India held back by wall of
instability By Chietigj Bajpaee
While much of the world's attention is on
the "rise" of China in the political, economic and
military spheres, there remains a relative lack of
attention on Asia's other rising power - India, as
highlighted by the fact that India has attracted a
tenth of the foreign direct investment of China.
Corruption, India's infrastructure
bottlenecks, bureaucracy referred to as the
infamous "License Raj" and India's unpredictable
democracy, which creates precarious coalition
governments and changes in policy every time there
is a change of administration has led India to
becoming subordinate to China among the emerging
economies.
However, another factor that
has the potential to deter India's rise is the
plethora of conflicts and instabilities on its
periphery. While
China has resolved or shelved
most such conflicts, India has active disputes
along most of its borders. This "wall of
instability" has prevented India from gaining
access to vital resources and markets, deterred
regional economic integration and security
cooperation, and may even undermine investor
confidence.
Limits to India's 'Look
East' policy India's poor relations with
Bangladesh and instabilities in Bangladesh,
Myanmar, Nepal and in India's northeast have
limited direct land access to the markets of China
and Southeast Asia. Progress on plans for Myanmar
to supply India with natural gas from its Shwe
field off the coast of Arakan state has been held
up by tensions between India and Bangladesh and
Myanmar's close relationship with China.
While a gas pipeline transiting Bangladesh
would be the shortest route for an overland
pipeline between India and Myanmar, frictions
between Delhi and Dhaka have forced India to look
into more expensive options such as constructing a
deep-sea pipeline, transporting gas by tanker or
through India's northeastern states.
Relations between India and Bangladesh
have deteriorated in recent years as the goodwill
generated from India's support for Bangladesh in
its war of independence in 1971 has given way to
Bangladesh's emergence as a potential new source
of Islamic extremism in South Asia.
Internally, confrontations between Sheikh
Hasina's Awami League and Begum Khaleda Zia's
Bangladesh National Party and its ally, the
Jamaat-e-Islami, are turning increasingly violent.
Meanwhile, groups such as the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen
Bangladesh (JMB), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami,
Bangladesh (HuJI-B) and Jagrata Muslim Janata
Bangladesh continue to call for the implementation
of sharia law in Bangladesh and have been held
responsible for a series of bomb attacks in
Bangladesh over the past few months.
Externally, Bangladesh has been accused of
fueling the insurgencies in northeast India with
arms, aid and training, providing a haven for
al-Qaeda terrorists and emerging as a hub for arms
trafficking. Bangladesh has emerged as a sanctuary
for Islamic extremist groups in the region,
including the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba and
Myanmar-based insurgent groups such as the Arakan
Rohingya Organization (ARNO) and the Rohingya
Solidarity Organization (RSO).
India's
concern over the deteriorating security situation
in Bangladesh was demonstrated in 2005 when the
13th summit of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was postponed after
the Indian delegation led by Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh refused to attend following a
series of bomb blasts in Bangladesh.
Tensions between India and Bangladesh have
been further fueled by a series of disputes over
illegal Bangladeshi immigration into India's
northeast, disagreement over water-sharing across
the 54 rivers that traverse the two states and
India's decision to fence its 4,000 kilometer
border with Bangladesh.
The plans for a
Myanmar-Bangladesh-India gas pipeline have been
further soured by Myanmar's signing of a
memorandum with the Chinese energy company,
PetroChina, in December for the sale of 6.5
trillion cubic feet of gas to China over the next
30 years from the Shwe field.
India has
been playing catch-up with China in cultivating
relations with Myanmar. In the past, relations
between the two countries were marred as a result
of India voicing its opposition to the military
junta's crackdown on pro-democracy activists and
the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader
of the National League for Democracy.
India's more pragmatic,
non-interventionist policy with regard to Myanmar
has been prompted by numerous factors, including
its need to gain access to energy resources in the
region; garner the support of Myanmar's
government, the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC), in tackling Indian insurgent
groups that have claimed sanctuary in Myanmar;
Delhi's desire to access the vast markets of
Southeast Asia under its "Look East" policy; and
balance the growing influence of China in the
region.
