WRITE for ATol ADVERTISE MEDIA KIT GET ATol BY EMAIL ABOUT ATol CONTACT US
WSI
Asia Time Online - Daily News
             
Asia Times Chinese
AT Chinese



    South Asia
     Sep 29, 2005
India discreet, China bold in oil hunt
By Indrajit Basu

KOLKATA - India's recent withdrawal from the race for acquiring Canadian oil firm Encana Corp's Ecuador assets, allowing a Chinese consortium to win the bid for US$1.42 billion, prompted Indian Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Iyer to say, "If we allow failures to set us back, we will never find successes." But India's failure to grab the 75,000 barrels per day of oil-producing properties and a pipeline is yet another instance of how the country is being consistently outwitted by the aggression of Chinese oil majors. When pitted against the Chinese, the Indians are not finding any success anyway.

Two weeks ago, India's largest oil company ONGC's subsidiary, ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), and Andes Petroleum Corporation, a joint venture of Chinese petroleum companies, were bidding for the Ecuador assets when OVL suddenly withdrew from the race, alleging that Encana was refusing to give it a guarantee against



any trouble with the Ecuador government over one particularly problematic oil block in the deal. This allowed Andes to walk away with 5 blocks of oil property with proven reserves of 143 million barrels at a price rumored to be $20 million cheaper than what Andes Petroleum had initially bid for.

But the Encana bid was not the only one that Chinese oil companies have won against India lately. With China's oil fields failing to meet the nation's explosive demand - which at 6.75 million barrels per day has doubled in the past decade to fuel its current 9.5% economic growth - China has been scouring the world to secure its energy supply with a steely determination. Moving smartly at times and aggressively at others, the Chinese oil companies have been consistently outmaneuvering India in just about every oil property the two countries have been shooting for over the past 12 months.

Consider these examples. About a month before the Encana deal - early August - China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) agreed to buy PetroKazakhstan, a Canada-based oil company that is the third-largest oil producer in Kazakhstan, a former Soviet state. CNPC grabbed this deal for $4.18 billion, topping the Indian consortium's (ONGC-Mittal) bid at the last moment. Earlier in the year, while experts termed the National Iranian Oil Co (NIOC) commitment in mid-January to allow OVL a 20% share in the development of Iran's biggest onshore oilfield, Yadavaran, as a big step in India's oil diplomacy, what went ignored was the fact that Chinese state oil company Sinopec retained a huge 50% share in the deal (Iran retained the other 30%).

Last October, despite an agreement between Shell and OVL that entailed offloading of Shell's 50% stake in Angola Block 18 for $620 million to OVL, India was stymied because Sonangol, Angola's national oil company, which is the sole concessionaire for exploration and production of oil in Angola, wanted the property to go to Chinese oil companies.

So, why is it that India has been losing out in every deal that both the countries have been eyeing? Is it being too cautious and China too dynamic? Indian oil experts, including those at ONGC, feel the Chinese oil companies have been overbidding to the point of economic absurdity. For instance, says an ONGC spokesperson, "Even if the $1.42 billion that Andes Petroleum Corporation paid for the Ecuador properties appears reasonable, it carries an immense amount of risk which if left uncovered changes the whole cost-benefit equation." According to ONGC, Encana had purchased 40% equity in Block-15 from US oil company Occidental, but the deal had no prior approval of the Ecuador government, which had also threatened to cancel the license. OVL wanted a guarantee from Encana that the license would not be canceled, which the Canadian firm refused; this in turn forced OVL to withdraw from the race. "If the Ecuador government indeed cancels the license, the Chinese may have to end up paying a much heavier price for it," said an ONGC source.

In the PetroKazakhstan deal, though ONGC has declared that it may reconsider its bid in an effort to grab it away from CNPC, oil analysts wonder if a re-bid would be prudent because the deal was overvalued from the very beginning. Initially, the ONGC-Mittal combine had bid $3.8 billion for PetroKazakhstan, which was higher than CNPC's $3.6 billion. However, in a sudden aggressive move, CNPC hiked its offer overnight to $4.18 billion, clinching the deal in its favor. India couldn't offer an immediate counterbid because, says ONGC, "We were still waiting for PetroKazakhstan to provide additional data required for making the counteroffer."

