The
results of Sri Lanka's presidential election of
November 17, as officially announced on the
following day, indicated that Mahinda Rajapakse,
the prime minister, had edged out his rival Ranil
Wickremesinghe, the leader of the parliamentary
opposition, by a margin of less than 2 percentage
points, having secured a bare 0.29% above the
mandatory 50% of the total of valid votes required
for a contestant to be declared the president.
Rajapakse, nominated by his party, the
People's Alliance (PA) , which is headed by the
outgoing president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, had the
backing of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, the
main left party in parliament); the Jathika Hela Urumaya
(JHU, the parliamentary
representation of which consists entirely of
Buddhist monks); the Eelam People's Democratic
Party (EPDP), the arch rival of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Tamil segment
of Sri Lankan politics; and a medley of other
organizations claiming to represent left-oriented
or ethnicity-related interests.
Similarly,
Wickremesinghe, the nominee of the United National
Front (UNF), headed a broad coalition of parties
that included the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC,
the largest party of the Muslim community that
constitutes 7% of the total electorate); and the
Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC) and one of its
splinter groups, the leaders of which mobilize the
support of the so-called "Indian Tamils" (the
ethnic sub-group accounting for about 6% of the
electorate, living mainly in the highland
plantation areas). The overall voter turnout was
73.7%. The campaign and the poll were remarkably
free of electoral malpractices and violence.
The campaign themes of both contestants
had an almost exclusive focus on the "national
question" and the economy - the former embracing a
variety of issues that converge on the quest for a
solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict, and the
latter focusing on the main challenges of
development among which acceleration of growth,
alleviation of poverty, reduction of unemployment
and curtailment of inflation were accorded high
priority. It was in respect of the "national
question" that there were more pronounced
contrasts in the stances of the two candidates.
Rajapakse, while declaring commitment to a
search for an "honorable peace", pledged to
safeguard the unitary nature of the Sri Lankan
state. He maintained that the peace efforts must
involve broad-based participation and not be
confined to bilateral negotiations between the
government and the LTTE, and refuted both the LTTE
claim of being the sole representative of the
Tamils of Sri Lanka, as well as the notion of an
"exclusive Tamil homeland" comprising the
country's northern and eastern provinces.
On prominent controversies of the recent
past, Rajapakse rejected the Norway-authored
blueprints for an "interim self-government
authority" for the northeast, and for a
post-tsunami operations management structure, on
the grounds that their implementation would bestow
official recognition and formal powers of
government on the LTTE in negation of the tenets
of democracy.
On the frequently violated
terms of the government-LTTE ceasefire of February
2002, Rajapakse stressed the need to renegotiate
the terms of that agreement. These, while
conforming to the policy stances that had been
advocated all along by the JVP and the JHU, with
which Rajapakse had entered into electoral
agreements at the commencement of his campaign for
the presidency (evidently without the formal
sanction of his own party), deviated in many
respects from those advocated by Kumaratunga, the
leader of his party.
"Defeat secessionism"
was the misleadingly belligerent rubric
Wickremesinghe adopted for his essentially
pacifist approach to the "national question".
Making a distinction between a "unitary" and a
"united" Sri Lanka, the prime objective he claimed
to pursue was that of unifying a nation already
divided.
For this he sought a popular
mandate to offer the LTTE scope for extensive
power-sharing within the framework of a federal
constitution. He premised this policy stance on
the belief (disregarding evidence to the contrary)
that the LTTE leaders have indicated their
willingness to accept devolved power as an
alternative to secession.
Throughout his
election campaign, Wickremesinghe ardently
defended the ceasefire agreement forged during his
tenure as prime minister (December 2001 to April
2004), trivializing the increasingly frequent
violations of that agreement by the LTTE.
His campaign rhetoric concerning the quest
for peace, though intended to persuade the
"nationalists" in the Sinhalese segment of the
electorate to his view that Sri Lanka has no
option other than that of seeking a compromise
with the LTTE, was also primarily aimed at
attracting the support of the Tamil National
Alliance (TNA, a group of parties represented in
parliament by 18 members operating under LTTE
control), Tamil voters in mainstream politics,
and, hopefully, the endorsement of the Tiger
leadership.
The economic policies
advocated by the two candidates had certain
differences, at least in relative emphasis. For
example, the JVP platform that backed Rajapakse
often promoted the concept of a "balanced economy"
(as distinct from an "open economy") which
probably meant the imposition of government
restrictions on the private sector, a reversal of
processes that had hitherto been associated with
economic liberalization (such as privatization of
state-owned enterprises and curtailment of
government sponsorship of social welfare), and the
enhancement of government sponsorship of
community-based economic activities of the
peasantry.
The policy package offered by
Wickremesinghe, in contrast, emphasized the need
for greater orientation of the economy towards the
free market, modernizing peasant agriculture,
promoting advanced technology, and attracting
foreign aid and investment. For the elevation of
living standards and for poverty alleviation, the
pledges of both candidates were similar in that
they offered more jobs, higher wages and
employment benefits, better public utilities and
welfare services, doles, subsidies, price
controls, production incentives etc, all of it in
a frenzied effort to outbid each other for voter
support.
The results of the election
suggest that it was the contrasting stances of the
two candidates on the ethnic conflict (rather than
their economic pledges) that had an overwhelmingly
decisive impact on voter alignments.
