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Nuclear battle lines
drawn
By Ashish Kumar Sen
WASHINGTON - The ink had barely dried on a
document laying out ambitious civil nuclear
cooperation between the United States and India
when Washington's entrenched non-proliferation
lobby raised its head.
On July 19, the
same day that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
addressed a joint session of the US Congress, the
House members of the Energy Conference Committee
approved a measure to prevent the exportation of
nuclear technology to countries, such as India,
which are not party to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that have
detonated a nuclear device.
Massachusetts
Democratic Congressman Edward Markey authored the
amendment. "Why should the United States sell
controlled nuclear goods to India?" he asked.
"India is not a member state of the nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty and lacks full-scope
safeguards required by the International Atomic
Energy Agency [IAEA] for non-nuclear weapons
states to receive nuclear supply materials. We
cannot play favorites, breaking the rules of the
NPT, to favor one nation at the risk of
undermining critical international treaties on
nuclear weapons."
Bush assured Manmohan he
would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy
cooperation with India" and would "also seek
agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and
policies".
But congressional contacts tell
Asia Times Online that Markey's concerns are just
the tip of the proverbial iceberg and an indicator
of the tough battle that will be waged on Capitol
Hill as the president seeks to amend US laws.
The US also agreed to sign a Science and
Technology Framework Agreement for joint research
and training, and public-private partnerships
posits US provision of high-technology to India.
These transfers could extend to any number of
exchanges previously banned under US sanctions and
export control legislation.
Both sides
agreed to build closer ties in space exploration,
satellite navigation and launch, and in the
commercial space arena through mechanisms, such as
the US-India Working Group on Civil Space
Cooperation. Yet, space technology also doubles
for missile technology and US-provided advances
could be used in enhancing India's pursuit of
inter-continental ballistic missile and
submarine-launched ballistic missile capabilities.
If implemented, this cooperation would
dramatically shift US non-proliferation policy and
practice toward India.
In return, India
has promised to identify and separate its civilian
and military nuclear facilities and programs;
declare its civilian facilities to the IAEA;
voluntarily place civilian facilities under IAEA
safeguards; sign an additional protocol for
civilian facilities; continue its unilateral
nuclear test moratorium; work with the US to
conclude a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty;
refrain from transferring enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to states that do not
have them, as well as support international
efforts to limit their spread; secure its nuclear
materials and technology through comprehensive
export control legislation and through
harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology
Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
guidelines.
However, some American
observers feel these steps are insufficient. A
Congressional Research Service report says there
are no measures in the agreement to restrain
India's nuclear weapons program. The report argues
the need for Washington to have some assurances
that its assistance does not, according to its
obligation to the NPT, "in any way assist,
encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state
to manufacture nuclear weapons".
A
significant question is how India, in the absence
of full-scope safeguards, can provide adequate
confidence that US peaceful nuclear technology
will not be diverted to nuclear-weapons purposes,
it adds.
To the casual observer, India
might seem to be a "weak link" in the
international non-proliferation regime. But New
Delhi has compiled a track record of controlling
proscribed dual-use exports that compares
favorably with most signatories to the export
control regimes, said Anupam Srivastava, director
of the Asia program at the University of Georgia's
Center for International Trade and Security.
When other nations joined the NPT in 1968,
India refused to sign on on the basis that it was
discriminatory. India exploded its nuclear device
in 1974, following which the US refused nuclear
cooperation with India and has tried to convince
other states to do the same. In 1998, India tested
its second nuclear device.
India,
Srivastava pointed out, has a "decades-old" system
of export controls.
With the exception of
a few cases in which forbidden dual-use items were
transferred out of the country without government
approval, India's track record compares favorably
with most advanced countries that are members of
the multilateral regimes, said Srivastava. The
explanation for this seemingly anomalous behavior
is straightforward: India thinks of itself as a
responsible international player whose domestic
capabilities must never contribute to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
or undermine regional or international security,
he added.
Robert Einhorn of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies said at a
recent discussion in Washington that the
formulation in the joint statement that India
would acquire the same benefits and advantages as
other states with advanced nuclear technology was
an "unfortunate" one.
"I would suspect
that this formulation would be a red flag to a
number of non-nuclear NPT parties, including many
friends of the United States, including Japan,
Germany, Canada, Australia, Brazil, South Africa .
And for over 30 years it was a key principle that
NPT parties deserved some preferential treatment.
There had to be some advantage in joining the NPT,
and so there was this principle of preferential
treatment," he said.
