|
|
|
|
SPEAKING
FREELY
India must sit at the nuclear
table
By Munish
Puri
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click here
if you are interested in
contributing.
For most of the
world, the timeline of India's nuclear development
stops rather abruptly in May 1998. At that time, a
nuclear India could not exist according to the
rules governing the world's nuclear-capable
countries; after its nuclear tests, ironically,
most of the world regarded India as if it never
became a nuclear power. Relative peace on the
South Asian subcontinent, awareness of a
clandestine nuclear bazaar, and tectonic shifts in
the global security paradigm create a unique
convergence of politics, technology, and history.
The genesis of the current
dilemma stretches back to the signing of the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Its
framers envisaged only two categories of nations
- nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon
states. This simple, inelegant distinction lacked
the ability to manage countries' nuclear
aspirations. One hundred and eighty-eight
countries subscribed to this dichotomous regime.
But a handful of holdouts,
among them India, questioned the provisions on
which the NPT rested. In particular, India
objected to the treaty's discriminatory nature -
dividing the world between the "nuclear-haves" and
"nuclear-have-nots" - and the tradeoff between the
civilian versus military uses of nuclear energy.
India's protest protected its own nuclear
potential. When the "nuclear-not-yets" became
"nuclear-haves", they challenged the NPT's
classification system.
The declared nuclear countries of the world
hoped and, heretofore, assumed that India's program might
be reversed - quietly but eventually. India never has
nor had any intention of turning the stub
of its self-issued ticket into the nuclear
club, which views India's program as "counterfeit"
and thus inadmissible. Simply, those within the
NPT will not accept the "outliers" as
nuclear-weapon states but only as non-nuclear-weapon states, while
those outside the NPT will not roll back their
nuclear arsenals.
Because
the nonproliferation regime ignored the
outliers' existence, the NPT has weakened. According to
the treaty, these outliers fit neither of the
two prescribed categories of signatories. What to
do with the "new" nuclear powers? Neither nuclear
nor non-nuclear weapons states considered this
question "urgent", even if it was "important". The
attacks of September 11, 2001, and the discovery
of Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear salesmanship in
Pakistan transformed national priorities. Both of
these events seemed to affect Pakistan more than
India, which is why India must pay attention to
them.
Pakistan and India can but will not
be hyphenated. Pakistan counterbalances India as a
nuclear outlier. India maintains that it has
behaved responsibly - "as if" it were a signatory
to the NPT. Unlike Pakistan, India's nuclear
technology has remained within its borders, as a
non-transferable commodity. Further, India's
nuclear infrastructure has a different history and
future than Pakistan's. India's commitment to
nonproliferation is the key to its authorized
admission to the nuclear club, despite the present
structure of the nonproliferation regime.
This dilemma underlies US-India relations
on the nuclear issue and redraws the
India-US-Pakistan triangle. Specifically, India
must reconcile its approach to nonproliferation
with noncompliance with the nuclear policy of US
President George W Bush. In addition to
strengthening the relevance of nuclear arsenals to
foreign policy formulation, the Bush
administration celebrates nuclear technology while
urging other countries, particularly India, to
dismantle its nuclear program. One might actually
fall for the hypocrisy if one believed that
India-US cooperation in the civilian nuclear
sector would come to fruition, despite the two
countries differing on their nuclear identities
and disagreeing on their commitments to
nonproliferation and disarmament. The resolution
of this dilemma does not lie with India joining
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a
US-led counter-proliferation policy aimed at
curtailing the illicit trafficking of weapons of
mass destruction and delivery systems. The PSI
abounds with questions of legality and
disintegrates under matters of implementation.
The
month-long NPT review conference, which began on May
2, provides an opportunity to release the "trapped"
discussion about India's nuclear program, though
this window will only open briefly. A relevant
dialogue must consider an inclusive international
system that respects the bargains negotiated
during the NPT - a lofty goal, no doubt. The
United Nations enveloped the foundering League of
Nations, and in the same way, a new
nonproliferation structure must subsume the NPT.
Though not a member of the NPT, India must
communicate its desire to facilitate the
discussion beyond the review conference.
Further, India must return to its
non-aligned roots, developing a common agenda with
countries on the nuclear periphery, such as Iran,
while counterbalancing the US's dismissive posture
toward nonproliferation. Unless India initiates
multilateral discussion on new nonproliferation
efforts, it will remain in nuclear purgatory.
India cannot wait for another catastrophe or
country to create space at the nuclear table -
instead, it must pull up a chair.
Munish Puri is a visiting
researcher at the Institute of Peace and Conflict
Studies.
(Copyright 2005 Munish Puri.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click here
if you are interested in
contributing. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
All material on this
website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written
permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2005 Asia Times
Online Ltd.
|
|
Head
Office: Rm 202, Hau Fook Mansion, No. 8 Hau Fook St., Kowloon, Hong
Kong
Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
|
|
|
|