Nevertheless, according to TNR Rao, a former petroleum secretary, India as a country has also been overcautious while China dynamic and aggressive. "In issues of energy security, along with commercial considerations, it is equally important to factor in non-commercial and geopolitical considerations and any comparison with values purely arrived at on a textbook basis makes no sense," says Rao. "When China bids, for instance, it [regards] issues [in terms of] national interest, whereas in India, where post-mortem of any large financial transaction is the rule, it is always necessary to have some benchmarks that can stand scrutiny."

Undoubtedly, even if India feels that China is being aggressive, it can't deny that China is also far more successful in terms of securing its energy supply. And this is evident in not only the PetroKazakhstan or the Encana deal, but also in other deals where the country was pitted against India. Experts say that for Chinese leaders, buying foreign oil and gas fields for energy security has become a central mission and the Chinese government has allowed its oil majors unprecedented freedom to achieve that goal. China has realized that its energy interests lie in geopolitical relations and has thus decided to focus on the same much more intently to address its security needs, says a security expert at Beijing University. And in that pursuit, Chinese oil companies have used all sorts of government aid, including non-oil commitments, transfer of missile technologies, the veto of UN sanctions against countries where China has oil interests, and even education aid, to clinch deals.

Take for instance the Angola Block 18 case. According to reports, although the Indian government also promised a $200 million rail line in Angola (over the $620 million for the oil blocks), CNPC managed to snatch it away because the Chinese government offered a composite $2 billion aid "for a variety of projects in Angola". Similarly, China managed to retain its 50% stake in Yadavaran, Iran, because there was reportedly an informal arrangement for the transfer of missile technology to Iran. Reports also suggest that China has been buying goodwill in African countries such as Sudan, Nigeria, and Chad with development aid.

Still, experts feel India shouldn't be too aggressive. For one, India's oil needs are still much lower than China's, so India can afford to be more "cost conscious". The International Energy Agency says China relies on overseas producers for just about one-third of supplies but accounts for about 7% of world oil demand. In contrast, India, despite importing 70% of its oil needs, consumes a little more than 2 million barrels (3% of world oil demand) a day - compared to China's 6.75 million barrels a day.

A government paper predicts that the country will take 20 years to reach China's current daily consumption level. By then, China's demand will more than double from its existing level. Says Subrata Barman, principal consultant of PricewaterhouseCoopers, "energy security is not just about securing properties abroad; energy security can also be achieved by other means, like diversifying supply sources without necessarily taking equity stakes in all the projects, and stepping up the domestic output of oil and gas". Indeed, in the last few years, India has discovered significant hydrocarbon resources in different parts of the country that can considerably reduce dependence on imported oil and gas. The Directorate of Hydrocarbons now estimates that the country's hydrocarbon resource base has reached a level of about 28 billion tons, including 7 billion tons from deep offshore.

Following the setbacks, India has now started pinning its hopes on past tie-ups with Russia and neighboring Asian countries. Last December, India and Russia signed a pact for joint exploration and distribution of natural gas in the Caspian Basin, as well as for building underground gas storage facilities in India. Recently, India has also announced that it is keen to dig into two major and largely unexplored areas in eastern Siberia and the Russian continental shelf (RCS). Besides, Indian minister Aiyer says that in his ensuing visit to Russia he intends to hold discussions with the Russian authorities for participation in Indian oil and gas companies in giant oilfields like Shtokman and Prirazlomneye. Discussions will also cover the possibility of OVL acquiring a stake in Sibneft, Russia's fifth-biggest oil producer. And dropping its reservations on the military junta, the Indian government is working on diplomatic ties with Myanmar as well as Bangladesh to bring Myanmar's natural gas into India via Bangladesh.

Indrajit Basu is a Kolkata-based equity-analyst-turned-journalist with more than 12 years of experience in business/finance and technology journalism. Besides writing for Asia Times Online, he also writes for US-based publications, as well as IT companies.

(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing .)


China's oil quest causes friction (Sep 10, '05)

Kazakh oil coup for China, India cries foul (Aug 24, '05)

India, China: Comrades in oil (Aug 19, '05)

 
 



All material on this website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd.
Head Office: Rm 202, Hau Fook Mansion, No. 8 Hau Fook St., Kowloon, Hong Kong
Thailand Bureau: 11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110