After years of hesitancy, India has now
firmly acknowledged the strategic importance of
the Andaman Sea. The Indian Navy is setting up a
Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) off Port Blair on
the Andaman Islands - also known as the Bay
Islands - located midway between the Bay of Bengal
and the Malacca Strait - to give it "blue-water"
status.
It is evident New Delhi believes
that the new strategic command will remain
vulnerable unless the entire Andaman Sea is brought
under the full control of
the Indian Navy.
A variety of factors led
to New Delhi's full realization of the Andaman
Sea's importance for overall regional security.
To begin with, the US's recent invitation
to the Indian Navy to help patrol the Malacca
Strait must have been viewed as an open US
affirmation of its intent to bring India into the
naval big league.
The Malacca Strait,
thanks to the weakness of the Indonesian and
Malaysian navies, has become a hunting ground of
pirates. Bringing the Indian Navy to help patrol
the strait would mean, according to some
analysts, Washington's tacit approval of India's
assertion of naval control over the Andaman Sea,
the eastern mouth of the Indian Ocean and the
waters that surround Sri Lanka.
Although
India is not party to any security arrangement for
the Malacca Strait, the immediate purpose of any
joint patrols would be to prevent smuggling,
piracy, drug and gun trafficking, poaching and
illegal immigration in the region.
Oil-tanker traffic through the narrow
strait, which already carries most of North Asia's
oil imports, is projected to grow from 10 million
barrels a day in 2002 to 20 million barrels a day
in 2020 - much of that oil will be destined for
the fast-growing market of China.
Even if
it is true that it was Washington's wink and nudge
that emboldened Indian authorities to stake
control over the Andaman Sea, other reasons often
debated in New Delhi's South Bloc were no less
critical.
As one Indian analyst points
out, in recent years, in addition to the US, whose
navy has long had a presence in the Indian Ocean
and has been stealthily sailing the waters of the
Bay of Bengal, China has also shown a considerable
interest in utilizing the Andaman Sea as an outlet
to the Indian Ocean in the near future.
New command There is little
doubt that the FENC is a well thought out
development. Indian naval officers have said that
FENC, when fully developed by 2012, will have a
chain of small anchor stations and three main
bases.
As for models, Russia has a similar
base in the Black Sea, and the US naval base at
Hawaii comes close. FENC will be larger than the
former US base in the Philippines at Subic Bay,
spreading from Narcondam to Indira Point. Car
Nicobar will serve as the vital link for various
FENC stations.
The plan to set up FENC was
set in concrete in 1995 following a closed-door
meeting in Washington between then Indian prime
minister, P V Narasimha Rao, and former US
president, Bill Clinton. At the time, Pentagon
officials made a formal request to the United
Front coalition government in New Delhi to open
the base, but for various reasons the Indian
government did not respond.
The US is
expected to partly fund FENC because it is
considered part of a US-led security arrangement
for Asia in which India plays a key role. US
funding was cleared in 2000 when Clinton visited
India.
FENC will have state-of-the-art
naval electronic warfare systems that can extend
as far as Southeast Asia. Also, the Russian Navy
will likely assist in setting up a few armament
projects.
The command will include
submarines. The upgraded naval ship repair yard at
Port Blair already refits minor war vessels. FENC
will build and repair bigger ships. This will
release more warships for operations and more
operational space in alternative ports for fleet
ships and submarines.
China
bogey? Some Indian naval authorities who
are concerned over the increasing Chinese presence
in these waters point out that with China
controlling the Myanmar ports of Akyab, Cheduba
and Bassein, India's approaches to the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands could be threatened.
China
is developing all these naval ports with
facilities to handle ships considerably larger and
more sophisticated than the Myanmar Navy currently
possesses. A host of Indian naval analysts say
that if India does not have a strong naval
presence in the region, in an emergency China
could enforce a sea denial on India by using its
warships stationed in Coco and other islands
leased from Myanmar.
Coco Island and the
northern-most tip of the Andamans are separated by
just 18 kilometers of sea. Officials say that Coco
is visible from the Andamans, and plenty of
Chinese fishermen can be seen in its port.
Others point out that the town of One
Pagoda Point, located near the mouth of the
Irrawady in Myanmar, is emerging as the main
logistic point for the Chinese. One Indian naval
analyst goes to the extent of claiming that if
China acquired control over the northeastern Sri
Lankan port of Trincomalee, Beijing would be in a
position "to convert the Bay of Bengal into a
veritable Chinese lake". Whether New Delhi sees
the developments in that light is not clear. But
it is likely that Washington might.
In New
Delhi, there has always been a cacophony of voices
concerning how to react to China's growing
presence in Myanmar. While no one in New Delhi
denies that China is becoming a significant
military power, there are many who see no reason
to push to develop an adversarial relationship
with China.
