On the surface, relations between India
and China are positive. India's economic ties with
China are booming. China is set to emerge as
India's leading trade partner in the near future,
leaving its current No 1 partner, the United
States, behind. Between 2000 and 2005, trade with
China registered a hike of 521%, whereas India's
trade with the US increased by only 63% during the
same period.
There are regular high-level
meetings between Asia's two rising powers. India
and China have just concluded their second round of
"strategic dialogue" and
declared 2006 a Sino-Indian friendship year. More
important, they have agreed to cooperate, rather
than compete, for global energy resources. The
incipient Sino-Indian entente has prompted some to
argue that it has the potential to alter Asian
geopolitics radically.
Longtime observers
of India-China relations, however, maintain that
some improvement in the rhetoric and atmospherics
notwithstanding, ties remain fragile and as
vulnerable as ever to a sudden deterioration. The
combination of internal issues of stability and
external overlapping spheres of influence
forestall the chances for a genuine Sino-Indian
rapprochement.
Though both sides are
working to expand and deepen economic cooperation,
there is as yet no strategic congruence between
the two giants. Indeed, the issues that bind the
two countries together are also the issues that
divide them and fuel their rivalry because they
have different positions in the international
system, contrasting strategic cultures, world
views and political systems, and competing
geostrategic interests.
In the power
competition game, China has clearly surged far
ahead of India by acquiring potent economic and
military capabilities, and the existing asymmetry
in power and status serves Beijing's interests;
therefore, China has resisted any Indian attempts
to narrow the power gap. Unlike China, India's
fractious polity continues to limit its economic
and military potential. Nor has New Delhi been
able to lend a strategic purpose to its foreign
and economic policies.
Beneath the
surface, frictions and tensions are simmering
between the two countries over some fundamental
issues: the territorial dispute, the nuclear
issue, the United Nations Security Council reform
issue, to name a few. Both remain locked in a
classic security dilemma: one country sees its own
actions as justifiably self-defensive, but these
same actions appear aggressive to the other. In
the past year, India has found itself ranged
against China at the UN, the International Atomic
Energy Agency over Iran's nuclear program, the
East Asia Summit and the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) over the issue of India's membership.
Three major developments that shook the
ground beneath South Block (India's External
Affairs Ministry building) in New Delhi recently
were the emergence of a pro-China axis comprising
Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh at the 13th South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
summit in Dhaka, China's opposition to the July
2005 India-US nuclear-energy agreement, and
Beijing's moves to confine India to the periphery
of a future East Asia Community at the first East
Asia summit in Kuala Lumpur in mid-December.
Add to this Beijing's worldwide campaign
against India's (and Japan's) bids for permanent
membership in the UN Security Council, the
continuing stalemate in the India-China border
negotiations, coupled with their ever-expanding
economies and widening geopolitical horizons, and
it is clear that the relationship between the two
rising Asian giants continues to be characterized
more by competition and rivalry than by
cooperation.
Despite the hype over India's
burgeoning trade with China, it consists mostly of
raw materials, iron ore, steel and like
commodities that are used to fuel China's economic
growth, while China exports manufactured goods,
electronics and machinery to India. Even in the
information-technology sector, the focus of
Chinese diplomacy remains on leveraging India's
strengths to China's advantage without any quid
pro quo in the technology hardware or
manufacturing sectors.
Neither power is
comfortable with the rise of the other. Each
perceives the other as pursuing regional hegemony
and entertaining geographical expansion. Each puts
forward its own proposals for multilateral
cooperation that exclude the other. Both vie for
influence in Central, South and Southeast Asia,
and for leadership positions in global and
regional organizations.
More than ever
before, the state of the India-China relationship
is increasingly being influenced by "the US
factor" as the Southern and Central Asian region
becomes an arena of strategic competition in Asia.
China's shadow over South
Asia All the talk of a "new beginning" in
Sino-Indian relations notwithstanding, there is
little evidence to support the view that China has
recast its foreign policy to build an
accommodative relationship with Asia's other
rising power - India. If anything, Beijing has
unveiled major strategic moves that will in effect
isolate India in South Asia and further squeeze
India's traditional strategic space in the region,
keeping New Delhi tied down with multiple
subcontinental concerns.
