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SPEAKING
FREELY
India and China: Neither friends
nor foes
By Manjeet Singh
Pardesi
The only
two civilization-states in the contemporary international system
- India and China - are at the beginning of a new
epoch in their more than two millennia-old relations.
When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in
April, the two countries signed numerous
accords, including a pact on "Guiding Principles" for
the peaceful settlement of their 4,000
kilometer-long boundary dispute. China is set to replace
the United States as India's single largest
trading partner over the next few years. Bilateral
trade between Asia's two giants increased by leaps
and bounds to US$13.6 billion last year from a
lowly figure of $1.9 billion in 1999-2000. Asia's
two rising economies hope to increase this figure
to $30 billion by 2010. India and China
are discussing the possibility of a free-trade
agreement that would represent 40% of humanity if
successfully implemented. The two countries also
wish to expand their links in cultural, tourism,
and civil aviation sectors.
During his recent
trip, Wen promoted the idea of "marrying" India's
software expertise with China's superb hardware
capabilities and mentioned that cooperation
would signify "the coming of the Asian century
in the IT [information technology] industry". Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh said, "India and China could reshape
the world order."
What does this
seismic reordering of relations between Asia's
rising economic heavyweights mean for the
international system? Many analysts have concluded
that the so-called Sino-Indian entente that
received a major boost during Wen's trip heralds
the end of Western dominance. While the "East" is
definitely rising, the reality of the Sino-Indian
relationship is far more complicated and has
significant consequences for the international
system.
Shared civilizational past
Historically speaking, China and India have
very ancient ties. India exported Buddhism to
China in the first millennium. So deep and
permanent was Buddhism's impact on every aspect of
China's culture, including Confucianism and
Taoism, that Chinese literature described India as
"Xitian", or "Western Heaven", in its conception of
world order. As a result of the links established
by Buddhism, many Indian Buddhist scholars visited
China in the first millennium. An Indian Buddhist
scholar named Kumarajiva, who visited China in the
late 4th century, is credited with laying a strong
theoretical foundation for the development of
Buddhism in China by translating Buddhist texts
into Chinese. In turn, many Chinese
scholars/pilgrims such as Fa Hsien and Hsuan Tsang
visited India to study Buddhism.
The
impact of their interaction went far beyond
religion to several secular and intellectual
pursuits. Through Buddhism, India impacted every
aspect of China's culture from the arts and
literature to astronomy and mathematics. Because
of the links developed due to Buddhism, an Indian
astronomer named Gautama Siddhartha became the
president of the Board of Astronomy in China in
the 8th century and produced the then Chinese
scientific classic of astronomy, Kaiyvan
Zhanjing. Ideas of mathematics and sciences
moved in both directions, and more importantly,
the priceless records left by visiting Chinese
scholars like Fa Hsien and Hsuan Tsang are
invaluable even today for Indian historians
studying the state and society of their land
during that period.
Contacts between these two
civilizations reduced and almost ceased in the first
half of the second millennium. For a number of
reasons, Buddhism disappeared from the land of its
birth - though the core features of its
philosophy were permanently imbibed by Indian
culture, including what later came to be known as
Hinduism. At the same time, Confucianism and
Taoism made a comeback in China, although after
permanently absorbing Buddhist influences. In the
second half of the second millennium, both India
and China were subjected to different degrees of
imperial control, and the interaction between the
two was limited to trade under imperial powers.
These two civilizations co-existed peacefully for
over two millennia. After their emergence as
modern states in the 1940s, newly independent
India was the first non-communist and democratic
country to establish diplomatic relations with
communist China in 1950.
Economic
competition
In their latest incarnation, India
and China began at more or less similar levels
of economic development. The crucial question
in the 1950s was whether democratic India or
communist China would be more successful. After dismal
performances in their first few decades as modern
states, China implemented structural reforms
in the late 1970s and emerged as the world's
fastest growing economy and has maintained an
average growth rate of 8-9% a year for over 20 years
now. India implemented reforms in fits and starts
in the 1980s (followed by significant structural
reforms in the early 1990s) and has grown
at an average rate of 5-6% a year since. In spite
of a significant differential in their growth
rates, the question today is not one that pits
India against China. Instead, it centers on which
of the two states offers a more sustainable growth
environment in the long term.
