US-Pakistan: An elaborate pas de deux
By Ramtanu Maitra

Washington's policy toward Pakistan as its ally since September 11 in America's "war on terror" has become so erratic that it  appears at times to verge on confusion. To many observers, the Bush administration improvises its Pakistan policy script as conditions in Pakistan progress, or regress.

Nonetheless, the broad outline set forth in the wake of September 11 and the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States in the winter of 2001 has held the wobbly bilateral relationship together. Briefly, the outline involves the following:

Washington must protect Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf physically from hostile forces within Pakistan and also make available to him some financial aid to help Pakistan's flagging economy.

Beyond this broad outline, directly related to the US-Pakistan alliance in the "war on terror", the Bush administration appreciates the usefulness of the Musharraf government in two other areas - its relations with Sunni Arabs and its proximity to the resource-rich and Islamic Central Asia.

Economic aid
The Bush administration's policy toward Pakistan is most obvious in economic areas. In June 2003, President George W Bush vowed to work with Congress on establishing a five-year, $3 billion aid package for Pakistan. Annual installments of $600 million each split evenly between military and economic aid began in fiscal year 2005. The Foreign Operations FY2005 Appropriations bill (PL 108-447) established a new base program of $300 million for military assistance for Pakistan; half of this FY2005 funding came from a May emergency supplemental appropriations bill (PL 109-13). PL 108-447 also allows for up to $200 million in FY2005.

Economic Support Funds (ESF) may be used for the modification of direct loans and guarantees for Pakistan (Congress made identical provisions in two previous foreign operations appropriations bills and Pakistan has used that $400 million in ESF to reduce its concessional debt to the US by $1.48 billion, leaving a balance of some $1.3 billion).

When additional funds for development assistance, law enforcement and other programs are included, the aid allocation for FY2005 is about $692 million. Congress also has appropriated funds to reimburse Pakistan for its support of US-led counterterrorism operations. PL 108-11 provided that $1.4 billion in additional defense spending may be used for payments to reimburse Pakistan and other cooperating nations for their support of US military operations. A November 2003 emergency supplemental appropriations act (PL 108-106) made available another $1.15 billion for continuing reimbursements. A May supplemental appropriation (PL 109-13) provided another $1.22 billion for such purposes.

A report of the House Armed Services Committee said the Secretary of Defense expected to disburse that entire amount to Pakistan in FY2005. Pentagon documents indicate that Pakistan received coalition support funding of $1.32 billion for the period January 2003 to September 2004, an amount roughly equal to one-third of Pakistan's total defense expenditures during that period.

What, however, really does not factor in the Bush administration's policy towards Pakistan is India. Despite what many analysts claim, the India factor in Washington-Islamabad bilateral relations since September 11 has remained constrained to preventing the two from going to war against each other. To begin with, it is arguable that the two countries were in fact willing to go to war in recent years, despite ominous posturing.

Non-proliferation, stability, Islamists
Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan, formerly of the Pakistan army, wrote in a recent issue of the journal of the Center for Contemporary Conflict, Monterey, California, that American objectives vis-a-vis Pakistan today are non-proliferation, regional stability and the end of support to radical Islamists. Washington wishes to prevent a repeat of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan, incursions into Indian territory and the Taliban, all springing from "Pakistan's security drivers".

The former military official predicts that the US alliance with Pakistan against terrorism and the US strategic partnership with India will always have higher priority than India-Pakistan conflict resolution. As a result, an end to India-Pakistan military competition will remain a "distant goal". Some cynics may point out that selling arms to both India and Pakistan, and modernizing their militaries with American arms, is good for the US military establishment.

It is evident, however, that the Bush administration is having a lot of difficulties, even in following the wide tracks laid out in the broad outlines. On September 13, 2001 the US presented Pakistan with a list of demands in its fight against al-Qaeda. When Musharraf agreed to them, Pakistan was reenlisted as an ally, this time in the "global war on terrorism". Sanctions from Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998 and Musharraf's bloodless coup in 1999 vanished in the light of this new cooperation. A new military aid and equipment package was agreed to, and by 2003 Pakistan was designated a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally.