The
overall pattern discernible in the related data
could be sketched out as follows:
In the predominantly Sinhalese-Buddhist rural
areas of the country, voter turnout approximated
or exceeded 80%, and Rajapakse usually secured the
support of a clear majority, often of over 60%.
In areas of mixed ethnicity, and/or where the
Tamil voter turnout was high, Wickremesinghe
obtained a distinct majority of the vote.
The relatively higher levels of support
for Wickremesinghe in urban areas could also be
attributed to the favorable response of those in
trade and commerce (which includes a large segment
of the Muslim community) to his economic policies.
Colombo's business moguls, including those
controlling private media firms, remained fiercely
opposed to the "radical" elements of Rajapakse's
economic policy package and hence gave strong
support to Wickremesinghe.
A week before
the election the LTTE/TNA called for its boycott.
On the day of the poll, the LTTE proceeded further
along this course and prevented the inhabitants of
the areas under its control from exercising their
vote.
There was, consequently, no polling
in Jaffna district, and a low voter turnout in the
districts of Vanni and Batticaloa. The disruption
of elections by insurrectionary groups is, of
course, not a novel phenomenon in Sri Lanka.
Indeed, since the early 1980s, there has
never been a country-wide poll free of such
disruption. Nevertheless, in the context of
Wickremesinghe's policy of appeasement (which had
involved, among other things, the maintenance of
silence on any atrocity committed by the Tigers,
and permitting foreign benefactors of the LTTE to
violate Sri Lanka's sovereignty), its boycott
decision was not merely an unexpected adverse turn
of prospects, but the decisive factor in the
eventual outcome of the poll. Had it not been for
the LTTE sabotage in the north, Wickremesinghe
would certainly have been elected the president.
Spokesmen for the LTTE have rationalized
the boycott on the basis of their dissatisfaction
with the policy pronouncements of both candidates.
A somewhat more plausible explanation lies in the
propaganda value of the boycott, representing as
it does both a show of power as well as a
reiteration of their dissociation from the
politics of Sri Lanka.
Some critics have
also attributed the boycott to the Tigers'
uncertainty about their capacity to rig the
election in favor of their preferred candidate in
the way they did at the parliamentary elections of
April 2004. According to yet another
interpretation, the boycott was intended to ensure
Wickremesinghe's defeat and thus undermine his
increasing personal popularity among the Tamils.
The aftermath of the election is unlikely
to feature a major change in the state of the
ethnic conflict unless there is a major calamity
which, given past experiences, can never be ruled
out. The probable scenario of the period ahead is
a continuation of the uneasy truce and the
stalemate in peace negotiations, alongside
brinkmanship and sporadic acts of terrorism. Nor
is it realistic to anticipate significant changes
in the state of the economy.
In the
political scene, however, one could expect some
interesting changes, one of which is the
possibility of Kumaratunga's exit marking the end
of the Bandaranaike dynasty. In the course of the
election campaign, relations between the president
and her prime minister were less than cordial.
Following her failure to mobilize support
from within the PA for an anti-Rajapakse onslaught
(making an issue of his alliance with the JVP and
the JHU), Kumaratunga made several moves to
jeopardize Rajapakse's campaign. In these she
received the fullest cooperation of her brother,
Anura Bandaranaike, whom she had maneuvered into a
hypothetical party post of "prime minister
designate" and, thus, Rajapakse's "running mate".
With these estranged relations, it now seems
improbable that Anura will be appointed prime
minister or even retained in his present post of
foreign minister. Among the other possible
casualties in the formation of the new cabinet is
the minister of finance.
The UNF has yet
to recover from the stunning LTTE blow that denied
Wickremesinghe the presidency. When the party does
take stock, it seems likely that sympathy and
commiseration for the defeated leader will drown
possible criticism for his culturally incongruous
persona and blunders of campaign strategy.
In the absence of leaders of comparable
stature in its ranks, the party will also ignore
the fact that, despite the enormous resources at
his disposal, the exclusive support from the
country's economic elite, and strong external
endorsement, Wickremesinghe has led the party to
defeat at four national polls. Hence there will be
no purges within the UNF, and Wickremesinghe will
continue as the leader of the party. It will also
persist with the myth of its own making about the
LTTE's willingness to abandon secessionism and
accept a federal solution.
The role of the
SLMC and the CWC in the period ahead has elements
of uncertainty. Throughout the recent decades,
their leaders have had a record of making
successful deals with the leaders of one or other
of the main parties in office and securing for
themselves enormous personal benefit and positions
of power. This time around, the new president
already has the support of other leaders of the
Muslim and "Indian" Tamil communities. Moreover,
he could command a parliamentary majority without
SLMC and CWC support. Accordingly, the leaders of
these parties now have considerably diminished
bargaining strength with the new president.
In an overall impact assessment it is not
possible to escape the conclusion that the
presidential election of 2005 has enhanced the
ethnicity-based polarization of the Sri Lankan
nation. What could be hoped for in this context is
that, with the fading away of the euphoria of
victory and the bitterness of defeat, the two main
parties and their allies will see the vital
necessity for broad-based collaboration for facing
the awesome challenges of national consolidation
and survival.
G H Peiris,
Professor Emeritus of the University of
Peradeniya, Sri Lanka.
