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New Delhi's new
diplomacy
By Adam Wolfe,
Yevgeny Bendersky and Federico Bordonaro
India is emerging as a decisive player in
US-China bilateral relations, often regarded as
the real landmark of this decade's geopolitics.
New Delhi launched a potentially revolutionary
"strategic partnership for peace and prosperity"
with China on April 11. The move was aimed at
ending the Sino-Indian border dispute on
Aksai-Chin (existing since 1962), and at boosting
mutual trade and economic ties. Prospects for a
more cooperative relationship between the two
Asian giants are to be read in light of regional
powers' ambitions to reshape the world order along
the guidelines of a balanced multipolarity - a
goal already expressed by China, France and
Russia, among other states.
However, to
rise as a great power, India needs more than
economic assets and a strong military; "infusions
of US technology and investments in
infrastructure", as former Indian envoy Lalit
Mansingh told the press on July 14, are necessary
for India to "become a major global player". These
Indian needs - along with concerns over the Indian
Ocean's security - form the context that led New
Delhi to sign a 10-year defense agreement with
Washington on June 29. Strategic partnerships are
not intended to directly challenge the US, but
rather to rapidly obtain economic, technological
and military power. Thus, India's strategy is not
contradictory. On the contrary, it is a
sophisticated policy whose endeavor is to create
the necessary balance of power in its geostrategic
environment in order to concentrate on economic,
technological and military matters indispensable
to its emergence as a true great power.
Interestingly, US President George W Bush
has clearly said that the US was involved in
helping India "become a world power" - which could
be a sign of Washington's gradual acceptance of an
embryonic multipolarity in Asia. However, US
fundamental interests in developing better
relations with India are the necessary containment
of China, and New Delhi's help in the war against
militant Islamic groups - a need that is growing
stronger due to the unstable political landscape
in Pakistan.
Project
Seabird
Such a political and diplomatic
framework is the background of India's ambitious
Project Seabird, which consists of the Karwar
naval base, an air force station, a naval armament
depot, and missile silos all to be realized in the
next five years.
Indian Defense Minister
Pranab Mukherjee said on May 31 that the naval
base INS Kadamba in Karwar, Karnataka state will
protect the country's Arabian Sea maritime routes.
INS Kadamba - also the name of the country's only
aircraft carrier - will become India's third
operational naval base, after Mumbai and
Visakhapatnam. Six frontline Indian naval ships,
including frigates and destroyers, took part in
the commissioning. Kadamba extends over 11,200
acres of land, along a 26-kilometer stretch of sea
front, and it will be the first base exclusively
controlled by India's navy. Eleven ships can be
berthed at Kadamba once the first phase of it is
achieved; 22 ships after the second phase of
construction will be completed around 2007,
according to INS Kadamba's first Commanding
Officer Commodore K P Ramachandran, as reported in
the international media. Moreover, the new harbor
is designed to ultimately berth 42 ships and
submarines.
The geopolitics of the Arabian
Sea and the western Indian Ocean largely explain
India's determination in such a US$8.13 billion
enterprise. The China-Pakistan-India triangle is
more than ever the Arabian Sea's decisive
geostrategic setting. For the Chinese, this
trilateral relationship is crucial for two
reasons: from the point of view of energy
security, the Arabian Sea and Pakistan are
Beijing's access points to the oil-rich Middle
East; from the perspective of military security,
Pakistan provides China an effective
counter-balancing partner in front of India's
ambitions.
Therefore, faced with
geographic constraints, the Chinese successfully
proposed to Islamabad the sharing of the Gwadar
naval base back in 2001. This latter serves the
Chinese purposes in three ways: first, it serves
as a tool to secure Beijing's access to the Gulf's
resources; second, it is a useful military base to
counter Washington's influence in Central and
South Asia: in fact, the Sino-Pakistani agreement
came into being just four months after US troops
entered Kabul in 2001; third, Gwadar functions as
an excellent wedge between India and the Middle
East and as an offset against India's naval power.
Sino-Pakistani cooperation has contributed
to accelerating India's plans to regain the upper
hand in the western Indian Ocean.
India
and US-China competition
The slowly
escalating competition between the US and China
has helped to create a fertile environment for
India's ambition to gain status as a great
regional power. Cooperation with China has become
one of the most discussed issues in India's
business community for a number of reasons, but
the loudest talk has been the opportunities based
in combining India's "software" economy with
China's "hardware" economy. There are also
geopolitical motivations for India to align itself
with China. Both countries favor multipolarity:
for Beijing, this trend will help to weaken US
influence in its sphere of influence; for New
Delhi, this shift creates an environment for it to
gain influence over its near-abroad.
However, India is also seeing gains from
advancing its relationship with the US. Washington
has often touted the "natural alliance" between
the two expansive, multi-ethnic democracies, but
it is on military issues that India would most
like to develop its relationship with the US.
During the recent tsunami relief effort, the two
states' navies worked together, which helped to
cement their budding military-to-military ties.
The US would like for India's navy to serve as a
bulwark against China as Beijing becomes more
active in the Indian Ocean. Also, there are some
areas where the US Navy cannot operate, such as
the Malacca Strait, where India's presence might
be seen as less threatening than that of the US.
However, there are drawbacks to aligning
too closely with either power for India. On energy
security, India and China have found cooperation
to be easy in Iran, but, as finding new sources of
oil becomes more difficult, there are bound to be
areas of friction. For example, China views the
Andaman Sea off Myanmar's coast as an important
source of oil to fuel the economic expansion of
China's western provinces. However, New Delhi sees
building a port at Dawei, Myanmar as a major
component to its future security strategy for the
region. China's presence in the area is an
unwelcome development for India.