But from the very outset of the US invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan was watched very carefully by a large number of officials in Washington. The reason was obvious. Pakistan was in the thick of things in building up the Taliban and helping them to oust the fractious opposition in Afghanistan, including the Tajik-Uzbek-led Northern Alliance, and seize power in Kabul in 1996. Moreover, Pakistan's hands-on involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s became so overwhelming that it had direct fallout on Pakistani society, whether as a result of regional compulsions or so chosen by the Pakistani establishment.

Washington's objective in the winter of 2001 was to eliminate the Taliban, get hold of the Osama bin Laden-led al-Qaeda members who had established a presence in the country and establish a regime in Kabul that would be protected by the Tajik-Uzbek alliance in particular. Washington realized the process would turn Pakistan's friends into Pakistan's enemies. In addition, the Northern Alliance was a known beneficiary of Russia and India, and Islamabad considers both these nations as anti-Pakistan. It was a bitter pill to swallow for Pakistan.

It soon became obvious to Washington that Islamabad would not abide by all the demands the Bush administration had made. It would give up some - not all - of its human assets to the US slowly. As a result, Pakistan was blamed directly, or indirectly, for the continuing presence of the Taliban inside Pakistan, and main al-Qaeda leaders remaining fugitive somewhere either in Pakistan or on the border areas.

Included in that rhetoric were statements of the then-Afghan-American US ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalizad, blaming Pakistan for protecting America's enemies. Khalizad, a member of the inner circle that surrounded Bush in the early days of his presidency, vehemently said that the Taliban supremo Mullah Omar and bin Laden were somewhere in Pakistan. His claim that the Taliban and al-Qaeda militants had infiltrated from Pakistan, in an organized manner, was termed as baseless and irresponsible by Pakistan.

Khalizad's charge was followed by statements by Afghan government officials, the officially controlled news media and Karzai himself. In other words, verbal volleys accusing each other were issued from both Kabul and Islamabad.

No doubt, Washington had instigated such verbal accusations against Islamabad, using Khalizad and the hand-picked Afghan president Karzai, a close friend of the then-US ambassador. Nonetheless, the Bush administration conveyed to the Musharraf government in the midst of such flaps that while the Americans appreciated Pakistan's efforts to get the Islamists, it was more important to maintain an alliance with Pakistan, despite all the difficulties. It was becoming evident that at the operational level in Afghanistan, and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan borders, such an alliance remained on paper.

It is no secret that the US-led coalition troops in Afghanistan do not trust the Pakistani troops with ground intelligence and the Pakistani troops' main objective at this point is to prevent US troops from running amok in the tribal areas along the borders inside Pakistan. The presence of US troops in operations with Pakistani soldiers raises the level of fierce tribal resistance, observers point out. Nonetheless, Islamabad has allowed Washington to set up four air bases inside Pakistan to help operations inside Afghanistan.

Cautious compromise
According to the Lahore-based Daily Times, there is little hope of differences on that score being resolved. In fact, a crisis in US-Pakistan relations is brewing just beneath the surface despite expressions of unity in the war against al-Qaeda.

The article points out that Musharraf and Bush are in a state of "cautious compromise", with Washington continuing to express confidence in the former's government and offering increased military assistance to his country. Islamabad believes that Pakistan's importance as a US ally is likely to dissolve if bin Laden is ever captured or killed.

Washington has been attempting to strengthen its ties with India and is even trying tentative negotiations with Iran, with the eventual goal of warmer relations. All these policy shifts, the article claims, are to undermine the Musharraf government.

Be that as it may, Pakistan maintains about 80,000 troops in the tribal and adjoining areas with Afghanistan. Islamabad claims the borders are completely sealed with latest reconnaissance devices and that the possibility of the Taliban entering Afghanistan in an organized manner is inconceivable, and blames the Afghan security apparatus for infiltrations.

