Sweetness and light in Pakistan By Federico
Bordonaro
On February 21, during
President General Pervez Musharraf's visit to
Beijing, Pakistan and China signed 13 agreements
and a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on energy,
defense, trade, and communications.
The
significance of these accords goes beyond their
strictly economic aspects: Beijing and Islamabad
are upgrading their long-standing strategic
partnership, which means
that
China's improved relations with India will not
imply the end of China's pro-Pakistan stance in
South Asia.
The deal The new
Sino-Pakistani agreements cover a number of
crucial issues. First of all, a framework
agreement on defense cooperation was signed by the
two Ministers for Defense Production. Since
Beijing's defense trade ties with Islamabad are
traditionally strong, China had little difficulty
in taking advantage of the recent increase in
Pakistan's military spending, which will rise to
US$3.74 billion in 2006 (up from $3.4 billion in
2005). [1]
China is already supplying
Pakistan's Navy with four F-22P frigates, thanks
to an agreement signed in April 2005. In addition,
Beijing and Islamabad jointly produced the JF-17
fighter aircraft (labelled the FC-1 by China's air
force) and are working together on the K-8 trainer
aircraft. The February deal is to be read in
continuity with this solid cooperation background
and assures further improvements in Pakistan's
strategic defenses.
Moreover, China is
Pakistan's decisive strategic partner in the field
of main battle tanks (MBTs) and missile
technology. Since Washington is still reluctant
(following Pakistan's 1998 nuclear testing) to
lift the ban on sales of most defense technology
items to Islamabad, Beijing has quickly become
Pakistan's primary military and nuclear technology
supplier.
Bilateral trade and economic
cooperation were also at the heart of the February
21 deal. A framework agreement signed by Commerce
Minister Humayun Akhtar and his Chinese
counterpart launched a five-year joint program
between the two nations, designed to boost their
economic ties and promote mutual free trade
between them over an increasingly extensive range
of goods, following the April 2005 talks and
November 2004 protocol. Sino-Pakistani
bilateral trade is already a flourishing reality,
having risen from $3.06 billion in 2004 to $4.25
billion in 2005; and the two partners declared
their intention to increase its overall volume to
$8 billion by 2008.
Beijing also agreed to
provide its counterpart with $300 million in loans
to be used by Pakistan to buy Chinese goods, and
offered further assistance to help rebuild the
important Karakoram Highway, which had been
severely damaged in the catastrophic earthquake
that struck Pakistan last year. The Chinese
private sector's already considerable investments
in Pakistan can thus be expected to increase even
more in the coming years.
At a time of
global worries about energy security, it's not
surprising that an agreement on energy cooperation
was also on the table. The accord was signed by Mr
Umer Ghuman, Islamabad's Minister for
Privatization. In the nuclear sphere - officially
designated as solely for civilian purposes -
Beijing has already helped Islamabad to set up a
nuclear power plant, and the two countries
recently started work on a second in eastern
Pakistan. (Interestingly, when Pakistan attracted
the ire of many world leaders by testing its own
nuclear weapon, China did not overtly condemn it
for doing so; instead, it pointed to India as the
starter of an unstoppable chain-reaction).
Other agreements were signed for increased
cooperation in important civilian sectors such as
health, family planning, meteorological research,
fisheries and pesticide management, even including
an agreement for China to help Pakistan provide
vocational training. [2]
Risky business
in Pakistan A serious challenge to China's
industrial and commercial cooperation with
Pakistan could be posed by the increasingly
volatile nature of the environment in which its
overseas technical personnel and business agents
are operating. In May 2004, a car bomb killed
three and injured nine of the 300 Chinese
technicians working at Gwadar port. Then in
October 2004, two Chinese technicians employed by
the Syno Hydro Corporation on the Gomal Zam Dam
project were kidnapped. And most recently, on
February 15 this year, three Chinese engineers
were killed in Hub, some 700 km southeast of
Quetta.
The reasons for such violence are
complex. Strong Chinese economic involvement in
Pakistan has sometimes given rise to hostility.
Some tribal members of Pakistani society have been
known to attack Chinese specialized workers in the
past, but their rationale is probably due more to
generic hostility towards economic development -
perceived as a deadly threat to traditional
communities - than to specifically anti-Chinese
sentiment.
However, China's interest in
Pakistan's Balochistan region and in the port of
Gwadar (see: China's pearl in Pakistan's
waters, Asia Times Online, March 5,
'05) has not been welcomed by some Balochi
nationalist militants, who view Sino-Pakistani
cooperation as strengthening Islamabad's control
over the region. Pakistan's capability to
successfully protect China's involvement in Gwadar
is crucial, as well for energy security. As the
above-mentioned Asia Times Online story reported,
"A road from Gwadar to Saindak, said to be the
shortest route between Central Asia and the sea,
is under construction. Gwadar would provide
landlocked Afghanistan and the Central Asian
republics with access to the sea. Goods and oil
and gas reserves from these countries could be
shipped to global markets through Gwadar port.
Pakistan's business community seems to be in favor
of Gwadar port being designated a free trade zone
and an export-processing zone."
Regarding
the Hub incident, President Musharraf said during
his visit to Beijing that Islamabad will do
everything it can to bring the murderers of the
three Chinese engineers to justice. It is to be
expected that governmental efforts to enhance
business security in the country will increase,
and that the issue will assume greater importance
in the near future.
Chinese President Hu
Jintao called President Pervez Musharraf "an old
friend of the Chinese people" as both leaders were
attending the agreement-signing ceremony in
Beijing. Chinese leaders in fact praised the two
countries' "common interests" in crushing
"terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism".
Business security and political goals - such as
the anti-jihadist struggle in Pakistan and China's
containment of Xin-Jiang's separatism - appear
tightly linked.
Perspectives Notwithstanding the improvement in Sino-Indian
relations - as attested by the April 11, 2005
deals on economic and diplomatic cooperation - the
Sino-Pakistani strategic relationship appears
consistently strong. Since September 11, relations
between Islamabad and Beijing have been
successfully upgraded and extended.
Inter-governmental summits and new accords have
increased in frequency, and even serious incidents
such as the February 15 ambush and previous
attacks in Gwadar have not hindered such progress.
China, the rising global power par
excellence, needs to maximize its own security and
to continue its economic growth while avoiding
open confrontation with other powers. In South
Asia, Beijing pursues two objectives: strategic
security and economic interests. Its
"comprehensive partnership" with Pakistan is
crucial to the achievement of these goals, and
will continue to be so.
Federico
Bordonaro is senior analyst with the Power and
Interest News Report. He can be contacted at
fbordonaro@NOSPAMpinr.com
Notes [1] Ben Vogel,
Pakistan and China strengthen defense ties, Jane's
Defence Industry, February 22, 2006.
[2]
The Daily Times, February 21, 2006.
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