Delhi fears only jihadis as Maoists
rampage By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - A series of high-profile attacks in recent months by Maoist groups
in India has raised concern over the serious threat such groups pose to India's
internal security. But while the frequency of Maoist-related violence might be
greater than that by Islamist militants and jihadis, it is tackling the latter
that remains a preoccupation of the Indian government.
A week ago, Maoists hijacked a train carrying some 300 passengers in the
northern state of Jharkhand. While they did
release the train within 11 hours and even fled the scene, the operation
indicates that the Maoists have moved way beyond blowing up rail tracks, to
hijacking trains. In what has been described as the largest-ever attack staged
by Maoists in the country, a group of them in November freed 350 of their
comrades lodged in the Jehanabad jail in the state of Bihar. That attack was
noteworthy not only for the large number of Maoist cadres - more than 1,000 -
who participated in it, but also for the meticulous planning and coordination
that went into executing it.
But while the Jehanabad jailbreak was a spectacular attack, it was neither "one
of its kind" nor "the first of its type", said P V Ramana, an expert on Indian
Maoist groups at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. Ramana pointed
out that the Jehanabad attack was "in fact a continuation of well-rehearsed,
meticulously planned - which includes snapping telephone and power lines and
blocking and mining highways and roads - and highly coordinated similar attacks
involving hundreds of rebels storming multiple targets in an area".
Maoists also carried out several attacks in 2004-05 that not only were large in
scale but revealed considerable planning and coordination.
As worrying as the scale of Maoist attacks is the dramatic increase in the
geographic spread of their influence. In the early 1990s the number of
districts affected by varying degrees of Maoist violence stood at just 15 in
four states. This figure rose to 55 districts in nine states by the end of 2003
and shot up to 156 districts in 13 states in 2004. At least 170 districts (of a
total of 602 districts in the country) are said to be under Maoist influence
today.
What makes this rapid geographic expansion reason for concern is that the
districts where the Maoists have consolidated control through violence and
control over administration are contiguous areas. For several years now,
left-wing insurgents in South Asia have been talking of "liberating" a "compact
revolutionary zone" (CRZ), extending from Nepal through Bihar in the north,
running through Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, and down to Andhra Pradesh in the
south of India. It appears that the Maoists are well on their way to creating
this contiguous corridor.
Security analysts have been warning of the serious threat posed by Maoists to
India's internal security. Ramana describes it as "the single internal security
threat that affects the largest number of states in India". In a speech in the
upper house of parliament in December 2004, General Shankar Roy Choudhary (a
member of parliament and former chief of army staff) observed that the Maoist
threat is "the main threat which is menacing the [Indian] state today, more
dangerous than the situation in Jammu and Kashmir or the situation in the
northeast".
Indian intelligence officials admit that the Maoist threat is serious. They
point out that more worrying than the level of violence and the high casualty
rate is the fact "it is the Maoists' writ that runs in some 90,000 square
kilometers of Indian territory".
Police officials in areas affected by Maoist violence grumble that the
government is not according the problem the priority it deserves. They accuse
the government of being excessively preoccupied with the threat posed by
Islamist militancy and jihadi terrorism when it is Maoist violence that is far
more worrying. They point out that the government "continues to see the Maoists
as misguided youth when they are in fact part of a 10,000-strong army that is
hostile to the Indian state".
While the Indian state's response to the Maoist problem has included brutal
elimination of suspected Maoists and their sympathizers, there is recognition
among some sections at least that the roots of the problem lie in poverty and
exploitation. Terrorism experts and counter-insurgency personnel might see the
issue as an internal security threat, but there are sections that are still
reluctant to do so.
Responding to a program telecast by CNN-IBN on the "Maoist threat" in India,
Home Secretary V K Duggal insisted the government didn't want to look at it as
a security issue. "It's a socio-economic problem. We must have the development
faster and have dedicated officers working in the area. It's not a security
issue."
The threat posed by Islamist terrorists and jihadis is, in contrast, viewed as
a security threat. As a retired army officer pointed out, "The terrorism in
Jammu and Kashmir poses a direct threat to India's territorial integrity."
Besides, jihadi and Islamist groups are "well funded and far better armed than
the Maoists", he said, adding that Pakistan's backing of these groups makes
them a bigger threat to India.
Outside Jammu and Kashmir, attacks by Pakistan-backed jihadi groups such as the
Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Jaish-e-Mohammed and others, while increasing, are not as
numerous as those by Maoists. Yet the concern that a single jihadi attack
generates is far deeper. This is because of the far more deadly immediate and
medium-term impact that a jihadi attack can have.
A terrorist attack, especially in public places such as markets or on targets
such as temples, has the potential of triggering Hindu-Muslim riots. There is
always a danger that Hindu right-wing extremists will fish in troubled waters,
stoke communal passions and unleash the kind of violence that Gujarat suffered
in 2002. The impact that such communal violence has on India's social fabric is
far more deadly and costly than the terrorist attack itself. The number killed
in communal violence is far greater. Besides the human toll, there are the
immense social costs. Communal violence shatters the fragile peace that exists
between Hindus and Muslims in India. It deepens Muslim alienation and anger
with the Indian state, providing a flood of recruits to the militant outfits.
Attacks by outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba in India in recent years
indicate that their strategy is aimed at triggering a communal backlash. It is
with this in mind that attacks on the Akshardham Temple in Gujarat, on the
makeshift temple at the disputed site in Ayodhya, the series of explosions in a
busy marketplace in Delhi on the eve of the Hindu festival Diwali, and the
recent bomb blasts at Varanasi were carried out. Not only is Varanasi regarded
by Hindus as the holiest of cities, but one of the bombs was placed in the
Sankatmochan Temple, one of its most famous shrines. The aim of the terrorists
is not so much the destruction of the target as it is to strike at Hindu
sentiments, stir communal passions and trigger riots.
Communal violence is believed to be the single largest reason that Muslim youth
have joined terror outfits in India. The call for global jihad has not struck a
chord with Indian Muslim youth. But while calls for global jihad have not
provided the Lashkar and other jihadi outfits with the Indian recruits they so
deeply desire, communal riots have done so. The desire for revenge prompted
scores of Muslim youth to join militant outfits after riots in 1993 and 2002.
It is this impact of jihadi attacks - the effect on Hindu-Muslim relations and
the flow of recruits to the militant ranks - that lies at the root of India's
"excessive preoccupation with jihadi outfits", say government officials. And
Pakistan's role in this makes the threat of jihadi violence all the more
menacing.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in
Bangalore.