Finally, India's own insurgencies
in the seven states of the northeast commonly
referred to as the "seven sisters" (Assam,
Arunachel Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya,
Mizoram, Tripura) where over 100 militant groups
operate, have delayed plans for direct energy,
trade and transport links between India and
Southeast Asia.
The geographic separation
of the northeast states from the rest of India,
with only a 20 kilometer pass known as the
Siliguri corridor linking the states to the rest
of the country has often led to fears that outside
powers could fuel the northeast insurgencies in
order to "cut the chicken's neck". The fact that
China claims 90,000 square kilometers of India's
northeastern state of Arunuchel Pradesh has also
been a cause of concern in the region.
The
Indian government itself has been preoccupied by
its northern insurgency in Kashmir, even though
the economic gains from resolving the northeast
insurgencies are greater given the importance of
the region as a potential trade route between
South and Southeast Asia as well as plans for a
pipeline transporting natural gas from Myanmar and
Bangladesh to India.
The region's
proximity to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal,
increasingly Islamic extremist Bangladesh and
separatist movements and authoritarian rule in
Myanmar have made the northeast insurgencies the
final piece in an "arc" of instability stretching
from Myanmar to Nepal.
Nepal and the
Naxalites While Nepal's King Gyanendra
ended his 14 months of direct rule in April, the
security situation in Nepal remains precarious as
almost half the country remains under the rule of
the Maoist militants (Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist) ( CPN-M). Although the Maoists have
entered into a 12-point agreement with the
Seven-Party Alliance (SPA), the Maoists and the
SPA do not see eye-to-eye on Nepal's future. The
SPA does not appear ready to give up on the
monarchy altogether while the Maoists want to turn
Nepal into a republic as well as calling for
one-partyl authoritarian communist rule.
The Maoists are also unwilling to disarm
as sporadic violence and abductions continue. This
conflict has spilled over into India as the
Maoists have often sought sanctuary in India and
maintain links with India's militant Maoists,
known as Naxalites. More than 13 states in India
have experienced Naxalite attacks, which have
grown increasingly bold in recent months.
The Indian Naxalites and Nepalese Maoists
continue to grant each other moral and material
support and sanctuary and have even espoused
creating a "compact revolutionary zone" from Nepal
to Andhra Pradesh. Any strengthening of the Maoist
position in Nepal is likely to invigorate the
Naxalites in India.
The prospect of Nepal
emerging as a failed state would have negative
repercussions for India in the form of refugees
and Nepal's emergence as a hub for terrorism and
illicit activities.
Sri Lanka - a
'ceasefire' only in name The
Norwegian-brokered ceasefire, which was
implemented in 2002 between the Sri Lankan
government and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil
Ealem (LTTE), appears to be a ceasefire only in
name. The suicide attack on the army headquarters
in Colombo at the end of April and a naval clash
in May add to a long list of violations of the
ceasefire, including the assassination of foreign
minister Lakshman Kardigamar in 2005 and
hostilities between the Northern Prabakaran
faction of the Tamil Tigers and the eastern Karuna
faction in 2004.
While India doesn't crave
the prospect of involvement in Sri Lanka, given
its bitter experience from deploying peacekeepers
to the country in 1987-90, which left it with a
bloody nose, Delhi is also unlikely to sit on the
sidelines as the Tigers and government become
increasingly trigger-happy.
The resurgent
violence is already increasing refugee flows into
India and has the potential to enflame emotions
among India's Tamil populous in the south. The
LTTE has also been a catalyst for arms trafficking
in the region, which has fueled conflicts in
India's northeast and in Southeast Asia.
Pakistan: Denying India in the 'New
Great Game' Tensions have declined between
India and Pakistan in recent years as a result of
increasing people-to-people contacts brought on by
direct road and rail links, military
confidence-building measures, sport and growing
trade.
