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COMMENTARY
Guiding hand in India, China
ties
By Ehsan Ahrari
Two recent reports about China-India
interactions deserve the attention of the
countries of Asia-Pacific and the United States.
The first one is about a meeting of the foreign
ministers of China, India and Russia in
Vladivostok, Russia. In that meeting, the
countries agreed to "synchronize policies or
security and economic issues, with an unstated aim
of creating a counterweight to US influence in
Asia". The second story is about China's strong
opposition to a G-4 resolution (that includes
India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany) that would
create six new permanent seats on the United
Nations Security Council. If China intends to
cooperate with India by synchronizing its
policies, then why not support a permanent UN seat
for India? The reasons are complex, and reflect
the increasingly paradoxical relations between the
two "rising powers".
The best way to
describe China and India is to call them "natural"
competitors or even adversaries. Two very large
countries cannot remain in a state of co-equal
existence, especially when both aspire not only to
becoming regional powers, but also have every
intention of using their respective regional
dominance as a launching pad for becoming great
powers. That is not to say they face a potential
of military skirmishes in the future (they did go
to war in 1962). What is important is that the
very nature of their intricate strategic
objectives makes it difficult to forecast which
way their mutual interactions will lead. First and
foremost, both China and India are driven by their
desire to seek regional and then global strategic
dominance. This is their chief strategic purpose.
All other objectives become subservient to that.
So it is possible for them to cooperate, or even
agree, to form a strategic partnership. Still, on
other occasions, they might oppose each other -
China's opposition to India's UN quest, for
instance.
The most vital preconditions for
becoming a regional power, and even a great power,
according to some, is for a country to have "a
very large internal market, correspondingly large
public expenditures for research and development,
education and infrastructures, a highly
competitive private sector, and an open trade and
investment policy". China, according to this
definition, meets all of these conditions. It is
developing a powerful indigenous technological
wherewithal by building a vibrant economy and a
world-class educational system that will ensure it
a place in the uppermost echelons of
nation-states.
In most of these
categories, India is running neck-and-neck with
China. In the realm of information technology
(IT), China is an emerging giant. In the realm of
software technology, India belongs in that
category. The educational institutions of both
India and China are fast developing their
advancements. They both are emulating the US
example of establishing partnerships between
entrepreneurial high-tech companies and their top
technological universities. The Central
Intelligence Agency's World Fact Book notes,
"China has benefited from a huge expansion in
computer Internet use, with 94 million users at
the end of 2004." In its economic competition with
India, "China has a lead in the absorption of
technology". "India has one important advantage in
its relative mastery of the English language, but
the number of competent Chinese English-speakers
is growing rapidly." Infrastructural development
remains India's Achilles' heel as far as global
entrepreneurs are concerned. China has invested
huge amounts of capital in its infrastructure
development; however, in the coming years, that
investment is expected to diminish palpably.
China has an advantage in terms of
attracting a considerably larger share of foreign
direct investment (FDI). A report published by the
Global Business Policy Council in October 2004
ranked China as the "number one most attractive
FDI destination in the world". The same report
stated, "India rose from sixth to third most
likely FDI location globally..." That is India's
highest ranking ever, just behind the US. It
added, "Although the United States remained the
second most attractive FDI location in the world,
the perception gap between the US and India may be
closing." Of the more attractive FDI attributes
between China and India, the former outscored the
latter by huge margins in such categories as
government incentives, financial economic
stability, economic reform, production/labor
costs, market growth potential, and access to
export markets. China is emerging as the "world's
leading manufacturer and fastest growing consumer
market", while India is seen as the world's "lead
business processor and IT service provider with
long-term market potential". Undoubtedly, this
intense economic competition between the two has
emerged as the newest wrinkle in their ongoing
strategic competition.
