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Meet Mr al-Qaeda 'Number 3'
(2003)
By Syed Saleem
Shahzad
"I applaud the Pakistani
government and President Musharraf for acting on
solid intelligence to bring this man [Abu Faraj
al-Libbi] to justice. This removes a dangerous
enemy who is a direct threat to America." -
President George W Bush
KARACHI - Both the
Pakistani and US governments have been effusive in
welcoming the capture of 40-year-old Libyan Abu
Faraj al-Libbi in Pakistan, claiming the arrest of the
man they describe as 
the number 3 in al-Qaeda is a major
blow for the group. He was wanted as the
suspected mastermind of the two unsuccessful
attempts to assassinate Pakistan's President
General Pervez Musharraf in December, 2003.
However, Asia Times Online analysis based
on months of inquiries suggests that Abu Faraj
will prove of little value in helping the US or
anyone else reach Osama bin Laden, or in
debilitating al-Qaeda.
Abu Faraj was
captured as a result of a US Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) operation in the Pakistani tribal
areas in North West Frontier Province. Though
Pakistan's Minister of Information Shiekh Rasheed
misled the media by saying that the arrest was
made in North Waziristan, Asia Times Online
sources based in Washington and in the Pakistani
intelligence community confirm that the arrest was
made in the village of Fatami, near Mardan, 30
miles north of Peshawar.
"He was arrested
along with five other foreigners ... and is giving
a lot of information about al-Qaeda's methods of
communications," according to the same US sources.
The CIA approached Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence several days ago with a tipoff from
someone in Abu Faraj's inner circle.
Asia
Times Online was informed a few months ago by a
top Pakistani intelligence official that Abu Faraj
was on run and that he had been tracked in
different cities, including in the southern port
city of Karachi, but he slipped away. (See Al-Qaeda
kingpin gets away in Pakistan Nov 4,
2004.)
Although Abu Faraj has been widely
promoted as a leading al-Qaeda figure, closer
examination proves this to be incorrect.
It has been some time since al-Qaeda
communicated through electronic means. Nowadays
its relies solely on human resources to pass
messages, and even this method is complex and
involves layers of people. Each person involved in
communication is monitored daily by various
sources, and if they go missing for even a few
days, the whole network changes its position and
dumps that missing link until it is confirmed that
he is not being monitored or cultivated by
security agencies.
Abu Faraj has been a
target for many months, so there is little chance
that al-Qaeda would have allowed him anywhere near
its top echelons. Indeed, in all likelihood he had
been stripped of his position as operational
commander of al-Qaeda in South Asia.
And
if Abu Faraj had known the route to bin Laden,
this would have been followed up on by now as Abu
Faraj would have been thoroughly interrogated
prior to the announcement of his arrest.
Pakistani intelligence agencies are
tight-lipped, but Asia Times Online's
Washington-based sources maintain that Abu Faraj
only spoke about his immediate contacts in
al-Qaeda who passed on his messages. Of course,
this chain might still be under investigation.
Al-Qaeda's operations in Pakistan received
a major setback when their Pakistani link, Amjad
Hussain Farooqi, was killed in a shootout in the
southern Pakistani city of Nawabshah near Karachi
last September. (See Why Amjad
Farooqi had to die Sept 30, 2004.)
Farooqi's killing and the arrests of
several others scattered al-Qaeda, and its
operators were reduced to a struggle for their
survival. There has been no feedback on any
al-Qaeda plans to carry out terrorism in Pakistan in
the past few months; rather, all information
suggests that Abu Faraj and others were simply
focused on moving around as much as possible in
search of sanctuaries.
Al-Qaeda is a very
different type of organization from, for instance,
Palestinian groups, which promote champions such
as Abu Abbas and Abu Nidal, who carried out
repeated acts of terror.
Al-Qaeda does not
encourage "heroes" in this manner. Instead,
previously unknown people are picked for attacks,
and only then do they come onto the radar of
intelligence agencies and become wanted figures.
Take for example Ramzi Binal Shib, Khalid
Sheikh Mohammad and Mohammed Atta, all involved in
September 11, and dozens of others. They are set
up for one event, and that's it. At best, they
subsequently become facilitators, or yesterday's
men.
With Abu Faraj's arrest, one cell is
dead - maybe it was already. But new teams
comprising unknown faces have been assembled or
are in the process of being put together.
Al-Qaeda's structure remains intact.
Syed Saleem Shahzad, Bureau
Chief, Pakistan, Asia Times Online. He can be
reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us for information
on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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