Nevertheless, attacks by
Pakistan-based terrorist groups, which have
traditionally focused on Kashmir, have spilled
over into the rest of India, as illustrated by
bomb attacks this year in Varanasi and Jama Masjid
in New Delhi, attacks in Ayodhya and the Indian
Institute of Science in Bangalore in 2005, and an
attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001,
which came close to sparking another war between
India and Pakistan. These attacks have been aimed
at igniting communal violence and undermining
confidence in India's economy.
Furthermore, India's fluctuating relations
with Pakistan have prevented access to energy
resources and markets in Iran and the Central
Asian republics. India has expressed interest in
both the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) natural gas
pipeline and the US-backed
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan or Trans-Afghan
gas pipeline.
India's plans to import
Iranian gas, which have been in the works since
1993, have been delayed by tensions between India
and Pakistan. This has led India to look to the
option of transporting gas by LNG (liquefied
natural gas) carriers and building a deep-sea
pipeline that bypasses Pakistan.
In recent
years, as India-Pakistan relations have thawed,
other security considerations have delayed the
project, such as the insurgency in Pakistan's
Balochistan province through which the IPI
pipeline would have to transit and ongoing
frictions between Iran and the international
community over Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
Meanwhile, the Trans-Afghan pipeline has
been held hostage to instabilities in Afghanistan,
from the Afghan civil war to Taliban rule and most
recently the spring offensive by the Taliban and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami.
Questions over whether Turkmenistan has
enough gas to meet India's appetite, given its
commitments to Russia and China, have also
dampened the Trans-Afghan pipeline project. While
these deals continue to be discussed, on May 25
crude oil began flowing through the
Kazakhstan-China pipeline from Atasu to Alataw
Pass in Xinjiang province, with the potential of
the pipeline being extended to the Caspian Sea.
The US-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline is up and running with discussions on
extending it to Kazakhstan, and Russia retains its
pipeline network with the Central Asian republics
from the Cold War. While India discusses its
options in the "New Great Game" for energy
resources, other states such as China, Russia and
the United States are already full-fledged
players.
China: Filling the
void While India continues to tackle
insurgencies and active conflicts within its
borders and on its periphery, China has either
resolved or "shelved" all conflicts internally,
with all 14 states along its border and with
states in the region, with the possible exception
of Japan.
Security and energy cooperation
between China and Russia continues to deepen,
while China engages in joint oil and gas
exploration of disputed territory in the South
China Sea with Vietnam and the Philippines.
China's improving relationship with South Korea
has even called into question Seoul's alliance
with the United States.
Even on the Taiwan
issue, which is the most likely source of conflict
for China, Beijing has developed a more nuanced
policy with its rapprochement with opposition
"pan-Blue" parties in the face of separatist
tendencies by the ruling "pan-Green" coalition led
by President Chen Shui-bian.
China is also
major player in numerous regional economic and
security forums, including the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) +3, ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) and the recently inaugurated East Asia
Summit, as well as being a leader in numerous
forums such as the Boao Forum, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization and the six-party talks
to bring about a nuclear weapons-free Korean
peninsula.
Finally, Beijing has
successfully projected its principle of "peaceful
rise" or "peaceful development" to reassure the
international community of China's non-threatening
intentions.
While numerous states on
China's periphery remain suspicious of China and
regard its "peaceful development" slogan as more
rhetoric than reality, Beijing's achievements far
outweigh those of India. While India's relations
with Pakistan have gone from open hostility to
limited cooperation and mutual suspicion, India's
relations with its other neighbors have continued
to deteriorate.
This has limited progress
by regional bodies such as the SAARC and BIMSTEC
(Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand
Economic Cooperation) in forging a regional
identity, creating a regional security structure
and developing intra-regional trade and economic
integration.
Intra-regional trade in South
Asia accounts for a mere 4% of the region's total
trade, even though the South Asia Preferential
Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) has been in place
since 1995. In contrast, in 2004, intra-regional
trade in ASEAN amounted to 49%; in NAFTA this
figure was 44% and in the European Union this was
67%. Progress on the South Asia Free Trade Area
(SAFTA) has been slow, which has been fueled in
part by political frictions between states in the
region.