In the
long-evolving strategic competition, China had the
advantage of being a nuclear power. However, India
closed that gap by becoming one in 1998. Even
though China, as a general approach, recognizes
the sovereign right of any nation to pursue a
nuclear option, it made a point of condemning
India's nuclear explosion in consenting with the
United States. Leaders in Beijing were fully
cognizant of the long-term implications of that
development to their competitive relationship with
India, if its nuclear-weapons programs were to
evolve. China was hopeful that the "strategic
dialogue" between then assistant secretary of
state Strobe Talbott and India's foreign minister
Jaswant Singh - that lasted between 1998 and 2000
- would lead to an unraveling of India's
nuclear-weapons program. Evidently, the Chinese
either miscalculated or neglected to fully fathom
India's resolve to remain a member of the nuclear
club.
In any event, China was not about to
wait in the line of global wishful thinkers who
thought that India would do away with its
nuclear-weapons program. It proceeded to do
business with its large neighbor by following the
usual realpolitik of using the "Pakistan card" to
maintain pressure on India, and by pursuing its
own strategic ties with its South Asian neighbor,
as well as with the US.
What China did not
anticipate, or at least not the full scope of it,
was the US decision to establish a strategic
partnership with India. Originally, president Bill
Clinton promoted the idea in the waning years of
his second term. Proposals of such a nature are
viewed with a jaundiced eye by hardnosed strategic
analysts, largely because these proposals are
promoted by a president whose term is about to
expire, not to mention motivated to establish his
legacy. However, the incoming administration of
President George W Bush not only sustained its
commitment to the US-India strategic partnership,
but also was enthusiastic to build on it further.
Only then did the Chinese know they had better
create a new vigor in their own momentum to
establish strong ties with India. That is one
reason why the symbolic but still significant step
of establishing a Sino-Indian strategic
partnership was taken when Chinese Prime Minister
Wen Jiabao visited India in April.
Even as
they signed the papers on a strategic partnership,
both China and India knew that it might have some
implications for their respective eagerness to get
closer to the US. India may have some feeling that
it has an advantage in this realm because its own
strategic partnership with the US is evolving
smoothly. However, China also knows that its own
endeavors for a close relationship with the US
have little relationship to the US-India strategic
partnership. US-China economic ties are important
and are becoming a major source of conflict, as
China's trade surpluses with the US increase. But
US-China ties are multidimensional. As many
reasons as there are for friction between
Washington and Beijing - trade issues, Taiwan,
China's rising defense expenditures, China's
growing presence in South America and the Middle
East - China remains virtually an indispensable
actor when it comes to the long-standing US-North
Korea nuclear conflict. So, China knows that in
the increasingly cumbersome strategic Sino-US
interaction, it is not likely to lose much ground
in favor of India.
That might be one
reason why China can afford to compartmentalize
its ties with India. It may agree with Russia and
India about strategic cooperation but still try to
block India's entry as a permanent member of the
Security Council. It may finally recognize India's
annexation of Sikkim about 30 years ago as a
quid pro quo to India's recognition of
China's annexation of Tibet. At the same time, it
may not see much linkage between the preceding
acts of cooperation and its continued use of
Pakistan as a balancer against India - a fact that
annoys India's leaders no end.
China and
India would cooperate with Russia, or any other
powers, if that cooperation, in a roundabout way,
were to contribute to the emergence of a
multipolar system. Directly confronting the US is
not in the interest of either country. But India's
membership in the Security Council would add to
its status, which India is likely to use in its
strategic competition with China. Beijing
certainly does not want that. As far as China is
concerned, the task of India becoming a permanent
Security Council member should not be made easy,
especially through China's acquiescence. Such are
the intriguing dynamics of Sino-Indian strategic
interactions.
Given the preceding
paradoxical intricacy of their strategic ties, who
is in the more advantageous position? In this
neck-and-neck competition, the deciding vote would
be cast by the US, which will watch, in an
ostensibly imperturbable manner, the strategic
maneuverings between the two very important
neighboring states.
Ehsan Ahrari
is an independent strategic analyst based in
Alexandria, Virginia, US. His columns appear
regularly in Asia Times Online. He is also a
regular contributor to the Global Beat Syndicate.
His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us for information
on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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