Pakistan-India nuclear rivalry
heats up By Ehsan Ahrari
The United States never understood the
permanent nature of the quest for power symmetry
that drives Pakistan in its bitter rivalry with
its larger and more powerful neighbor, India. That
quest is currently driving it to seek the same
type of nuclear deal with the US that India has
received. As much as Pakistan wishes for that, it
is not likely to get it unless it takes at least
two steps, both of which it will not take any time
soon.
So, wittingly or unwittingly,
President George W Bush has intensified the
nuclear-arms race and a race for technological
parity in conventional
military that are two essential elements of the
power symmetry between the two South Asian rivals.
One of the idiosyncrasies of US foreign
policy is that either it remains oblivious to the
implications of its regional policies for major
rivals or adversaries in that region or it fails
to pay sufficient attention as to how its new
political maneuvers would affect the balance of
power in it. Such an inadequate attention is
costly in South Asia, where America's stakes as
related to its "war on terrorism" are so high and
where the regime of President General Pervez
Musharraf is doing so much in terms of fighting
that war on behalf of the United States.
Even though Pakistan has emerged as
America's major frontline ally in the era since
September 11, 2001, there remains ample alienation
and, indeed, antagonistic attitude toward that
country in the US Congress and within the nuclear
non-proliferation community. There may be a number
of reasons underlying that unsympathetic attitude,
but two bear mentioning, for they are significant
and stand out quite vividly.
First there
is the absence of democracy in Pakistan in an era
when the Bush administration is harping so much on
it for the Middle East, though not necessarily for
all the Muslim countries with the same intensity.
A number of US legislators remain quite flustered
with Bush officials for not putting sufficient
pressure on Musharraf to democratize Pakistan. At
the same time, there is ambivalence inside
Congress on the entire issue of promoting
democracy in Muslim countries. After all, there is
plenty of evidence to show that when elections are
held in Muslim countries - eg Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon
and Palestine - hardline Islamists candidates may
do well. Despite this paradox, the absence of
democracy in Pakistan has left it with few strong
supporters inside the US Congress.
Second,
the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear-proliferation factor
has remained a source of irritation and anger in
Congress, a body that will scrutinize any
potential US-Pakistan nuclear deal if it becomes a
reality, just as it will scrutinize the
just-concluded US-India nuclear agreement. Few US
legislators, if any, believe the imprudent
explanation Pakistan has proffered that the
"father" of its nuclear bomb was acting as a
"loose cannon", and without the knowledge or
approval of the government, in his
proliferation-related activities involving North
Korea, Iran and Libya. What is even more annoying
to US lawmakers is that the Bush administration
did not take a resolute stand on interviewing the
Pakistani nuclear scientist to find out the full
extent and scope of his nuclear-proliferation
activities.
Consequently, the United
States has to rely on the official Pakistani
narrative on how much damage Khan had really
caused by providing highly sensitive technical
information on nuclear weaponization to North
Korea and Iran. Of these two countries, the
general understanding is that North Korea has
already developed nuclear weapons and Iran may not
be too far behind.
India, in contrast, has
a clean record regarding its commitment to nuclear
non-proliferation. Still, that country has a
number of critics inside the US Congress. A number
of US legislators are still smarting from the way
New Delhi surprised and embarrassed US
intelligence sources when it exploded its nuclear
bomb in May 1998. Since then, it not only has
refused to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, but rebuffs all suggestions to de-escalate
the pace of modernization of its nuclear forces.
US decision-makers are unconcerned that India's
decision to continue modernizing its nuclear
forces is in direct response to its reading of
similar activities by China and Pakistan.
The US-India nuclear deal is viewed in
Islamabad as a major setback for its vital
interests. Through its strategic partnership with
India, the Bush administration may be focused on
containing China. However, Pakistan envisages that
partnership as just another maneuver of India to
ensure that Pakistan does not achieve parity in
the realm of nuclear as well as conventional
military power. Musharraf definitely feels that
the US-India nuclear deal has weakened his own
position vis-a-vis the super-hawks and Islamist
elements in the Pakistani army. He might even feel
betrayed by his friend George Bush.
What
will Pakistan do in the aftermath of the US-India
nuclear deal? The most logical steps it must take
are toward democratization and to allow US
national-security personnel to interview Khan
directly. However, both these steps are not likely
to be taken any time soon. Even if he were to
decide to democratize Pakistan, Musharraf's
credibility is so low in that regard that few in
the United States would believe he was serious.
The issue of allowing Khan to be interviewed by US
officials is so explosive that Musharraf might not
want to start a firestorm of protests by merely
agreeing to it.
In the absence of the
preceding, Pakistan is likely to take the
following measures. First and foremost, it will
continue to make its case with Washington for a
similar nuclear deal to India's. It will even take
some concrete measures to assure its critics
inside the United States that it will no longer
serve as a "nuclear Wal-Mart". Second, it will
continue to expand its long-standing nuclear
cooperation with China, or even broaden its
nuclear horizons by approaching Russia.
China is fully aware that the US is using
its nuclear deal with India to put pressure on
Beijing. China will continue its similar maneuvers
by using Pakistan to put pressure on India, its
growing trade ties with Delhi notwithstanding.
US-Russia ties relations have recently become
visibly competitive in Central Asia. So Moscow
would be receptive to making its own deals with
Pakistan to create undercurrents within its
neighborhood that would place it in a more
competitive position vis-a-vis Washington.
If all else fails, Pakistan will hope that
the US-India nuclear deal faces a major hurdle
either in the US Congress or with the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. Chances are US legislators will
be critical of the deal. Though they might not go
to the extent of rejecting or blocking it, if some
of them were to start to nit-pick the deal, the
government of India might be forced to back out of
it for reasons of national honor and prestige.
The Communist Party of India, which is a
coalition partner with the Congress party-led
government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, will
be watching the US Congress with rapt attention,
and will be ready to pounce on the Indian
government if it gives any further concessions to
the Bush administration. The communists aren't too
happy with the fact that the government has
already placed 18 of India's 22 nuclear reactors
under civilian control, thereby opening them for
periodic inspections by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Whether the remaining eight
reactors will be sufficient for the requirement of
India's dynamic nuclear deterrence against China
and Pakistan is likely to be a source of constant
debate in India.
Pakistan knows that it
just lost one round on the nuclear deal, but its
long-standing battle and uphill quest to reach
military parity with India will continue.
Islamabad still has an ace in its pocket. It might
slow the pace of its cooperation in
the "war on terrorism" to put pressure
on the US for a nuclear deal of its own. That
option is dicey. However, the nuances and
uncertainties related to the US anti-terrorism
campaign continue to favor Pakistan, especially
while the uphill battle in Iraq is putting
constant pressure on Bush.
Ehsan
Ahrari is the CEO of Strategic Paradigms, an
Alexandria, Virginia-based defense consultancy. He
can be reached at eahrari@cox.netorstratparadigms@yahoo.com.
His columns appear regularly in Asia Times
Online. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
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