India, US: The natural partnership By IPS correspondents
WASHINGTON - One of the enduring mysteries in international relations has been
the hitherto cool relations between the United States and India. Both are proud
democracies, suspicious of Islamic fundamentalism and deeply concerned about
the rise of China. And yet the two nations were in opposite camps during much
of the Cold War.
Even today, more than 15 years after the end of the Cold War, fundamental
differences remain, particularly on how to deal with Iran and how best to
secure future energy supplies. But these differences have deliberately been put
on the back burner as the
two giants embark on a path of partnership.
The clearest sign that relations have changed came in March, when US President
George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed a far-reaching
nuclear agreement in New Delhi. In exchange for allowing international
inspection of most of its nuclear reactors, India was assured of a steady
supply of enriched uranium and technology for its civilian nuclear program.
Predictably, the deal has caused a furor around the world and, more important,
within the US and India themselves. Critics charge that the agreement strikes a
fatal blow to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has been a
cornerstone of international nuclear equilibrium since 1968. India did not sign
the NPT, having always claimed it was a mechanism of control by the nuclear
haves over the have-nots. But the US treaty's supporters argue that the deal
brings India, a rising power with demonstrated nuclear capabilities, into the
institutional controls of the international nuclear regime.
"It is better to manage India's rise peacefully and integrate it into the
international order than keep it an outsider. Making India a stakeholder in the
[NPT] regime and supporter for its enforcement for regional states may have
value for global peace and order," T V Paul, professor of international
relations at McGill University, said at a recent conference hosted by the
Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Washington, DC.
Both these arguments have some truth. But the nuclear deal, and the ensuing
debate, is really about three things: the crumbling status of the NPT, the rise
of India, and US concerns over China. The Indo-US treaty links all these
together in a way that no other document could.
The NPT, long criticized by India, is on its deathbed because of what are often
called the "rogue" actions of Iran and North Korea. Now that the Bush
administration has pledged assistance to a country that has refused to sign the
NPT, the deal only tempts other powers to pursue their own nuclear ambitions,
critics argue.
This concern is even more acute because, by providing India with enriched
uranium, so the argument goes, the US is helping India use its own uranium
stocks to increase its nuclear-weapons stockpile - one aimed solely against
China, as then Indian defense minister George Fernandes famously remarked in
1998.
Paul, however, discounted that possibility summarily during the Washington
seminar, noting that the German and Japanese governments dropped their nuclear
ambitions after being provided a nuclear security umbrella by the United States
during the Cold War. A similar path could be forged in Asia for other smaller
states, he argued.
That contention, however, cannot hide the delicate balancing act under way in
Asia - one where the US is trying to save the NPT by reining in the nuclear
ambitions of North Korea and Iran, while at the same time offering nuclear
assistance to India. For this reason, many critics have called the US policy
hypocritical and one that could provide more incentives, not fewer, for others
to pursue nuclear weapons - thus further destabilizing Asia.
The second point contained in the Indo-US treaty is that Washington, at long
last, is recognizing the growing potential of India in security affairs in
Asia. Despite America's long-standing alliance with Pakistan, India's
subcontinental rival, Washington and New Delhi think alike in security terms in
the post-September 11, 2001, world. Both are concerned about Pakistan's
nuclear-proliferation activities. South Asian Islamic fundamentalism - Taliban,
al-Qaeda - is another common concern. There is a school of thought within the
US foreign-policy establishment that sees India as a bulwark against these
dangers.
India is happy to play the role, though not at the cost of its own security
interests, especially when it comes to China. Economic ties and regional
stability are too important to both India and China to get caught up in someone
else's strategic games.
This was a point hammered home forcefully by Martin Walker, an editor with
United Press International, who spoke at the Sasakawa seminar. "Anybody who has
been to India recently will agree that the Indians do not want to become the
kind of guaranteed American ally that Britain has been in Europe. They do not
want to become America's client state, to help encircle or restrain China,"
Walker said.
But this does not mean that India is not totally concerned about Chinese
intentions, despite their growing rapprochement since the late 1980s. Paul
pointed out: "What has been characterized by the past [Sino-Indian]
relationship is China's engagement and containment of India at the same time.
China was engaging India but at the same time building Pakistan as a way to
contain India to some extent."
This last point underscores the third important aspect of the Indo-US deal,
which surrounds the two countries' joint concerns over China. But just as
surely, the Indo-US deal also raises concerns in China, which knows only too
well that it has emerged as the latest bogeyman in the peculiar US game of
finding an "enemy".
Walker again illustrated this point. "If you're sitting in Beijing at the
moment, you see American troops in Japan, South Korea, you see Americans
building up a base in Guam, you see the Americans becoming very friendly with
the Vietnamese, having almost base facilities in Singapore and building
military bases in Central Asia - and now you see the Americans wooing India, it
must look from Beijing's point of view as though you are being encircled," he
said.
These developments may not be new and may only have been thrust out into the
open by the Indo-US nuclear deal. Experts note that the three important aspects
of the treaty have always been India's long-standing policy goals.
"If you looked at a wish list of what India wanted from the US in 1965, it
would look remarkably similar to the deal," pointed out Kurt Campbell of the
Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Basically the
US had a choice. It could either negotiate on these issues, which have been
firm and clear on India's agenda for decades, and then move on to other issues,
or it could have no agreement whatsoever."
While that may be true, the difficult tasks all lie ahead. The most pressing,
however, remains the ratification of the treaty by the both countries'
legislatures.
Though not a certainty, it is more likely that the Indian parliament will
ratify the treaty in its present form, since it is seen as more beneficial to
India. The US Congress, however, could be an entirely different matter because
there are numerous critics of the treaty in that legislature.