Washington's relationship with two of
India's neighbors, Iran and Pakistan, are the
major sticking points in their relationship. The
US prefers to starve out the current government in
Iran, but India sees the country as an important
source of energy for its expanding economy.
Washington's support of Pakistan's military since
September 11, 2001, has been protested loudly and
repeatedly by India. However, the US is unlikely
to abandon this support because the Central Asian
countries aligned with China in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) have recently
signaled that they favor a US withdrawal from the
region. Because of this, the US will now need
Pakistan's support even more for the success of
its operations in Afghanistan.
Even though
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Bush
announced on July 18 a new agreement for the US to
cooperate with India's civilian nuclear industry
in return for international oversight and a
continued moratorium on nuclear weapons testing,
Washington's support for New Delhi's nuclear
industry will continue to be tempered by India's
unwillingness to sign the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In this
environment, India has been very successful in
using strategic partnerships with both Washington
and Beijing to further its interests on the Indian
peninsula and Indian Ocean. For the near term, New
Delhi can be expected to emphasize points of
agreement with China and the US, while looking to
gain better positioning for itself in the region.
Another interested player:
Russia
India's increasing ambitions in the
western Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf will
most likely draw in actors other than the US,
China and Pakistan. The Russian Federation will no
doubt assume greater importance for India as a
major source of military hardware that is
currently fueling India's drive for a blue-water
navy. Since the flagship of Karwar, INS Kadamba,
is a Russian-built aircraft carrier with
Russian-designed MiG-29 aircraft, India will rely
on Moscow for a major portion of spare parts and
maintenance in the short and medium run.
India's growing naval ambitions represent
an expanding area of interest for Russian
manufacturers. Currently, China is a major
customer of Russian-made submarines, surface ships
and surface-to-surface weapons systems that are
adding to Beijing's growing naval strength. Since
Karwar, INS Kadamba is expected to accommodate an
increasing number of military ships, India may
augment its indigenous production capacity with
ever-growing numbers of Russian-made vessels.
This may spark a naval race in the western
Indian Ocean if China places its most advanced
vessels in Pakistan's Gwadar port. The two
countries have much to gain from cooperation in
the business and trade sphere, and an outright
military clash between their navies is unlikely.
However, the two could be drawn into a
confrontation if the vessels of other navies,
aligned to either state, get involved in a
conflict.
If more political and military
problems develop between India and Pakistan, then
even a growing rapprochement with China may not
prevent a dangerous escalation for New Delhi.
Washington may find itself powerless to act in
this case, as it will be unwilling to compromise
both its tactical relationship with Islamabad and
its growing "alliance of need" with New Delhi. On
the other hand, Russia may well benefit from such
a scenario, as it has experience in supplying two
belligerents fighting each other at the same time.
Moscow sold weapons to both Iraq and Iran in the
1980s when the two countries were at war.
Presently, Russia will be content in selling naval
ships and technology to both India and China, even
as the two states may be inching towards
competition in the strategically important western
Indian Ocean.
There is much to gain from
cooperation for India and China when it comes to
shipments of oil from the Persian Gulf. A major
disruption of such flow - whether from an
intentional military escalation by the two states
or even from a combination of factors having less
to do with both countries, such as an Iranian
military action or a terrorist attack - will have
negative consequences for the economies of both
countries. Peaceful shipments of oil and gas are
in everyone's interests. Still, the construction
and use of both Karwar and Gwadar will certainly
invite some form of competition, as India and
China may view each other's minor advancements in
naval technology, number of vessels or any other
technical factor as a less-than-benign show of
strength.
The dynamics of the region still
call for a balance-of-power approach rather than a
straight alliance. China-Pakistan cooperation will
figure prominently for Indian decision-makers,
just as India's warming relationship with
Washington may be a concern for China's People
Liberation Army planners. The construction of both
Karwar and Gwadar may signal both India's and
China's readiness to upgrade their naval strength
from brown water to blue water capability, but
cordial relations between both states may be no
guarantee of the peaceful use of the western
Indian Ocean.
Relying more and more on
advanced military technology that is not currently
indigenously produced by both states, India may
turn to Russia to supplement its increasing naval
needs. This may enhance Moscow's status in the
region, as well as offer the possibility of
countering Washington's current undisputed naval
primacy in that part of the world.
Conclusion
The rise of India as
a major power, coupled with the better-known - and
frequently analyzed - Chinese rise, is changing
the structure of the world system. Not only is US
"unipolar" hegemony in the Indian Ocean facing a
challenge, but the strategic triad US-Western
Europe-Japan, which has ruled the international
political economy for the past few decades, is now
also under question. Nonetheless, when confronting
the new reality, Washington seems eager to help
India rise in order to counter Beijing's growing
influence. Moreover, India's increasing power is
also a part in the process of a major shift
occurring in international relations, from
US-based unipolarity to a "multifaceted
multipolarity" which could be the prelude of a new
multipolar order.
In this transition
phase, the Indian Ocean's security will be a
crucial issue. Massive military build-ups have
already started, and the risks of miscalculations
by the traditional and new great powers are
getting higher. We can expect the South Asian
region to be one of the system's key areas to be
watched in the next decade.
Published
with permission of the Power and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
to content@pinr.com |
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