The United States and India may be allies
but they have different views on the pressure
Washington is exerting on New Delhi to stand on
its side by voting for Iran's referral to the
United Nations Security Council at next week's
meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).
The Americans have warned India
that its nuclear deal signed during Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh's last trip to Washington
will
die in Congress if it doesn't back the US on Iran.
From India's perspective that's bare-knuckle
diplomacy at its worst. From the US vantage point
this is merely a test of friendship between the
two democracies.
If India were to follow
its past patterns of conducting an independent
foreign policy, it would be unlikely to take too
kindly to such threats. But India's practitioners
of realpolitik have claimed for about the past
five years that, being two democracies, India and
the United States are "natural allies". That
aside, the next few weeks are crucial in terms of
testing this bare-knuckle diplomacy and India's
natural predilection to follow its vital national
interests free of external pressures.
The
history of US-India relations during the Cold War
may be described as a hard-nosed practice of
independent foreign policy on the part of India,
or so claimed the mandarins of Indian foreign
policy. From America's perspectives, that alleged
independence was blatantly pro-Soviet (and biased
against the US). But India's response was that in
heady matters of foreign policy, Moscow, more
often than not, stood by New Delhi, while
Washington either hedged its bets or sided with
Pakistan. Both sides are partially right in their
respective claims.
That might be ancient
history. Then again, it might not be ancient after
all.
US Ambassador to India David Mulford
has stated that the United States is eagerly
seeking India's support when the IAEA meets to
discuss Iran's nuclear-research program. If India
takes the position that Iran should not have
nuclear weapons, he said, "We think they should
record it in the vote."
By itself that
statement would not have been half as bad if
Mulford did not add that that US-India nuclear
deal would "die in Congress" if leaders in New
Delhi were to vote against referring Iran to the
UN at the meeting next Thursday.
The
US-India nuclear deal was reached when Manmohan
visited Washington in July. The United States
agreed to share advanced civilian nuclear
technology with India, thereby lifting sanctions
that were imposed on the country in the aftermath
of its nuclear test in May 1998. An important
aspect of the deal was that it had to be approved
by the US Congress, which has always been
suspicious of India's intentions regarding the
nuclear issue.
More to the point, as a
matter of general practice on issues of
international trade, and especially regarding
nuclear non-proliferation, US legislators are
known to set standards of "good" or "credible"
behavior involving sovereign nations, a practice
regarded by these countries as obnoxious, or even
offensive. China felt that way when its oil
company CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corp)
offered to buy Unocal for US$18.5 billion late
last year. The US Congress ultimately passed
legislation declaring the retention of Unocal as a
matter of "national security". In response, CNOOC
decided to back out of that deal.
One
wonders whether Washington paid much attention to
the controversy the US-India nuclear deal created
in New Delhi. The Manmohan government came under
intense criticism from the communist parties for
its alleged subservience to Washington and for
parting company with the long-standing tradition
of conducting independent foreign policy that was
established by India's first prime minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru, and cherished by his successors.
When Manmohan signed the nuclear deal in
Washington there were expectations and
understandings that Iran would not be referred to
the UN any time soon, since such a measure would
have forced the current Indian government to take
a position. If it were to side with the US, there
were fears the coalition government might be
brought down. But if New Delhi were to oppose the
US, then such a measure would have created its own
deleterious consequences along the lines specified
by Mulford.
What the US does not
understand - or maybe understands but fails to
appreciate - is that India's foreign policy toward
Iran is quite complex. Iran has consistently
balanced, especially lately, its ties between
India and its South Asian arch-rival, Pakistan. At
times, Iran has gone some distance in terms of
manifesting its preference for India and
Indo-Iranian economic ties.
That is saying
a lot, considering both Pakistan and Iran claim to
be "Islamic republics". Besides, after acquiring
nuclear weapons of its own by developing a complex
rationale for them, New Delhi is not interested in
antagonizing Iran in its own attempt to acquire
advanced nuclear knowledge. Indian leaders are too
busy with other important foreign and domestic
policy matters to be bogged down in a quarrel
involving Iran, the United States and the EU-3
(Germany, France and the United Kingdom).
What is likely to be the outcome of this
newly intensified controversy between two major
democracies? It should be noted that India has
already rejected any claims of linkages between
the Indo-US nuclear deal and its vote related to
Iran. Still, its choices may not be that simple.
One option for India is to take no
position on the issue when the matter is referred
to the IAEA next week. It might hope for IAEA
director general Mohamed ElBaradei's reported
intention to give Iran more time before referring
it to the UN.
If that doesn't happen, then
India is likely to go with the US position only if
it determines that such a move would not bring
down the coalition government. However, if there
is a storm of powerful protest and controversy in
India in the coming days and week on the issue,
Manmohan is likely to vote against referring Iran
to the UN, calculating that the US-India nuclear
deal might prove to be too humiliating when the US
legislators start taking a close look at it and
start adding more conditions to it.
Whatever India decides to do on this
issue, the consequences are likely to be
unsettling. But that is just par for the course
for a rising power. India is now very much part of
the "big-power league". It will be forced to make
heady decisions and live with the consequences.
Ehsan Ahrari is a CEO of
Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria, Virginia-based
defense consultancy. He can be reached ateahrari@cox.netorstratparadigms@yahoo.com.
His columns appear regularly in Asia Times
Online His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
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