China
has developed world-class physical infrastructure,
is emerging as the world's manufacturing
powerhouse, and attracted more foreign investment
in 2004 alone than India has since 1991. On the
other hand, India is emerging as a major
outsourcing and business processing destination as
well as the research and development laboratory of
the world, has a reasonably developed banking and
financial system, and has near world-class
multi-national corporations in information
technology and pharmaceuticals, with no comparable
Chinese firms. However, both economies have
similar shortcomings - inefficiencies in terms of
resource consumption, corruption, growing regional
disparities, and massive disparity between the
rich and poor (especially in India). As each tries
to emulate the other to learn from the best
practices of the other, competition however is
bound to ensue.
Security
competition
Although healthy economic
competition is likely to be beneficial, the two
countries' security relationship complicates
matters. After the Chinese occupation of Tibet in
the 1950s and the 1959 Lhasa revolt, India granted
refuge to the Dalai Lama as well as a large
Tibetan community. This strained Sino-Indian
relations and in 1962, the two states fought a
short but bitter border war. After their brief
border war, the Chinese gained control of almost
38,000 square kilometers of territory in Kashmir
and laid claims to India's northeastern state of
Arunachal Pradesh.
Soon after this war,
China established politico-military links with
India's subcontinental rival, Pakistan. India's
security environment further deteriorated after
China became a nuclear weapons state in 1964.
China also threatened to open a second front
during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars. In the
1960s and 70s, India accused China of supporting
separatist movements in its troubled northeastern
regions.
In 1975 India assimilated the
Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim after the India-backed
assembly of Sikkim passed a resolution calling for
participation in India's political and economic
institutions. China did not accept India's
absorption of Sikkim and charged it with
attempting regional hegemony in South Asia.
However, with Wen's recent visit to New Delhi,
Sikkim ceased to be an irritant in their bilateral
relations. The "Guiding Principles" document
signed by the India and China refers to "the
Sikkim State of the Republic of India".
A
perceived threat from China was one of the factors
behind India's first nuclear test in 1974. China
has provided Pakistan considerable help with its
nuclear and missile programs since the 1980s and
has also contributed significantly to its
conventional arsenal. India justified its May 1998
nuclear tests by citing China and the
Sino-Pakistani nexus as the chief threats to its
security. As India's economy grows, it is likely
to expand its nuclear and missile capabilities to
have a robust deterrent vis-a-vis China's more
advanced capabilities.
China is worried
about India's growing blue-water naval
capabilities and is expanding its own naval
presence in the Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf region by
financing a major port at Gwadar in Pakistan.
China is also increasing its naval presence in the
Indian Ocean by cultivating ties with Myanmar and
Bangladesh. Although these Chinese moves are
significantly motivated by its increasing
dependency on sea-borne trade and energy supplies,
they raised alarm bells in New Delhi. India views
China's moves in these states as Beijing's
strategy to contain India in South Asia. Signaling
that closer relations with India will not dilute
China's close ties with India's neighbors, Wen
visited India at the end of his four-nation South
Asia tour that included visits to Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The two countries are
also likely to engage in a competition for
influence in Central Asia and Southeast Asia.
Their thirst for oil and gas has added
a new dimension to their relationship. India
wants to collaborate with China in its pursuit for
oil and gas abroad and recently floated the idea
of extending a proposed Iran-Pakistan-India
gas pipeline to China (via Myanmar) in order to
create a pan-Asian energy grid. Beijing has been
lukewarm about India's proposals as it enjoys
a considerable lead over New Delhi in its quest
for energy security. India and China are likely
to compete for scarce energy resources to power
their energy-deficient but growing economies.
Conclusion
Chinese leaders are wary of
India's growing strategic ties with the US. Last
month, the Chinese noted American overtures toward
India with great anxiety when the George
W Bush administration announced its intention
"to help India become a major world power in the
21st century". Even though some Indians found this
statement condescending, the fact that India is
slowly but surely emerging as a power to reckon
with is not lost on the Chinese. By all major
estimates, including those of Goldman Sachs and
the US National Intelligence Council, India and
China together with the US will be the three
largest economies in the world in two to three
decades time.
It is a tragedy of the
modern-state system that in spite of sharing a
glorious civilizational past and having never
fought a single war until their emergence as
modern states, security competition between India
and China is inevitable as their economies grow.
However, the good news is that this security
competition does not have to be conflictual. A
rising India will surely expand and intensify its
relations with the US. However, with its strong
desire for strategic autonomy, India is unlikely
to overtly ally with the US to contain a rising
China. To this extent, a good beginning has been
made by Wen's recent trip to India and through his
attempts to engage India politically and
economically. We are witnessing the contours of an
important US-India-China strategic triangle that
will shape the course of history in the 21st
century.
Manjeet Singh Pardesi
is an associate research fellow with the Institute
of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore.
(Copyright 2005 Manjeet Singh Pardesi)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
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