third place
within the next two decades. How they manage their
relationship will have a tremendous impact on
peace and stability in the regional and,
increasingly, global context.
Dr
Jing-dong Yuan, is director of research for
the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and associate
professor of International Policy Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies, where
he teaches Northeast Asian security, Chinese
politics and comparative national security policy.
Published with permission of
the Power and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
to content@pinr.com . |
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