Section 129 of the
Atomic Energy Act requires ending exports of
nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive
nuclear technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state
that, after March 10, 1978, detonates a nuclear
explosive device.
The joint agreement
reached between India and the US notes that
Washington "will work with friends and allies to
adjust international regimes to enable full civil
nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India,
including but not limited to expeditious
consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded
nuclear reactors at Tarapur".
The US
committed to encouraging its partners to consider
this request - a reversal in the US position,
which has been to ban fuel to Tarapur - and to
consulting with its partners on Indian
participation in ITER (collaboration on fusion
research) and in the Generation IV International
Forum for future reactor design.
Bush and
Manmohan agreed to create a working group, which
presumably will negotiate not only the scope of
nuclear cooperation, but also Indian commitments
to non-proliferation. Manmohan said India "would
take on the same responsibilities and practices
and acquire the same benefits and advantages as
other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the United States."
Einhorn, a former assistant secretary for
non-proliferation at the Department of State,
criticized the haste with which the recent
agreement was pushed through. The initial
expectation was that the agreement would be put
together in time for Bush's 2006 visit to India,
he said. But US and Indian officials say the deal
was being hammered out even as Bush and Manmohan
were meeting at the White House on July 18.
Einhorn said as a result there wasn't an
opportunity to lay the groundwork with members of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group or with members of
Congress, where US legislation will have to be
changed.
Last month, Under Secretary of
State Nicholas Burns said that the Bush
administration would put a specific program in
front of Congress when it returned from recess
"that would allow the United States to proceed to
commit itself to this program of cooperation" with
the advice and agreement of Congress.
According to the Congressional Research
Service report, several questions could arise as
members of Congress consider the Bush
administration's proposal. Some of these would
be:
How complete are India's declarations of
civilian facilities?
What is the level of intrusiveness of the
IAEA's program to inspect those facilities?
What is the added value of the additional
protocol, given the likelihood that nuclear weapon
facilities will not be able to be inspected?
How well is India's export control
implementation functioning?
What are India's plans for its nuclear weapons
program and what is the possibility that US
assistance could benefit that weapons program?
If India is prepared to take on the
responsibilities undertaken by other nuclear
weapon states, is it prepared to stop producing
fissile material for weapons?
Is it prepared to declare some nuclear
material as excess to its defense needs and place
that material under IAEA safeguards?
What impact will nuclear safeguards on
civilian facilities have on India's transparency
efforts with Pakistan?
Some congressional
sources privately indicate they are concerned
civilian nuclear cooperation with India would
contravene the multilateral export control
guidelines of the NSG.
This concern is
echoed in the Congressional Research Service
report: "At a time when the United States has
called for all states to strengthen their domestic
export control laws and implementation and for
tighter multilateral controls, US nuclear
cooperation with India would require loosening its
own nuclear export legislation, as well as
creating an NSG exception."
Under the
terms of the Atomic Energy Act, Congress must
approve an agreement for cooperation. If the
administration chooses to exempt the agreement
from statutory non-proliferation criteria, both
houses of Congress must pass a joint resolution of
approval. The Bush administration alternatively
may seek to amend certain portions of the Atomic
Energy Act; in particular, it could seek to amend
sections 128 and 129, both of which include
nonproliferation criteria.
The Bush
administration has not revealed publicly how it
will handle NSG guidelines, but consensus among
the 44 NSG members is not always assured. "Some
states may agree that it is time to create a new
paradigm for India, while other states,
particularly those who have benefited from the
right of peaceful nuclear cooperation under the
NPT, may not," the Congressional Research Service
report says.
Danielle Pletka, of the
American Enterprise Institute, said, "We can
change our own laws, but we cannot change the
guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which
do not allow us to cooperate with India. The
Nuclear Suppliers Group, like many of these
international agreements, operates on the basis of
consensus. Are we going to be able to change the
guidelines of the NSG so we can in fact sell to a
country without full-scope safeguards?"
Dissent within the NSG could be
counterproductive to achieving other objectives
the US is pursuing in nuclear non-proliferation,
for example, disarming North Korea and restraining
Iran. US-India cooperation could also prompt other
suppliers, like China, to justify supplying other
non-nuclear-weapon states, like Pakistan.
Einhorn said he believed the Bush
administration would want to make the case that
this deal is a net plus for non-proliferation.
But, he said, "I think the administration lowered
the bar a bit too far. And if the deal is
implemented as it currently stands, in my view
there will be some negative implications for our
global non-proliferation efforts. I think we'll
have a harder time persuading other countries to
tighten the rules while we're urging them to make
exceptions."