They point out that the
encroaching Indian naval presence in the Andaman
Sea could threaten Beijing and create roadblocks
in steadily developing Sino-Indian cooperation.
They are not quite sure that measures undertaken
by New Delhi to enhance the security of India's
Andaman and Nicobar Islands will not threaten, or
antagonize, Beijing even if India's intent is
clearly stated and underlined.
Other
threats The increased activities of
Pakistan along the Myanmar coast have also
troubled Indian authorities. According to Jane's
Defence, Pakistan has supplied Myanmar with
several shiploads of ordnance and other military
hardware, such as 106mm M40 recoilless rifles and
various small arms over the past decade, and
regularly trains Myanmar's soldiers to operate
Chinese tanks, fighter aircraft and howitzers.
Myanmar's officers attend Pakistan's
Military Staff College at Quetta in Balochistan
province. Since 2001, a full-time Pakistani
defense attache has been posted in Yangon.
In 2001, three Pakistan Navy ships,
including a submarine and a destroyer, called at
Yangon, and this was followed by President General
Pervez Musharraf's visit to Myanmar. The joint
communique issued at the end of the visit
mentioned the Jammu and Kashmir issue, raising
concern in New Delhi as Myanmar, rarely, if at
all, comments on third countries.
Security
sources said that Pakistan was negotiating to
build an airstrip in the Chin region of Myanmar,
which is contiguous to Mizoram.
Indian
naval intelligence also claims that it is through
these waters that guns are run into south
Bangladesh and the northwestern coast of Myanmar,
to arm Naga insurgents in India and the Rohingiyas
of Myanmar along the Arakan Coast, as well as the
Karens and the Kachins of northern Myanmar.
In addition, India's northeast, which has
remained in deep turmoil for decades, has nurtured
secessionist rebels using the waters of the Bay of
Bengal and Andaman Sea. Neighboring Myanmar has a
number of powerful insurgent groups that are
interlinked with the Indian northeastern rebels.
A large portion of illegal lethal weapons
that come into northeast India originate in
Cambodia. The underground route to South Asia is
said to begin on the Ranong islands off the Thai
coast, from where the arms are shipped through the
Andaman Sea to Cox's Bazaar along the Bangladesh
coast. From here, the weapons are divvied up into
smaller consignments and carried to various
destinations in Myanmar and northeastern India
through different routes.
In early April
2004, on a tip-off, Bangladeshi joint forces
seized 10 truckloads of submachine-guns, AK-47
assault rifles and other firearms and bullets in a
swoop on the Karnaphuli coast in the port city of
Chittagong. It was the largest-ever arms haul.
Police and coast guard forces found the new
submachine guns, AK-47 rifles, submachine
carbines, Chinese pistols, rocket shells and
launchers, hand grenades and bullets stuffed in
about 1,500 wooden boxes.
But long before
the big haul was reported, it was widely known
that international arms smugglers were active in
the coastal belts in Chittagong and Cox's Bazar.
The vast coastline in the bay near Ukhia in Cox's
Bazar and border points between Bangladesh and
Myanmar had become a sanctuary for arms smugglers,
mainly in the absence of an adequate security
watch. The smugglers were bringing in
sophisticated firearms, including pure military
hardware such as AK-47 and M-16 rifles, long-range
pistols, revolvers and grenades, among other
items.
Naval diplomacy But
India's strengthening of its presence in the
Andaman Sea is not just derived from negative
developments in the region. New Delhi's interest
in and involvement with Southeast Asia has been
growing steadily over the past decade, and its
concern for development of the Andaman basin has
grown accordingly.
An agreement was signed
in 2003 in Yangon by the foreign ministers of
India, Myanmar and Thailand to develop transport
linkages between the three countries. When
complete, a 1,400-kilometer road corridor will be
a highway of friendship linking the peoples of
South Asia and Southeast Asia. India also reached
agreement in principle with Myanmar and Bangladesh
on the construction and operation of a pipeline
that will bring natural gas from Myanmar to India
via Bangladesh, according to reports by the
Alexander Gas & Oil company newsletter.
The pipeline, which is likely to cost more
than US$1 billion, will carry natural gas from the
Shwe fields in Myanmar's Rakhine or Arakan state,
through the Indian states of Mizoram and Tripura,
and into Bangladesh before finally crossing back
into India, all the way up to Kolkata.
India's planned building of a deep-sea
port in Dawei in Myanmar, together with a new
highway connecting it to Kanchanaburi in Thailand,
will no doubt contribute further toward closer
trade and commercial links between the two
regions.