In reality, however, more than Pakistan's role in helping to ferret out the Taliban and bin Laden, what make US-Pakistan policy interactions like the pas de deux (step of two) are the nuclear proliferation episode and the training of orthodox Islamists in Pakistan's thousands of madrassas (seminaries).

In pas de deux , the man quite often does not stand in a ballet position or appear to be dancing at all. He can do this because the audience will almost always watch the lady. The man acts as a "third leg" for the lady by stabilizing, lifting and turning her. In essence, more often than not, Washington resembles the man.

The static role of the US in the entire episode of Pakistan's nuclear proliferation (to which a rogue scientist has claimed to have been acting on his own) is an eye-opener of how confusing the US-Pakistan relationship has been for years.

The most interesting aspects of the almost three decades-long proliferation operation by the most important Pakistani engineer associated with its nuclear facilities (Abdul Qadeer Khan) is that the operation went unhindered for that length of time.

Islamabad also did very well to convince the Bush administration that Khan was not helped in his nefarious ventures by the Pakistani establishment at any point. Islamabad has also restrained Washington from questioning Khan by not making him available to the Bush administration for interrogation. Islamabad must be credited for this astonishing feat since the Bush administration has made nuclear non-proliferation as important as a crusade.

In June 2004, months after the Khan "secret" proliferation exploits had appeared all over the media, Bush designated Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) . The designation, long enjoyed by Japan, South Korea, Australia and other allies, makes Pakistan eligible for expedited access to excess defense articles and other privileges and is perhaps related to Pakistan's planned purchase of American weapons.

On November 16, 2004, the Department of Defense notified Congress of possible military sales to Pakistan of six Orion P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, 2,000 TOW-2A missiles, 14 TOW Fly-to-Buy missiles, six Phalanx close-in weapon systems and an upgrade of six earlier models of the Phalanx shipboard anti-missile defense systems, along with associated equipment for all of the systems.

Media reports in early December 2004, following a visit to Washington and a meeting between Musharraf and Bush, indicate that the Pakistani leader did not get the answer he wanted on the aircraft. However, the subject of F-16s reportedly was on the agenda of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's March trip to New Delhi and Islamabad

As if to underscore the possibility that US arms sales to Pakistan could be destabilizing, Pakistan tested a Shaheen nuclear-capable short-range (700 kilometers) ballistic missile on December 8, 2004, the very day that US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld arrived in New Delhi.

Again, as one watches the dance around the Khan episode and the Bush administration designating Pakistan with MNNA status, one is immediately reminded of the pas de deux , with Washington helping Pakistan to put up a dazzling show.

Madrassas
Another area in which US-Pakistan policy seems blurry, if not downright amorphous, is the noisy discussion about madrassas. The US claims with near contempt that these Islamic schools not only make young Pakistanis narrow-minded Islamists, but are the breeding ground of anti-US terrorists. There are reasons to believe that such statements are highly exaggerated. But, the US officials continue to press the Musharraf administration to "do something" about it.

But not everyone in Islamabad believes what Washington says about the madrassas. Recently, one of Musharraf's cabinet ministers said, "Our madrassas are the biggest NGOs [non-government organizations], they are not promoting terrorism, but work to safeguard Islam."

On July 14, just one week after the major terrorist bombings in London, Musharraf ordered a fresh crackdown on extremist and terrorist elements in Pakistan. On July 18, Pakistani officials confirmed that three of the four suspects in the London bombings had visited Pakistan during the past year and two may have spent time at a religious school near Lahore. More than 200 suspected Islamic extremists were arrested in nationwide sweeps over a period of several days, spurring modest-sized protests by Islamist parties.

The Bush administration points out that Musharraf demanded in 2002 that the thousands of madrassas operating within Pakistan must be registered. The demand was not well received in the cleric community, and as a result most madrassas remained unregistered.

It seems Washington really did not mind Musharraf's failed attempt to register the madrassas. But Washington jumped on the British bandwagon right after the London bombings to point fingers at the madrassas and claim once again that these are the terrorist-training centers.

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