The first battle will be
waged on Capitol Hill when members of Congress
return in September from their month-long recess.
But the opening shots have already been fired.
Lynne Weil, a spokesperson for California
Democratic Congressman Tom Lantos, said Lantos
believed the issue of civil nuclear cooperation
between India and the US was a "complicated" one,
which will "require careful review by Congress".
Lantos is the ranking Democrat on the influential
House International Relations Committee.
Some observers have maintained that while
the strategic benefits of expanded cooperation
with India may be considerable, the
non-proliferation costs may outweigh the benefits.
Markey warned, "Selling nuclear materials to India
is a dangerous proposition and bad
non-proliferation policy."
"Now that
Russia and China have agreed to adhere to the
Nuclear Supplier Groups requirements, the United
States is going to ignore the rules," Markey said.
"What will Russia say when they want to supply
more nuclear materials or technology to Iran? You
can be sure that Pakistan will demand equal
treatment. Will the Bush administration soon be
announcing nuclear cooperation with them?"
Senate Conference Conferees rejected
Markey's measure in a voice vote. "Unlike our
friends on the Senate side, we don't have any
ability to advise and consent on treaties," said
Congressman Joe Barton, a Texas Republican who
chairs the House Conference Committee. "This is a
way for the House to send a signal on this
particular treaty."
The role of US
interests
While the July 18 joint
statement in terms of technological gains appears
weighted in India's favor, this does not indicate
that there are no advantages for the US. Its
benefits rest in the financial gains to be made
through military sales to India and the
preferential placement of US military bids
vis-a-vis European, Israeli and Russian
competitors. The Indian Air Force plans to
purchase 126 new jets over the next four to five
years. Not coincidentally, on March 25, the US
agreed to allow Lockheed Martin to sell F-16
fighter planes, which may be used to deliver
nuclear weapons, to both India and Pakistan. If
F-16s are selected over Swedish, Russian and
French competitors, the total price tag for
supplying India alone could reach $3 billion.
The US also has been looking for markets
to peddle such wares as the much-touted and much
failed PAC-III missile defense system, which
figures prominently into the "New Framework for
the US-India Defense Relationship". Strategically,
India offers the potential for increased
cooperation with a country that is rapidly growing
as an economic and military pole in a region
increasingly dominated by China. The US has also
been searching for a means of expanding the
Proliferation Security Initiative and interdiction
into the Indian Ocean. On issues of terrorism,
India has also presented itself as a point of
intelligence sharing in a crucial region.
Conclusion
India has eschewed
non-proliferation constraints and tested nuclear
weapons. Yet, less than a decade later, India
receives benefits in not only the military realm,
but also with nuclear and missile-related,
dual-use technology. This sends a hypocritical
message to countries playing by the
non-proliferation "rules", as well as to those
that are trying to break them.
The
US-India joint statement has already set in motion
mechanisms that promise to test the US Congress
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group as to their stand
on non-proliferation. While the parties pushed the
joint statement nearly a year ahead of schedule,
the outcome remains distant due to demands for
changes in US and international nuclear
legislation.
In the meantime, the US has
tied its hands on demanding more concrete pledges
from India on cutting its fissile material
production, much less placing its nuclear
facilities under feasible safeguards. The US
stopped just short of calling India a nuclear
weapons state and yet it conferred on India the
same benefits as a NPT signatory.
Cooperation between the US and India has
the potential to generate economic and strategic
benefits for both parties in military exchanges
and confidence-building measures. For the moment,
however, the scale is decidedly tipped in India's
favor on technology transfers. India is on its way
to becoming a great power in the 21st century, and
for India a large part of this accomplishment will
remain vested in its nuclear weapons and missile
programs.
Indeed, this week Britain has
lifted nuclear sanctions from India - the first
country to respond positively to the India-US
nuclear. British Prime Minister Tony Blair
notified parliament on Wednesday about significant
changes in its laws regarding exports of dual-use
technologies to India.
Ultimately, while
the US-India joint statement is bilateral in tone,
its repercussions will be global. Nuclear weapon
states and military suppliers like Russia, China
and France are carefully observing the outcome to
guide their own future sales. Similarly, countries
outside of the NPT or contemplating violation of
the treaty are also watching. If the agreements
and changes in US or international legislation
that come out of the joint statement are not made
with this understanding, India's gain may be the
non-proliferation regime's loss.
(Additional reporting by Lora Saalman of
Power and Interest News
Report
Ashish Kumar
Sen is a Washington-based journalist.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us for information
on sales, syndication and republishing.)
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