US a winner over India's UN bid
By M K Bhadrakumar
The Indian announcement last Thursday of the candidature of Shashi Tharoor for
the position of United Nations secretary general has raised more questions than
answers, especially related to a possible US hand in the surprise move.
The formal announcement in New Delhi curiously began with an acknowledgement
that the support of the "rotational principle" under which the next secretary
general should come from an Asian country is itself yet to gain traction in the
international community.
It is highly uncharacteristic of the Indian establishment, which is habitually
prone to erring on the side of caution in such matters,
to have put forward Tharoor's candidacy so audaciously. It caught many
observers off-guard.
The Indian statement listed what in New Delhi's perception ought to be the
"eligibility bar" for a UN secretary general. It mentioned four criteria.
First, the candidate must be of "impeccable credentials"; second, the candidacy
should have the "broadest possible" acceptability among UN member countries;
third, the candidate should be strongly "committed" to UN reforms; and fourth,
he should be committed to the "interests of developing countries".
From this principled position, Delhi has argued that its decision to put forth
Tharoor's candidacy rested on two factors: (1) India's commitment to the
"rotational principle" and (2) Tharoor's "internationally acclaimed stature and
experience", which makes him "eminently suitable".
Shashi Tharoor served as a bureaucrat in the UN for the past 28 years and now
holds the position of undersecretary general for communications and public
information.
The Indian spokesman underlined that Delhi indeed took into consideration the
"pros and cons" of the fact that there are other candidates from the Asian
region already in the fray, including a candidate of the member countries of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (Three "Asian candidates" are
already on the scene - Thai Deputy Prime Minister Surakiart Sathirathai, South
Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, and a former UN undersecretary general
from Sri Lanka, Jayantha Dhanapala.)
Furthermore, the Indian spokesman insisted that Tharoor's candidacy did not
"dilute" India's continuing search of permanent membership in the UN Security
Council, as the two were "separate issues". In his words, there has been a
"steady accretion" of support during the past 12-year period for India's
"impeccable credentials" to become a member of the Security Council.
The overall lack of coherence in the Indian statement raised eyebrows among
foreign-policy observers in New Delhi. Many draw parallels with the touch of
unreality bordering on a sleepwalker's fantasy that similarly surrounded the
Indian decision to vote against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency.
There is rising criticism already about the incumbent United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) government's track record in foreign policy. Satish Chandra, a
distinguished Indian diplomat and a highly respected figure in the Indian
strategic community, who was a former head of the National Security Council,
wrote this week, "Indian foreign policy has traditionally, with few
aberrations, been uncompromising in ensuring the country's independence of
action. This time-tested approach has been jettisoned by the UPA government.
India has been reduced to a client state of the US ... This turnabout has
already cost us dear. It has severely damaged our ties with Iran, aroused
China's suspicions, adversely affected our standing in the international
community, hurt sentiment in the Islamic world, undermined our strategic
deterrent and, above all, divided the country."
Actually, the Indian media reported that prior to the official announcement in
New Delhi on Thursday, the Indian government had consulted the United States.
This should not come as a surprise, though. Conceivably, the UPA government
cannot be expected to make a major decision on a foreign-policy issue without
first ascertaining the thinking in Washington, informally at least, and
ensuring that the administration of President George W Bush is on board.
Delhi would have estimated that in today's unipolar world, without US support,
it is unrealistic and pointless to project Tharoor's candidature. There is a
paradox here. In one way, within the UN regime, there is no "power center" that
can rival the authority vested in the Security Council. The secretary general
largely carries out the mandate given to him by the Security Council. The
secretary general is accountable to the Security Council.
Within the 15-member Security Council itself, the five permanent members
holding veto power (the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and
China) become an even more exclusive entity. Yet the secretary general carries
tremendous influence in numerous ways in influencing the world body and
international opinion. The paradox is that while an effective secretary general
with leadership qualities could make the world body purposeful and credible, at
the same time, an assertive secretary general prone to independent thinking on
"hot issues" might become an embarrassment.
This is why Washington has always taken keen interest in the personality of the
UN chief. Ideally, he should be pro-American and willing to play a subservient
role to US global policies. Or, at a minimum, he should be a faceless
personality who will keep his views to himself. Even then, at least two
secretaries general in the past - Dag Hammarskjold from Sweden and Egypt's
Boutros Boutros-Ghali - posed serious problems for the Americans.
At the present juncture, the US is determined to ensure that a person of its
choice succeeds Kofi Annan when his term ends in December. The UN is entering a
period of reform. It stands to reason that the secretary general would have a
role in fine-tuning these reforms.
On the whole, the reforms are expected to lead to a "democratization" of the
UN's functioning. The US, on the other hand, disfavors any transformation that
might result in a dilution of its pre-eminent role in the UN.
Second, the US is beginning to realize after the imbroglio in Iraq that it is
useful to carry the imprimatur of the UN when it embarks on the pursuit of its
geostrategies in various parts of the world. Therefore, the recent signs are
that the UN may find itself in the coming period once again in the first circle
of participants in tackling regional and global issues.
This brings us to an interesting point. Could Washington have been unaware of
Tharoor's candidature until the UPA government approached it? Or is the
candidacy in actuality a US initiative in the nature of an Indo-US joint
venture? We cannot tell at this stage. Given the high stakes in the forthcoming
election to the UN post, it is unthinkable that Washington hadn't begun giving
thought to the matter.
Tharoor had been paying "high-profile" visits to New Delhi in the recent
months. He has networked with Delhi's power brokers and opinion makers. An
attempt has been under way for months building up domestic opinion in favor of
Tharoor's candidature. It will be naive to imagine that all this traffic
between Tharoor, who lives and works in New York, and the UPA government, which
is based in New Delhi, had gone unnoticed in Washington.
For India, the considerations in backing Tharoor seem to be straightforward -
national pride, as the Indian spokesman candidly admitted. Evidently, it is not
at all a Kennedyesque proposition of what Tharoor can do for India but what
India could do for Tharoor. Delhi should know that Annan could do hardly
anything worthwhile for Ghana. But it was probably a matter of pride for all
Ghanaians that Annan was one of them.
By getting Tharoor elected, UPA government can hope to claim credit that though
it could not fulfill its promise when it came to power two years ago to secure
India's membership of the UN Security Council, it could at least get an Indian
national rise to the post of the UN secretary general.
And, in the process, domestic opinion in India might look away from the harsh
truth that at least for the next 10 years, there isn't an outside chance for
India to become a permanent member of the Security Council. Sadly, there are
two Indias - a metropolitan India that lives by its dreams and images, and the
bulk of India, the "real" India, for which Tharoor and all these issues of
pride and prejudice will ever remain irrelevant.
Tharoor's candidature is a smart US move. Many countries are bound to voice
reservations about the break from the tradition that a secretary general should
not belong to a major power. India is without doubt a major power politically
and economically. But if Tharoor's candidature fails to gather momentum, it
will not hurt Washington's interests.
In such situations, there will always be a Plan B and Washington will not have
lost anything. It showed goodwill for India's candidature in the first instance
- making up for the lukewarm attitude toward India's claim to become a
permanent member of the Security Council.
And if Tharoor indeed gets the top job, well, Delhi ought to be grateful to
Washington for salvaging the pride of a nation as well. This is what diplomats
call a "win-win" situation.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service
for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