After Pakistan
and Myanmar, Beijing is skillfully employing
economic and military means to draw Bhutan,
Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka into
China's orbit. The Chinese military's recent
incursions and road-construction activity in
Bhutanese territory are aimed at coercing the tiny
Himalayan kingdom to end its protectorate
relationship with India and move into China's
orbit "if Bhutan desires peace and development
with the world's fastest-growing superpower".
Ignoring Indian pleas not to fish in
troubled waters in volatile Nepal, Beijing has
gone ahead with arms supplies to the beleaguered
monarchy. Nepal's King Gyanendra has been openly
playing "the China card" to counter Indian and US
demands for an early restoration of multi-party
democracy in the Himalayan kingdom.
Taking
advantage of a sharp downturn in India's relations
with Bangladesh over issues ranging from illegal
immigration to Islamist terrorism, transit and
trade, Beijing has upgraded its ties with Dhaka to
gain naval access to the Chittagong port, to
establish a road link with Bangladesh via Myanmar
and to acquire Dhaka's immense natural-gas
reserves.
China is already the largest
supplier of weaponry to Bangladesh. Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao's recent offer to provide Dhaka
with nuclear-reactor technology has led to
speculation as to whether Beijing would replicate
in Bangladesh the sort of military, nuclear and
missile collaboration it has with Pakistan.
Bangladesh and Nepal are also expected to join
Pakistan in concluding peace and friendship
treaties with China in the near future.
At
the 13th SAARC summit held in Dhaka in November,
India's physical presence was overshadowed by
China's invisible presence but growing influence.
Nothing highlighted this more strikingly than
India's volte face on the issue of China's
induction into the grouping as an observer or a
dialogue partner.
On the first day of the
proceedings on November 12, Indian Foreign
Secretary Shyam Saran ruled out China's induction
unless it signed a memorandum of understanding for
being associated with SAARC. However, within less
than 24 hours, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh was forced - mainly by the pro-China
grouping comprising Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh
- to come out with a statement welcoming China as
an observer. (The only consolation for India was
that it managed to extend the same privilege to
its friend, Japan.)
India's climb-down
occurred against the backdrop of the pro-China
grouping threatening to veto Afghanistan's entry
into SAARC as the grouping's eighth member, which
India supported, unless China was allowed in. The
inclusion of China as an observer is seen by most
SAARC member-states as a counterbalance to India.
Apparently, while India has been preoccupied with
fighting cross-border terrorism on its own
territory, China has been busy making significant
inroads into India's back yard through
cross-border economic and strategic penetration of
Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives.
Beijing's main objectives are said to be
access to raw materials, commodities, natural
resources and access to South Asian markets for
Chinese goods and to expand China's influence in
the region. However, China's support for India's
smaller neighbors suggests that gaining access to
markets and natural resources is not the only
reason behind Beijing's South Asia policy: Beijing
also wants to make a point on the limits of Indian
power.
In fact, aiding "India-wary"
countries in South Asia to "concircle" (contain
and encircle) India has long been an integral part
of China's strategic calculus. As a rising
maritime trading power, Beijing is also seeking
once again to project force into the Indian Ocean
in the manner of the fleets sent out under the
command of Admiral Zheng He nearly 600 years ago
during the Ming Dynasty.
Border talks
again end in stalemate China's growing
presence in South Asia is accompanied by a
hardening of its stance on the territorial
dispute. This became evident at the last round of
border talks held in Beijing between last
September 26-27. Defense analysts attribute the
Chinese intransigence in resolving the border
dispute to the rapidly shifting military balance
of power in Beijing's favor on the Tibetan
Plateau. Since 1999, there has been a constant
probing of the line of actual control, via
frequent border crossings by Chinese border
patrols in a manner designed to test Indian
resolve, psychology, vulnerabilities and border
intelligence.
With the near-completion of
the 1,118-kilometer Qinghai-Tibetan railway and
other military infrastructure projects in Tibet,
China "may be tempted to resort to force or
coercion more quickly to press diplomatic
advantage, advance security interests or resolve
disputes", according to an unnamed senior Indian
military officer.
The Chinese have also
rebuffed India's pleas for a quick boundary
settlement within a fixed time frame. Even on
Sikkim, the Chinese have deliberately decided to
"go slow" on the implementation of their verbal
promise after obtaining a written commitment on
Tibet from India in June 2003 during former prime
minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China.