Furthermore, India's poor
relations with its periphery have created a vacuum
in power and influence, which has been filled by
extra-regional powers, such as China. China has
taken advantage of India's poor relations with its
neighbors to expand its naval presence in the
Indian ocean, as seen by the development of port
facilities in Gwader in Pakistan and on the Coco
islands in Myanmar and in Chittagong in
Bangladesh.
These initiatives have been
driven by China's desire to secure the Malacca
Strait and the Strait of Hormuz through which as
much as 80% of China's oil imports flow, as well
as bypassing these chokepoints with overland
"energy corridors" from Pakistan, Myanmar,
Bangladesh or Thailand.
Beijing's presence
on the Coco islands has also allowed it to monitor
India's naval presence in the Andaman and Nicobar
islands. In 2005, China also conducted its first
joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean with
Pakistan, the first outside its territorial
waters. India's transfer of the INS Tilanchang to
the Maldives in April and desire to gain exclusive
access to the naval base in the eastern town of
Trincomalee in Sri Lanka has been regarded by some
as a response to Beijing's increasing interests in
the Indian Ocean.
China's observer status
at the SAARC, much to the consternation of India,
is also a sign of China's encroachment into its
backyard. China continues to assist Pakistan in
augmenting its military with the joint development
of the F-22P frigate and JF-17 Thunder fighter.
China is also assisting Pakistan with strategic
infrastructure projects, such as widening the
Karakorum Highway linking both countries and
increasing cooperation in the energy sphere,
including developing Pakistan's oil refining,
storage and exploration capabilities.
China has also agreed to increase
nuclear-power cooperation with Pakistan, which
some regard as a reaction to the US-India nuclear
deal that was reached during President George W
Bush's visit to India in March. China has also
made inroads in improving relations with other
South Asian states, including Bangladesh, Nepal
and Sri Lanka, as seen by the number of high-level
visits between China and these states in recent
years.
China's strengthening of direct
road links with Nepal and support for King
Gyanendra during his suspension of democracy,
regarding it as an "internal matter", while India,
Britain and the US criticized his actions and
suspended military aid, led some to believe that
China may attempt to fill the void left by India.
China has also emerged as Bangladesh's
leading trade partner and arms supplier and agreed
to assist Bangladesh with its civilian nuclear
program as well as expressing interest in the
country's natural gas reserves.
Troublesome neighbors India possesses numerous advantages over
China, such as a strong bottom-up entrepreneurial
spirit and English-language skills, and strong
managerial and information technology skills.
India has also raised its profile on the world
stage in recent months, as illustrated by its
prominent role at the Davos World Economic Forum
in January and the US-India nuclear deal.
Furthermore, much of the limelight on
China is negative, such as China's violation of
intellectual property rights, undervalued exchange
rate, growing trade surplus with the US, poor
human-rights record, perceived aggressive policy
toward Taiwan and Tibet, support for pariah
regimes, growing oil imports, and potential to
challenge US global predominance.
Over the
long run, China's authoritarian system has the
potential to create more instability than India's
democratic government. The record number of
protests across China in 2005 demonstrated that in
the absence of a safety value offered by a
democratic system, frustrations can only be vented
through increasingly violent clashes with the
authorities.
Nonetheless, India continues
to be held back by instabilities on its periphery,
which are preventing its access to markets and raw
materials, deterring the emergence of regional
economic and security structures and may even
deter investors to the region.
Chietigj Bajpaee is a research
associate at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington DC. He has
been a researcher for the London-based
International Institute for Strategic Studies and
a risk analyst for a New York-based risk
management company. His areas of interest are
energy security and macroeconomic, geopolitical
and security developments in the Asia-Pacific
region. The views expressed here are his own. He
can be reached at c.bajpaee-alumni@lse.ac.uk
(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd.
All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing
.)
