|
|
|
|
Tigers get their
wings
By B Raman
Speaking at a meeting of the Foreign
Correspondents' Association of Sri Lanka in
Colombo last Saturday, Hagrup Haukland, chief of
the Norwegian-led military mission that monitors
the three-year-old ceasefire between the
government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), confirmed the allegation of
the Sri Lankan government that the LTTE had
constructed an airstrip near Iranamadu, in the
Wanni area under its control in the Northern
province of Sri Lanka.
"We have seen the
airstrip while flying in a Sri Lankan military
helicopter," Haukland said. However, he did not
comment on the government's other allegation that
the LTTE had acquired at least two aircraft that
looked like the Czech-built Zlin Z-143. He said
his mission had been denied access by the LTTE to
verify government charges that the LTTE possessed
at least two light aircraft. From his statement,
it would appear that while his mission was able to
see the airstrip from the Sri Lankan helicopter,
it could not notice the presence of any aircraft
on the ground or in the vicinity of the airstrip.
Haukland did not give any other details as to
whether the mission noticed any hangar or any
other construction in which the LTTE might have
kept the aircraft concealed.
He warned
that any move by government forces to bomb the
airstrip could lead to a resumption of the war
that has been suspended for several years through
a ceasefire. Haukland said an air capability would
"mean a hell of a lot" to the LTTE. "Those two
aircraft, if they have any, represent a very
serious threat," he said, and added that India had
also expressed concern over the matter.
Asked what would happen if the Sri Lankan
military were to bomb the airstrip, he said, "If
the air force bombs the airstrip, then it will be
war. If bombs fall, we pull out ... it is not a
ceasefire anymore. If the Tigers fly, it will be a
violation of Sri Lankan airspace and also of
international law, because the air space is a
matter only for the Sri Lankan government."
The Sri Lankan authorities, who have been
seriously concerned over the implications of the
LTTE's success in clandestinely acquiring an air
capability for their operations, have for the
present confined their reaction to bringing the
matter to the notice of foreign governments,
including reportedly those of India and Pakistan.
President Chandrika Kumaratunga is expected to
discuss this development with Indian leaders
during her three-day visit to New Delhi that began
on Wednesday.
The LTTE's plans to acquire
an air-mounted capability for suicide missions
against government personalities and ground
infrastructure had been known for nearly 15 years.
Western and Indian intelligence agencies had
earlier detected the Tiger's instructions to its
followers in countries such as the United Kingdom
and Switzerland to join local flying clubs and
learn to fly. They also noticed that Tiger cadres
in Western Europe and Canada were buying a large
number of expensive technical books relating to
flying and that they had been making inquiries in
Europe about the availability and price of
microlite aircraft. These agencies were closely
monitoring the LTTE's efforts in order to prevent
it from acquiring any aircraft.
The fact
that the LTTE hoodwinked them and succeeded in
acquiring some aircraft and smuggling them in to
the areas under its control - possibly in a
dismantled condition - became evident on November
27, 1998, when the group's Voice of Tigers
clandestine radio station, in a broadcast on a
function held in the Wanni area in memory of
cadres killed in operations, claimed that aircraft
of the "Air Tigers" had sprinkled flowers from the
air on the memorial. It did not specify the number
of aircraft or whether they were fixed-wing planes
or helicopters.
Since then, there have
been periodic reports that the LTTE had managed to
acquire abroad and smuggle to the Wanni area at
least one light aircraft, but the Sri Lankan
authorities kept denying these reports. What is
new now is not that the LTTE has acquired aircraft
for its air wing, which is at least seven years
old, but that the Sri Lankan government has, for
the first time, officially admitted it and taken
up the matter with the international community.
While the LTTE's acquisition of an
air-mounted capability for suicide attacks is thus
old news, it needs to be added that the LTTE has
not so far used the aircraft, in a conventional or
unconventional manner, either for suicide missions
or in its operations against the Sri Lankan
security forces before the ceasefire came into
force in 2002.