From the Chinese standpoint, the concept of give
and take vis-a-vis India could also damage China's
image in South Asia as the predominant power.
China opposes India's bid for UN
seat Another sign of proactive containment
of India is Beijing's opposition to any move to
expand the veto-holding permanent membership of
the UN Security Council. With the exception of
China, the remaining four permanent members have
voiced their support for expansion of Security
Council permanent membership, with the United
States supporting Japan while Russia, France and
Britain are supporting India's bid.
A
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson has now made
it clear that while Beijing is willing to see
India occupy a seat in the semi-permanent or
non-permanent category, it remains opposed to
having its Asian rivals - India or Japan - sitting
in the Security Council permanent membership
category.
The fact that China has now
emerged as the major obstacle to UN reforms can be
attributed to divergent world views held by
Beijing and other world capitals. Similar to how
the US seeks to prevent the emergence of a peer
competitor at the global level, China wants to
prevent the rise of a peer competitor at the
regional level. This stance leads Washington to
support a multipolar Asia (with a strong Japan and
powerful India to balance China) but a unipolar
world (with the United States as the sole
hyperpower without any peers).
In
contrast, Beijing prefers a unipolar Asia-Pacific
(with China as the sole superpower without any
peers) and a multipolar world (with the United
States, the European Union, Russia and China as
four major power poles). In contrast with both
Washington and Beijing, New Delhi champions
multipolarity at both regional and global levels.
Beijing's attitude to the expansion of the UN
Security Council is a clear indication that it
will not countenance the emergence of an Asian
peer competitor.
The East Asia
Summit In early 2005, Beijing dispatched
its diplomats to Laos (then "country convener for
India" within the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations regional grouping) and other Southeast
Asian capitals to dissuade them from lobbying for
India's membership (albeit unsuccessfully) in the
East Asia Summit (EAS) scheduled for its first
inaugural meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December.
However, with the exception of Malaysia, Beijing
did not find any takers for its anti-India stance,
primarily because nearly all Southeast Asian
countries supported India's participation in the
EAS, seeing it as a useful counterweight to
China's growing power.
Having failed to
keep India (and Australia and New Zealand) out of
the new regional grouping, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry attempted to dominate the emerging East
Asian Community (EAC) by dividing it into two
blocs: the core or primary states with China as
the leading, dominant player inside the ASEAN+3
(including China, South Korea and Japan) and the
peripheral or secondary states of India, Australia
and New Zealand (or "outsiders" as the People's
Daily editorial of December 7 described them).
Beijing remains leery of India's
great-power pretensions and attempts to extend its
influence in China's back yard. Seeing New Delhi's
"Look East" policy as part of a wider
"counter-China" strategy unveiled by the
Washington-Tokyo-New Delhi grouping, the thrust of
Chinese diplomacy is to confine India to the
periphery of a future East Asia Community and to
foil India's efforts to break out of the South
Asian straitjacket.
The People's Daily
commentator reacted sharply to the Indian prime
minister's proposal for an Asian Economic
Community (AEC): "India's proposal is not warmly
responded [to] as each country has its own
considerations." Apparently, China's "own
considerations" are primarily geostrategic in
nature. Beijing fears that India's participation
in the core group would shift the balance of power
and make the EAC less susceptible to domination by
China.
Therefore, in the run-up to the
East Asia Summit in Malaysia and days after
obtaining observer status in SAARC, China's
message to India was crystal-clear. Finding his
country relegated to the outer circle, an Indian
diplomat expressed his disappointment over the
decision to entrench the ASEAN+3 framework within
the EAS: "To state that ASEAN is in the driver's
seat, the passengers have a right to know where
they are going."
Energy fuels feud Both face growing demand for energy and are
locked in fierce competition for stakes in
overseas oil and gas fields in Asia, Africa, Latin
America and the Middle East. In the energy
competition stakes, however, China currently has
an overwhelming lead because China has linked
energy to its national security policy for longer
than India has. Moreover, China has been more
successful in diversifying its energy resources,
developing a varied network of oil suppliers from
Africa to Latin America.
