SPEAKING
FREELY Afghanistan's stability lies with
Pakistan By Haroun Mir
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
KABUL - In 1989, the
Soviet Army withdrew from Afghanistan.
Simultaneously, the West disengaged from the
Afghan conflict, which left the Afghans at the
mercy of regional powers. The collapse of the
communist bloc provoked a shift in US policy in
the region. Because the
US lacked a strategic interest in Afghanistan,
Washington [delegated the formulation] of
Afghan
policy to both
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which are two close
allies of the US. The Saudis had no other interest
in Afghanistan than the desire to create a
government in Kabul that was hostile to Iran.
Although Iran shares a common language and
culture with Afghanistan, it has historically had
a limited influence on the country. This limited
influence resulted from the religious differences
between the Sunni-majority Afghanistan and the
Shi'ite-majority Iran. With the blessing of the
both the US and Saudi governments, Pakistan
remained the major player in Afghanistan.
In 1992, the communist regime fell in
Afghanistan; mujahideen groups entered Kabul,
where two alternative options were presented to
Pakistan. One option was to stabilize Afghanistan
through mediation among major mujahideen leaders
who lived in Pakistan. This option would have
economically benefited Pakistan with open trade
roads to Central Asian countries. The second
option was to pursue the strategic goal of
Pakistan, which consisted of having a puppet
government in place and a fragile economy.
This option would have kept Afghanistan
dependent on Pakistan both economically and
politically. Ultimately, Pakistan's military
elites opted for the second option, even though it
went against the conventional wisdom of their own
people. The military chose this option because it
had always feared that a strong Afghanistan would
pose a serious threat to Pakistan.
In
fact, the creation of Pakistan is rooted in
controversy. In 1947, Britain chose to partition
India to create a new country for British India's
Muslim minority. The creation of Pakistan was
based on the assumption that the Muslim minority
could not coexist with the majority Hindus.
Currently, minority Muslims living in India appear
satisfied with being engaged in the political
process through a democratic mechanism.
Muslims who live in Pakistan, however, are
denied basic rights by a military dictatorship. It
is not surprising that Indian Muslims do not want
to emigrate to Pakistan. It is evident that an
individual's political and economic inspirations
bypass his or her religious affinity; this notion
was confirmed with the partition of Pakistan
between East and West, when in 1971, the people of
West Pakistan chose to become the sovereign state
of Bangladesh.
The ethnic issue has indeed
shattered the dreams of the founding father of
Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who envisioned
Pakistan as a modern, democratic and pluralistic
state. After his death, the domination of
political and military power by Punjabis caused a
growing resentment among other ethnic groups such
as Bengalis, Sindhi, Balochis and Pashtuns.
Very much like Bengalis, who opted for
partition from Pakistan, Balochis have also
struggled for independence since the creation of
Pakistan. They refused to become part of Pakistan
until 1948; in that year, the military forced
Balochi leaders to adhere to Pakistan. For
instance, the current military conflict in
Balochistan is the continuation of the Balochis'
struggle for independence (like those of Kurds in
Iraq).
Similarly, Pashtuns who live in the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) will remain
with Pakistan until they receive large enough
monetary subventions from Pakistan's federal
government. Pahstuns and Balochis live across the
border in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Pakistan's military leaders fear Afghanistan's
potential influence over Pashtuns and Balochis who
live in Pakistan; this is because Pakistan lost
its western territories due to the similar
influence of India over Bengalis.
After
losing the largest chunk of the territory to
Bengalis, Pakistani leaders feared that similar
dismembering could happen with the Balochi people
in the east, and with Pashtuns in the NWFP.
Pakistan is squeezed between two hostile countries
- India and Afghanistan.
In addition,
Pakistan has always viewed an economically
prosperous and militarily strong Afghanistan as a
threat to its existence; this is because a
contentious borderline between the two countries
exists. Upon the inception of Pakistan, the Afghan
government resisted the membership of this new
country in the UN because the question of the
border between Afghanistan and Pakistan remained
unresolved.
The long border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan has never been officially
ratified by the two countries. The existing
borderline issue dates back to an old agreement -
known as "The Durand Line" - between Afghanistan
and British India. On November 12, 1898, the
Afghan ruler, Emir Abdul Rahman Khan, and the
foreign secretary of British India, Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand, signed the demarcation line
between British India and Afghanistan. Indeed,
this border question has remained at the core of
Pakistan’s negative policy on Afghanistan.
Pakistan's military has always feared that
a strong Afghanistan would dispute the current
border between the two countries. In addition, an
economically prosperous Afghanistan would become
more attractive to Pashtuns and Balochis who live
in Pakistan, which is the result of their cultural
affinity with the Afghans. Therefore, according to
Pakistan's military leaders, a powerful government
in Afghanistan would pose an existential threat to
Pakistan.
In 1989, the US left Afghanistan
at the mercy of regional powers, giving Pakistan
an opportunity to accomplish its long-term
strategic goal to make Afghanistan dependent on
it. In fact, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 helped Pakistan achieve its strategic goals.
The Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) had
specific plans to destroy Afghanistan's military,
economic and social infrastructures.
There
are obvious examples of the ISI's clandestine
involvement in Afghanistan. For instance, in 1992,
mujahideen groups took over Afghanistan and agreed
to share power by creating a coalition government
in Kabul. As a result, Pakistan immediately
ordered its best Afghan puppet, the militant
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, to disrupt normal life in
Kabul with deadly rocket attacks.
As a
result of the destruction, foreign embassies
closed; the educated, prosperous people left the
country. Similarly, the ISI instructed its agents
across Afghanistan to destroy Afghanistan's
military hardware, industrial machinery and all
other equipment, which had been left by the
Soviets.
Numerous poor and ignorant
Afghans have collaborated with Pakistani agents to
destroy factories military assets such as tanks
and airplanes, and other sophisticated equipment.
These were then sold in Pakistan for scrap.
Eventually, Pakistan's puppet Taliban regime
closed schools, universities and public offices in
Afghanistan, in an effort to keep future
generations in total ignorance and darkness.
Despite the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, which led to the liberation of
Afghanistan from the ruthless Taliban and al-Qaeda
terrorist network, Pakistan's policy has not
changed in respect to its strategic goal in the
country.
Since the arrival of coalition
forces in Afghanistan, schools have been torched,
economic development has been stalled, foreign
experts have been beheaded, suicide bombers have
flooded in from Pakistani madrassas, and Taliban
and al-Qaeda allies have found a safe haven inside
Pakistan.
In recent times, a consensus
among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
military and intelligence officers has indicated
that some in Pakistan's military turn a blind eye
to the activities of the Taliban in Pakistan;
further, this consensus has suggested that they
collaborate with al-Qaeda.
The path to
Afghanistan's stability is through Pakistan; it is
the responsibility of the Afghan government and
the coalition countries in Afghanistan to respond
to the strategic concerns of Pakistan. Afghanistan
is not in a position to get involved in the ethnic
rift inside Pakistan. Also, the issue of the
Durand Line between the two countries should be
debated and settled with a plebiscite on both
sides of the border.
Pakistan's military
leaders should recognize that their fear of a
democratic and economically prosperous Afghanistan
is irrational. Pakistan's civilian leaders
understand that they would benefit economically
from a stable, democratic and friendly
Afghanistan, as opposed to a Taliban-type regime
that could be detrimental to Pakistan's long-term
interests in Afghanistan.
Haroun
Mir served for over five years as an aide to
the late Ahmad Shah Masoud, Afghanistan's former
defense minister and leader of the Northern
Alliance. Haroun Mir is currently president of SIG
& Partners Afghanistan in Kabul.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