During its various rounds
of fighting against the Sri Lankan security forces
before 2002, the LTTE totally relied on
conventional anti-aircraft weapons and
surface-to-air missiles for bringing down aircraft
of the Sri Lankan Air Force. It acquired some of
these on its own in Thailand and other places and
smuggled them into the areas under its control
while it received some others from the
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM - then known as the
Harkat-ul-Ansar) of Pakistan in 1995 as a quid pro
quo for clandestinely transporting in one of its
ships a consignment of arms and ammunition to the
jihadi groups of the southern Philippines that
were being assisted by the HUM.
By 2001,
the LTTE had exhausted its holding of
anti-aircraft ammunition and missiles and started
facing difficulties in procuring replenishments.
These difficulties increased after September 11,
when US intelligence started closely monitoring
the movements of LTTE ships to prevent their being
used for the clandestine transport of arms and
ammunition or for the movement of men by al-Qaeda
and its associates in the International Islamic
Front (IIF).
Despite these difficulties,
the LTTE continued to clandestinely procure arms
and ammunition from different sources and
transport them in its ships to northern Sri Lanka,
without anything being done to stop this either by
the Norwegian-led monitoring mission or by the
other members of the international community. Only
Indian agencies and the Coast Guard continued to
monitor LTTE activities and share with the
government of Sri Lanka any information coming to
their notice. There had been occasions before the
ceasefire when Indian naval ships had by
themselves intercepted LTTE ships and foiled their
gun-running missions.
It needs to be
mentioned here that ever since the LTTE acquired a
shipping capability for clandestine gun-running,
there have been innumerable occasions when such
gun-running missions were foiled on the high seas
or near Sri Lankan coastal waters. In all these
instances, action was initiated by the navies of
India and/or Sri Lanka. There has not been a
single reported instance in which other powers -
either in Asia or Europe, including Eastern Europe
or the US - had thwarted a gun-running mission of
the LTTE, either by preventing it from
clandestinely procuring arms and ammunition or
smuggling them by sea to northern Sri Lanka.
From this, it would not be wrong to
conclude that the silence and inaction of many
external powers have contributed to the LTTE's
emerging as the most ruthless non-jihadi
organization in the world, with a capability for
sea and air-mounted suicide missions. While the US
and other Western powers have not hesitated to act
promptly and decisively against jihadi
organizations posing a threat to the lives of
their citizens and their interests, they have
shown a worrisome reluctance to act in this
instance.
One does not know clearly
whether the LTTE procured the planes in its
holding before or after September 11. It is a
serious development regardless of when they were
procured. It would be even more serious if the
procurement had been made after September 11, when
the international community, acting under UN
Security Council Resolution No 1373 against
terrorism, set in place an international
anti-terrorist infrastructure network in order to
prevent the flow of funds and equipment to
terrorist organizations.
If the LTTE had
hoodwinked the intelligence agencies of the world
after September 11, it should be equally easy for
other organizations, such as al-Qaeda and the
other members of the IIF, to similarly hoodwink
these agencies for procuring and transporting
weapons of mass destruction material to areas of
intended use.
The reluctance and the
failure of the international community to act
against the LTTE will have serious implications
for the "war against terrorism". The Sri Lankan
government cannot escape a major share of
responsibility for this state of affairs. Its
failure to take up the matter with the monitoring
mechanism set up by the Security Council after the
passage of Resolution 1373 and complain not only
against the LTTE, but also against the countries
that have been turning a blind eyes to the LTTE's
gun-running and the supine attitude of the
Norwegian-led monitoring mission toward the LTTE
have contributed to the emergence of its air
force.
B Raman is additional
secretary (retired), cabinet secretariat,
government of India, New Delhi, and, presently,
director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai,
and distinguished fellow and convenor, Observer
Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter. Email:
itschen36@gmail.com
(Copyright 2005 B
Raman) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
All material on this
website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written
permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2005 Asia Times
Online Ltd.
|
|
Head
Office: Rm 202, Hau Fook Mansion, No. 8 Hau Fook St., Kowloon, Hong
Kong
Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
|
|
|
|