China's superior
financial muscle and diplomatic clout also enables
it to win friends and contracts for natural
resources. As 2005 progressed, Chinese oil firms
went out of their way (excessively overpaying for
assets) to thwart India's attempts to secure
international energy assets in Kazakhstan,
Ecuador, Angola, Nigeria and Myanmar. Clearly,
India's efforts to secure supplies cannot succeed
unless and until New Delhi creates incentives
(arms, aid and diplomatic support) or economic
dependencies (via trade) for the supplying country
to sell oil and gas to India.
Ironically,
the day India's oil minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar,
left for Beijing to discuss energy-cooperation
joint ventures, Myanmar announced that its gas
would be flowing east to China instead of north
and west to India. Despite the conclusion of
energy-cooperation agreements, China is likely to
go solo in its quest for energy security; energy
competition, rather than energy cooperation, will
be the norm.
As finding new sources of oil
becomes more difficult, there are bound to be
areas of friction between Asia's two
fastest-growing economies. While China views the
Andaman Sea off Myanmar's coast as an important
source of oil to fuel the economic expansion of
China's western provinces, India sees China's
presence in the Bay of Bengal an unwelcome
development. The Chinese navy has asserted its
legitimate right to operate in the Indian Ocean to
ensure security of its oil and trade transiting
through the region.
China already has
better relations with the two largest energy
suppliers - Saudi Arabia and Iran - than does
India. With Pakistan as its long-term military
ally, China also has closer relations with four
important Islamic countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Pakistan and Bangladesh) than India, the United
States and Japan.
As a major trading
country and a future world power, China is now
laying the groundwork for a naval presence along
maritime chokepoints in the South China Sea, the
Malacca Strait, the Indian Ocean and the Strait of
Hormuz in the Persian Gulf through acquisition of
naval bases in Cambodia, Myanmar, Bangladesh and
Pakistan to protect its long-term
economic-security interests.
Sooner rather
than later, China's military alliances and forward
deployment of its naval assets in the Pakistani,
Bangladeshi and Myanmar ports would prompt India
to respond in kind by seeking access to the
Vietnamese (Cam Ranh Bay), Taiwanese (Kaohsiung)
and Japanese (Okinawa) ports for the forward
deployment of Indian naval assets to protect
India's shipping and trade routes and access to
energy resources from the Russian Sakhalin
province.
China's 'no' to US-India
nuclear deal In another indication of
tension between India and China, the official
Chinese media attacked last July's US-India
nuclear pact (which aims to recognize India as the
sixth nuclear power as well as open up civilian
nuclear supplies, despite India being a
non-signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty) and cautioned of its "negative impact" on
the global nuclear order.
In a scathing
commentary on October 26, the People's Daily
accused Washington of being soft on India and
warned that if the US made a "nuclear exception"
for India, other powers (ie, China) could do the
same with their friends (read Pakistan, Bangladesh
and Myanmar) and weaken the global
non-proliferation regime.
India and China
have long been suspicious about each other's
relationship with the US, seeing it in zero-sum
terms. Seeing the US intent to help India become
"a world power" as a way of containing China,
Beijing has become alert to India's new-found
coziness with the US, particularly in the wake of
US support for India's civilian nuclear-energy
development. More important, China, much like
Pakistan, insists that any changes to US laws and
the NSG guidelines to accommodate the deal must
not be "India-specific" so that they can benefit
other countries (Pakistan) as well.
Furthermore, China is not only opposing
India's NSG membership but is also trying to
prevent the India-US nuclear deal by presenting
itself as the champion of nuclear
non-proliferation. With Beijing aggressively and
openly joining the voices against the nuclear
pact, New Delhi's quest for nuclear technology is
turning knottier by the day. From Beijing's
perspective, if India and the US start drifting
apart over the collapse of the nuclear deal, it
will further contribute to China's strategy to
isolate and concircle India.
Conclusion All of these negative
developments indicate that India's so-called
"healthy competition with China" is becoming one
of rivalry. In fact, China's behavior toward India
is not much different from that of the United
States' behavior toward China, for the simple
reason that China is a status quo power with
respect to India, while the US is a status quo
power with regards to China.
Dr
Mohan Malik is a professor at the Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii.
His views expressed in PINR are his own and do not
reflect the policy or position of the Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies or the US Department
of Defense.
Published with
permission of thePower and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
tocontent@pinr.com
.