India's economic ties with Sri
Lanka and Thailand, meanwhile, are growing. The
Indo-Sri Lanka Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement spanning trade, services and investment
will advance this further. A land bridge has been
proposed across the Palk Strait that separates
India from Sri Lanka. This could also carry
transmission lines to hook up Sri Lanka to India's
Southern Region Electricity Grid, with the
Kudankulam nuclear power plant serving as a
base-load station, an observer pointed out.
These developments can also be put under
India's broad "Look East" policy involving the 10
members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the "rim" states farther a
field - like Japan and South Korea. It can be
argued that India's diplomatic success with these
nations is in large part due to India's naval
diplomacy.
Eye in the Sky Last
month, the Malacca Strait's littorals - Indonesia,
Singapore and Malaysia - together with Thailand
launched a joint air patrol initiative called "Eye
in the Sky" over the strait.
While the
initiative signals the continuing determination of
the Malacca Strait's littorals to take care on
their own the patrolling of this strategic
waterway, countries such as India, which have
stakes in the strait, believe that they have a
role to play in its security system.
The
Eye in the Sky initiative is part of the larger
Malacca Strait's Security Initiative (MSSI). India
is among the countries that are keen to
participate in the MSSI.
After all, India
is very much a part of the Malacca Strait security
system, points out Vijay Sakhuja, a former officer
in the Indian Navy and now senior fellow at the
Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation.
Sakhuja draws attention to the fact that
although India might not be a littoral, it is
contiguous to the strait. Indira Point - the
southern tip of India's Andaman and Nicobar
Islands - is about 90 nautical miles from
Indonesia's Banda Aceh.
The Indian Navy
has been exercising with its counterpart in
Singapore for more than a decade, with the
Indonesian Navy since last year and with the Thai
Navy since August. The naval exercises with
Indonesia were held at the mouth of the Malacca
Strait.
In a briefing paper "Cooperative
Security in the Strait of Malacca: Policy Options
for India" brought out in August, Sakhuja draws
attention to the positive impression that India's
naval patrolling has had on the Malacca littorals.
"Many regional countries have seen the Indian
Navy's vessels patrolling the Malacca Strait and
are confident about its cooperative approach and
its capability to challenge forces inimical to the
safety and security of maritime enterprise in the
Strait of Malacca. The Indian Navy has managed to
play a highly positive and balanced role, fully
cooperating with and augmenting the regional
efforts, but always, as it were, from behind -
from a secondary position. In fact, the Indian
Navy's adaptable approach has won the confidence
of the regional nations on the viability and the
efficacy of coordinated patrols with the Indian
Navy."
This positive impression and its
close naval engagement with these countries
notwithstanding, India has been moving cautiously
with regard to carving a larger role for itself in
the security of the Malacca. Sakhuja told Asia
Times Online that the Indian government's approach
has been to impress on the littorals that India
will not force itself on them but will be "ready
to provide assets when asked for".
Outlining the kind of role that the
Malacca littorals would like India to play,
Lawrence Prabhakar, associate professor at the
Madras Christian College and research fellow at
the maritime security program at the Institute for
Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore, points
out that they would prefer joint exercises with
the Indian Navy and Coast Guard in the region.
"Such an Indian role would have to be
non-intrusive, cooperative and benign in
operations," he told Asia Times Online, adding
that this "would be most preferred in the event of
a contingency or crisis resulting from maritime
terrorism/piracy incidents rather than a staying
presence".
Sakhuja said there were several
ways in which India could contribute to the MSSI
that would not threaten the sovereignty concerns
of the Malacca littorals. Drawing attention to the
outdated radar equipment for reconnaissance that
is currently in use in the Malacca Strait, he
suggested that India, which manufactures this
electronic equipment, could supply it to the
littoral states.
What it needs now is an
invitation from the Malacca Strait littoral
countries, not just the US.
Expanding
reach Indian naval diplomacy has now gone
beyond the western shores of ASEAN. The October 3
visit to New Delhi by a Vietnamese defense
delegation led by Lieutenant General Nguyen Thinh,
head of the Vietnamese Defense Research Center,
opened up new possibilities. Thinh is expected to
ask for Indian help and technical assistance in
acquiring a missile production capability.
Should India agree, what it would ask in
return is a moot question. One analyst claims that
Hanoi should be persuaded to allow the Indian Navy
a basing option in Cam Ranh Bay, the finest
natural deep water harbor in Asia.
All
these developments underline the strategic
importance - and, in particular, its recognition
in New Delhi - of India's island territories, more
particularly the Andaman and Nicobar Islands,
which command the Malacca Strait and the sea lanes
that carry vast quantities of Gulf oil to Pacific
destinations.
Additional reporting by
Sudha Ramachandran, an independent
journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
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on sales, syndication and republishing
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according to some
analysts, Washington's tacit approval of India's
assertion of naval control over the Andaman Sea,
the eastern mouth of the Indian Ocean and the
waters that surround Sri Lanka. 
